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Abstract 
In this thesis I investigate the notion of experience in German Idealist Philosophy. I focus on 
the exploration of an alternative to the transcendental model notion of experience through 
Schelling's insight into the notion of logogrif. 
The structural division of this project into two sections reflects the two theoretical 
standpoints of this project, namely the logic and the logogrif of experience. 
The first section - the logic of experience - explores the notion of experience provided in 
Kant's Critique of Rure Reason, Critique of Judgement and Fichte's Science of Knowledge. I 
argue that Kant's fundamental question about the possibility of synthetic a priori judgements 
succeeds in thernatising the aporia of cognitive experience but results in a subject-oriented, 
representational model which radically confines the notion of experience to the constitutive 
laws of the understanding or to the normative precepts of Reason. Experience is founded 
upon a sharp division between faith and knowledge, will and logic, desire and reflection, 
absolute and finitude. Fichte's endeavour to articulate a non-representational account of 
experience, does not succeed in extricating itself from the representational model, so long as 
experience is reduced to the ever-producing deeds of the self-positing ego. 
Despite the serious differences between Kant's and Fichte's notions of experience, both 
accounts, so long as they unfold from a transcendental standpoint, attempt to resolve 
experience into conceptual laws or determinations of the ego's absolute will. Experience is 
transformed into an object of the subject's cognitive or volitional faculties. The paradoxes of 
man's interaction with the world are intended to be accommodated either by the law-giving 
spontaneity of the understanding and the Architectonic of Pure Reason or by the over- 
powerful primordial act of the self-positing ego. This implies the conceptualisation of the self 
in terms of constant identity-through-time, or sheer self-determination. However, this 
conceptualisation remains at the normative or prescriptive level, which in turn is projected 
upon the world. The latter, though appears as the subject's property, essentially remains alien 
and opaque, confirming the radical limitations of the ego rather than its order-giving 
authority. Moreover, this notion of experience is ultimately founded upon a radical expulsion 
of the divine from the world, the de-spiritualisation of the sensual and the de-sensualisation 
of the spiritual, the sharp juxtaposition between absolute and finitude. This results in a self- 
defeating subjectivity, whose firm identity and rule-giving authority does not rescue it from 
its perennial unattainability to 'organise the conditioned' or 'conquer the unconditioned'. 
In Kant's and Fichte's thought, however, I detect elements that potentially transgress their 
transcendental account of experience. These are found in Kant's concept of spontaneity and 
free play between understanding and imagination, and Fichte's concept of productivity. I 
argue that these elements lose their potential dynamism, so long as they are absorbed by the 
transcendental demands for the solution of the aporias of logic. However, these elements 
point to the need for a radical re-conceptualisation of the notion of experience. This is 
provided by means of Schelling's logogriflic approach, which constitutes the theme of the 
second section. 
The second section - the logogrif of experience - attempts to articulate a different approach 
towards the notion of experience, through an exploration of Schelling's versatile and 
provocative thought. This section focuses on Schelling's original insight into the notion and 
act of logogrif, which opens the dialogue between logos and mythos, cosmic becoming and 
human soul, cosmic imagination and human reflection, faith and knowledge. This section 
attempts to illuminate Schelling's fascinating philosophical investigations and discoveries 
that have been rather overlooked, possibly, due to Hegel's overwhelming critique. This 
section, after a brief critical examination of the Identity Philosophy, attempts to elucidate 
Schelling's notion of experience through his middle works, Of Human Freedom, Ages of the 
World, The Deities of Samothrace, which are treated as a self-developing trilogy. 
Schelling re-addresses the aporias of logic not as part of Reason's self-interrogation but as 
part of the cosmic paradoxes and living experiences. In this way, Schelling resets the scene of 
the debate on the conditions of possibility for cognitive experience by putting on the stage the 
enigmas of the cosmos and life rather than the Tribunal of Reason. 
Logic itself is conceived as a potency in the cosmic becoming, and consequently can no 
longer attempt to establish the transcendental conditions for the possibility of cognitive 
experience. 
Cosmic becoming, in which man is an active part, is conceived as the process of the 
movement, the interaction, the transformations and transmutations of multiple potencies. 
These, far beyond any mechanical conceptualisation, appear as self-moving and yet 
interdependent, unknown yet familiar, inscrutable and yet manifest powers, describing the 
mystery of life itself. The latter is depicted as an ever-recurrent act of longing for self- 
expression as active unity. Experience is conceived as the lived process of a network of living 
potencies, which may not only resist rational powers but may also puzzle and seize them. In 
this context, reflection acquires a plastic dimension, as opposed to its rigidity in the 
representational model of experience. Reflection depicts cosmic longing's self-formation, 
whose man is part. This self-bending formation partially illuminates the nature of longing, 
and from this standpoint is the logic of the longing. However, this formation is movable, 
transmutable and mostly ineffable, and from this standpoint is the logic of a riddle: a 
logogrif. 
Logogrif is the transitive term that attempts to describe the transition of experience from its 
enacted phase to its allusive conceptual utterance, and in this sense the term itself participates 
in both phases, as both form of thought and form of life. The logogrific approach to 
experience in turn transposes us as from the realm of pure concepts to the realm of the 
mystery of life, from pure thought to acts of longing, from the Architectonic of Pure Reason 
to Cosmic Theurgy. The latter term attempts to grasp the paradox and dynamism of cosmic 
and non-cosmic becoming by means of multiple, vanishing and ever-recurring, transmutable 
potencies, or in Schelling's terms 'the magic of insoluble life'. Schelling's logogrific account 
consists in a powerful voice for the re-enchantment of the world, the introduction into the 
notion of experience of the imminence of the divine. This is not suggested in terms of the 
adoption of old religious doctrines but by means of the discovery and re-discovery of the 
theurgy of life, through the intensification of our artistic mood, the creative expansion of our 
deeds. 
This notion of experience allows for the reconsideration of the notion of the self, in terms of 
a dynamic, conflictual process between conscious and unconscious powers and the critical 
revaluation of the accounts of subjectivity which reduce it to the sphere of self- 
consciousness. 
The thesis concludes with the need for an investigation into the relation between logos and 
mythos, which only tangentially has been introduced by the present project. In this context it 
will be possible to re-appraise the potential that the logogrific approach opens for an 
alternative to both logical and traditional mythological patterns of thinking. 
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Introduction 
If in ancient Greek cosmogony it is Moira that allots to each god its province', as the 
untransgressable, delimited field of activity and power, in the Age of Reason this task 
is assigned to Reason itself, which is called to institute a tribunal upon itself and 
justify its lawful claims2. The latter can be sought only in that province which is 
conditioned by our faculty of sensibility, and by no means in the realm of the 
unconditioned, that always seduces the "light dove" of Reason, which "cleaving the air 
in her free flight, and feeling its resistance, might imagine that its flight would be 
easier in empty space" (CPR, A5). Reason should rise from its immaturity and clearly 
demarcate the provinces of knowledge and faith, cognition and feeling, thought and 
will, theory and praxis. Accordingly, the relation between man and world is itself 
divided into separate cognitive-contemplative, moral-practical, scientific and religious 
provinces, all being objects of Kant's wide-ranging philosophical investigations. The 
issue, though, around which the latter revolve, and that seems to most stimulate 
philosophical interest and nourish the debate amongst German idealist thinkers, is that 
which inquires into the modes and the possibility of cognitive experience. Kant 
brought the various investigations concerning the claims of Reason under the central 
question: "How are a priori synthetic judgements possible? " (CPR, B 19) The very 
formulation of this question includes, in a condensed way, the core of Kant's 
philosophical thought, namely, transcendental logic, and pre-empts his notion of 
experience as an object of the cognising subject, establishing thereby its 
1 Cornford F. M., From Religion to Philosophy, p. 12,15, Princeton University Press, 1991 
2 It is Immanuel Kant who set the scene and formulated the conditions of the debate about the notion of 
experience, by sharply distinguishing between Reason's legitimate and illegitimate provinces. 
conceptualisation in dualistic terms, theoretical and practical, conditioned and 
unconditioned. This division assumes a clear separation between finitude and infinity, 
and fixates the concept of Absolute, and Reason's inherent tendency to conquer it, 
either in the form of truth or in the form of freedom. However, as long as this aim is 
rendered unattainable, Reason is restricted to its legitimate provinces and becomes, 
with regard to its unconditionable claims, either prescriptive or perennially 
melancholic. 
This thesis focuses on the exploration of the various responses, in the context of 
German Idealist Philosophy, to the main Kantian question "how are a priori synthetic 
judgements possible" and on the concomitant conceptualisations of the notion of 
experience. Through this enterprise, we first discover the main tenets of the grounding 
of transcendental logic, of representational, conceptual thinking, and the limits of this 
mode of thinking. The investigation of the Kantian question is carried through Kant's 
differing approaches in the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Judgement, 
Fichte's Science of Knowledge, and Schelling's early and middle works. The 
discovery of the limits of transcendental logic does not develop from a Hegelian - 
speculative - standpoint, as might be expected, but from a Schellingian alternative, 
which introduces an original challenge to transcendental logic, by means of 
Schelling's insight into the concept and act of logogrif 3. As this thesis will show, 
Schelling's logogrific approach towards the central Kantian question and the 
philosophical themes implicated thereby - i. e. the question of judgement-power, the 
notion of the self and the issue of freedom - in fact shakes transcendental logic. And 
3 The term logogrif has been coined by Schelling; see Schelling, F. W. J., Philosophical Investigations 
into the Nature of Human Freedom, p. 35, footnote. 
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this, not simply by introducing an alternative logical model, but by breaking the rigid 
boundaries between logical and mythical thinking and reconsidering the possibility of 
an alternative to the Kantian and Fichtean notion of experience, emerging out of the 
intertwinement of these distinct realms. The idea of logogrif, however, should not be 
understood as some sort of middle term or any kind of outcome of the investigation of 
the relation between Logos and Mythos, since Schelling's thematic in the works we 
examine, is not focused on this wider issue. This should be the object of another 
research, as indeed our present study will show in its conclusion. 
Our scope of research focuses on the specific configuration of Logos, in the form of 
transcendental logic, as the predominant form of modern, conceptual logic and in its 
critical challenge through the original notion of logogrif, which evokes and recalls 
elements of mythical thinking and action. The idea of logogrif, as such, is not 
explicitly elaborated by Schelling. Schelling himself simply announced the task for the 
formulation of a new mythology, in his System of Transcendental Idealism (1800), 
without any further elucidation of this bold statement until his late writings, which 
attempt to establish a systematic Philosophy of Mythology. Here, though, we are not 
concerned with the investigation of traditional mythology and its relation to logical 
patterns of thought. Instead, we follow a reverse path. We start with the main Kantian 
question and through the discovery of the severely limited character of the notion of 
experience provided by transcendental logic, we find in Schelling's responses the 
potential for a new notion of experience, intimated in the idea of logogrif. We detect, 
though, even within the context of the transcendental approach, elements that already 
augur the possibility and the need to seek forms of an alternative mode of thinking and 
expression. The latter is preliminary understood as a mode that does not unfold from 
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the Kantian conception of Pure Reason, the `land of oughts', with the perennial 
demands of Reason to seek the unconditioned, its consequent bounds and retreat to 
faith or melancholy, its necessary and inevitable restriction to transcendental logic - as 
the only secure and legitimate zone - in which Reason may find the satisfaction from 
the use of its principles. Instead, these elements - which are found in Kant's notion of 
spontaneity and free play, and Fichte's notion of productivity - anticipate the 
dissolution of the sharp boundaries between finitude and infinity, knowledge and 
faith, pure logic and experience, conceptual thinking and feeling or will. They also 
introduce the perspective of considering logic as an act of self-generative productivity, 
which potentially alludes to unknown forces and unpredictable acts, and from this 
point of view harbours a mythic dimension. 
The main challenge of transcendental logic, though, comes through Schelling's 
original insights, though his early writings develop from a transcendental standpoint. 
However, the orbit of his thought seems to radically diverge from the gravitational 
field of pure logic, in order to reformulate the original questions, and readdress them 
not simply as part of Logic's self-interrogation, but as parts of the cosmic paradoxes 
and living experiences. The major break with transcendental logic comes with 
Schelling's main shift - from the Identity Philosophy phase (1800-1804) to his Of 
Human Freedom treatise (1809) up to the Deities of Samothrace (1815) -, which 
resets the scene for the debate, putting on the stage the paradoxes of the cosmos itself, 
rather than the Tribunal of Reason, as the field proper into which the aporias and 
paradoxes of logic itself could be readdressed. The paradoxes of pure logic are no 
longer sheer conceptual issues, but express the riddles of life and the cosmos itself. 
From forms of pure thought, we are transposed to shapes of life, where the latter term 
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intends to include experience in a more holistic mode, through concept and feeling, 
cognition an wi , reflexivity and immediacy, conceptual appropriation and free play, 
order and chaos, transcendence and immanence. According to Schelling, the Kantian 
questions cannot be adequately addressed as long as they remain restricted to the 
boundaries of the concepts of the understanding, despite the latter's claim on their 
right to organise experience. The `I', even though retreating to the phenomenal 
security of the limits of its concepts, cannot content itself with its entrenchment from 
the world and the rigid separation of knowledge from faith. The major logical 
questions become part of the paradoxes of cosmic becoming and consequently can no 
longer be exhausted within the limits of inquiry into the transcendental conditions of 
experience, not even into the retrospective conclusions of its recollection. For it is not 
only Schelling's suggestion that there is always "an irreducible remainder'A - that 
seems to resist any orderly classification on behalf of rational illumination -, that leads 
to the need for another form of expressing experience; it is also, Schelling's implicit 
discovery that the very rational reconstruction of experience may take a perplexed, 
elusive, and allusive form, which attempts to retain the vital paradoxes of experience 
and carry within it its dynamic movement and life, in both its openness and 
closedness, familiarity and strangeness, immanence and transcendence. The notion of 
logogrif is precisely the transitive term that attempts to describe, this time, the 
transition of experience itself from its enacted phase to its conceptual expression, and 
in this sense the term itself aspires to participate in both phases, as both form of 
thought and form of life. 
4 Schelling F. W. J., Of Human Freedom, p. 34 
5 
We begin our investigation of the central Kantian question with a thorough 
examination of his attempt to deduce the employment of the concepts of 
understanding, for this undertaking essentially constructs the main tenets of 
conceptual-representational thinking and establish the notion of experience as the 
object of the subject's conceptual construction. Kant's enterprise of the Deduction of 
the Categories results in the necessity of establishing the formal, continuous identity 
of the self though time. The concepts of the understanding spring spontaneously from 
the human mind and act as the unifying, formal rules, which render experience 
possible at all. The spontaneity of the concept is associated with the notion of a 
unifying rule. Both spontaneity and order, seem paradoxically then to constitute the 
necessary conditions of experience. The deeper question of legitimacy, namely, the 
self-legitimacy of Reason's spontaneity, thereby arises, and indeed, as one which 
delivers order upon the passive and chaotic sense material. A spontaneity of order can 
resort only to another illegitimate demand, namely the self's certainty of its identity, 
which is claimed to exist 'before its eyes'. (CPR A 108) Thus, the deduction of the 
categories, and along with it the main tenets of logical-conceptual thinking, draws its 
ultimate validation from the necessity of the establishment of the formal identity of 
the self, which is self-confirmed by the organisation of experience according to its 
formal rules. Spontaneity is absorbed by the primordial identical self, and thus its role 
is reduced to the deliverance of order according to the needs of a formally unified self 
through time. Accordingly, spontaneity undergoes a further severe deformation: it 
becomes a transcendental concept. The story of the limits of Pure Reason begins from 
this point. The concepts of understanding seek their legitimacy in the identity of the 
self, which now appears more as a desperate demand rather than as an unquestionable 
foundation of experience. Reason's spontaneity can exist only as prescribing order, 
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and so its employment is limited to the province of the applicability of this order, 
namely to the passive, inactive intuition, through the aid of the understanding. Hence, 
spontaneity is identified with a law-giving, ordering activity, which, moreover, 
pertains exclusively to human Reason. Reason discovers its limits, according to Kant, 
as lawgiver, for it cannot give order to anything that falls outside the bounds of 
experience. Reason can only organise what appears as inactive to it, as its object. The 
limits of Reason arise then precisely because spontaneity is conceived in terms of 
order, of a law-giving faculty. Kant's fruitless conclusions of the Deduction do not 
derive from his 'resorting' to the infinity of the understanding and the thereby alleged 
introduction of the notion of the absolute subject, as Heidegger claiMS5. In 
contradistinction, Kant's resorting to the spontaneity of understanding does not 
prevent him from establishing the radical limitations of the subject, rather than its 
absolute status. For the concepts of understanding, conceived as order-giving rules, au 
are exclusively conditioned by what seems to be susceptible to their law-giving 
authority. Consequently, the problem is not Kant's resorting to the notion of 
spontaneity. Instead, we find in it a potentially exceptional insightful notion, 
especially so long this is conceived as both infinite and yet finite, self-enacted and yet 
limited. The problem is not one of an absolute reliance on the notion of spontaneity, 
but rather, contrariwise, that this notion has not been adequately expanded. Firstly, in 
Kant's system, spontaneity has been restricted only to the realm of human Reason, 
whilst nature, intuition, stands for a lifeless, inactive mass in need of external 
organisation. Secondly, spontaneity is conceived in terms of order-giving and indeed, 
as the type of order which corresponds to the formally, identical-through-time self, 
5 See Heidegger M., Kant and the Problems of Metaphysics. Heidegger's critique will be discussed in 
Appendix I 
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that is, to the universal and necessary rules that should arrange the temporally and 
spatially distinguished moments of empirical experience. Hence, spontaneity 
eventually is associated with static classification, sequential and systematic 
arrangement and in this context, reaches its most and and self-refuted 
conceptualisation, namely, that of a transcendental concept, a logical presupposition 
for the possibility of experience, as if the very thought of the conditions of the 
possibility of experience is not itself an act of spontaneity. 
In the Critique of Judgement, where Kant addresses the same fundamental question, 
"i. e. how are a priori judgements possible? ", from the standpoint of the contingent 
particular, we are provided with a new perspective on the concept of spontaneity, 
which potentially augurs new insights into the relation between man and the world 
and the notion of experience. These derive from Kant's innovative notion offree play 
between imagination and understanding during reflective judgement's preoccupation 
with the contingent particular. Here, spontaneity seems freed from its rule-giving role 
and manifests itself rather as afeeling ofpleasure, arising from the free interplay 
between the subject and its contingent representations. However, as long as the 
judgement of the contingent is addressed from the transcendental standpoint, its 
promising dynamism annuls itselL The contingent, although not constituted by the 
laws of the understanding, should conform to them, for otherwise, the identity of the 
self, as the latter has been established in the CPR, could not be sustained. If the gap 
between the laws of the understanding and the contingency of experience initially 
ap ears to be mediated by a free play between them, the requirements of a Ip 
transcendental notion of experience command a different solution. This is given by the 
Architectonic of Pure Reason, whose principles establish its internal systernaticity and 
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harmony. In this context, the judgement of the particular is rendered universal and 
necessary by virtue of the prescriptive conforn-ýity of the contingent with the laws of 
the understanding. Hence, if experience had so far been constituted by the laws of the 
understanding, now it is prescribed by the precepts of Reason, so that it satisfies 
Reason's Architectonic. Accordingly, spontaneity regains its order-giving role, this 
time not by means of constitutive rules, but through Reason's precepts for the securing 
of its inner harmony. The prescriptive universality and necessity of the judgement of 
the particular, is, in turn, deduced not by means of the constitutive identity of the self, 
but by means of a normative inter-subjective communicability: put summarily, this 
enhances the normative dimension of the notion of subjectivity, as long as its duties 
are not only the maintenance of its identity, but also its universal communicability, 
through discipline and culture. 
Through Kant's philosophical investigations, we are left with a 
dualistic/representational account of experience, which results either in a constitutive 
or in a normative appropriation of the world, by the laws of understanding or the 
precepts of reason respectively; in both cases, a model that attempts to transfer order, 
transparency and unity; and resolve the contradictions and paradoxes arising from 
man9s engagement with the world. The world, though, remains fundamentally alien 
and opaque, reconfirming Reason's radical finitude and the unattainability of its 
perennial striving for self-legitimacy. 
We turn thence, to Fichte's response to the Kantian question, since he unfolds his 
project precisely with a view to refuting the representational model of experience. 
Fichte's project intends to provide an account of experience that would do away with 
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the sharp Kantian dichotomies between the conditioned and unconditioned provinces 
of reason, necessity and freedom, cognition and will, theory and praxis. He 
reformulates the Kantian question into the following: " What is the source of the 
system of presentations which are accompanied by the feeling of necessity, and of this 
feeling of necessity itself? 996 For, according to Fichte, experience is defined precisely 
as the system of the representations that are accompanied by the feeling of necessity, 
and the main task of Philosophy is to furnish the ground of all experience. Fichte's 
extraordinary answer is that the source of the feeling of necessity, which grounds all 
experience, is the very feeling of absolute freedom of the self-positing self, which is 
itself a factual and incontestable necessity. Experience then, is defined as the ever- 
producing deeds of the self's unlimited productivity, as long as the self itself is 
conceived as " an absolute productive power", an infinite outreaching activity. The 
Kantian dualisms are definitely dissolved by the overwhelming activity of the ego's 
absolute power, only now, the world, from being mere representation, becomes an 
annoying check on the ego's unconditionable and voluntaristic expansion. 
Nevertheless, we find in Fichte's notion of productivity an interesting insight that, in 
combination with his reconsideration of the notion of intuition as active, potentially 
releases the notion of experience from its sheer logical, conceptual reconstruction and 
imports to it the problematic of powers rather than of pure concepts. 
Fichte, however, does not extricate himself from the kernel of the representational 
model of thinking, since productivity pertains exclusively to the subject, and 
experience is essentially rendered as its property. The subject assumes an absolute 
status , whose self-reverting activity intends to ground and generate Reality as a 
6 Fichte J. G., The Science of Knowledge, p. 6 
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whole, so long as every entity acquires its real existence by virtue of its falling into the 
productivity field of the self-positing ego. In this context, the spontaneous productive 
activity of the ego becomes both all-inclusive and the grounding of all experience. The 
Kantian dualism is substituted by the monolithic and engulfing identity of the self- 
positing ego, suspending any difference or contradiction in man's engagement with 
the world and with himself. If in Kant's system thought and emotions are severely 
kept separate, in Fichte's they are entirely identical, reduced to the stormy impulse of 
the primordial ego, losing any relative autonomy, solidifying thus the assertive identity 
of the self. In turn, experience is determined not by means of the logic of the concepts 
but through the logic of the will. The latter seems to dissolve the Kantian categories 
into the crucible of the primordial, atemporal, self-positing act, which, however, 
recurs with any action of the self, breaking the succession of time with an act of 
eternity. No matter how insightful the latter idea is, it loses its fascinating 
implications, as long as the paradoxes of experience are intended to be accommodated 
by the repetitive, predictable transparency of the determinations of the self-positing 
ego. 
It is in Schelling's thought that we meet a radical break with representational thinking. 
According to Schelling, experience is not merely reconstructed by the subject, nor is 
the subject always able to recollect its experiences consciously and moreover 
formatively. Schelling introduces the bold statement that the subject may also be 
seized by experience, and that the conscious appropriation of experience does not 
necessarily imply the subject's Bildung. Conceptual representations are but a 
configuration of the power of human intelligence, which discovers its relative 
autonomy from the cosmic process and attempts to capture its movement by means of 
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abstraction, and thereby to resist its - i. e. the cosmic process' - seizing power upon it. 
Reflection thus, is a power of abstraction from the infinite complexity of reality, and 
indeed one associated with a specific and rather slender dimension of human 
subjectivity, namely that of self-consciousness. However, reflection's conceptual 
constructions are not dismissed as fictions of subjective fancy or entirely impertinent 
abstractions, for the latter themselves are a moment, a manifestation of the various 
forms that cosmic forces, in their interaction, may take. Man himself is conceived as a 
"nexus of living forces"7 , part of and interacting with the cosmic forces. Hence, man 
can seize and be seized by its experiences because he is conceived in the same 
dynamic and yet not identical terms. This means that Schelling does not intend to 
provide us with another transcendental instrument for explaining the constitution of 
the cosmos by means of the methodology of 'forces'. The latter are not meant to be 
conceived as some sort of fundamental constituent elements, that allegedly construct 
the cosmos through their infinite combinations. Schelling's use of the term force lies 
in the antipodal position , since by means of it he attempts to hint at the inexplicability 
of cosmic processes rather than at its rational and lawful exegesis. Through the 
terminology of forces, which later gives its place to the terminology of potencies, 
Schelling reunifies man with the cosmos, by means of their most multiple 
differentiation. Cosmic becoming, in which man is an active part, is the process of the 
movement, the interaction, the transformations and the transmutations of multiple 
potencies. These, far beyond any mechanical conceptualisation, appear as self- 
moving, living, unknown and yet familiar, inscrutable and yet manifest powers, 
describing the mystery of life itself. The latter is mostly described as an ever-recurrent 
and omnipresent act of longing, yearning, desire for self-expression as active unity. 
7 Schelling F. W. J., Of Human Freedom, p. 41 
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Nature, empirical reality, experience, is no longer the lifeless or passive object which 
can be resolved into the laws of conceptual thought. Experience is itself alive, a 
network of potencies, which may not only resist rational powers but may also puzzle 
and seize them. As such, the potencies are called gods: these are no longer expelled to 
an unknowable spiritual beyond, but transpire from the very sensual realm, 
spiritualising the natural and naturalising the spiritual, bringing back the paradox to 
the conceptually transparent, rendering the 'beyond' immanent. 
In this context, reflection acquires a creative and plastic dimension, as opposed to its 
rigidity in the representational model of experience. If in the transcendental context 
reflection finds the abstract thoughts of a pure logical subject, which bends back to 
itself, in the context of potencies, reflection finds the activity of the potencies in which 
the subject consists. In fact, the very reflective act is a potency itself, it is longing 
reflecting back to see its image. Here reflection depicts longing's self-formation, 
longing giving shape to itself, longing expressing itself, giving itself concrete 
character, individuality and differentiation from an amorphous and self-consuming, 
untamed craving. This, however, seems to be the very material which reflection strives 
to bend, to tame and formulate, or rather, a part of longing, contra to itself, bends upon 
itself and shapes itself. However, what it sees and what it shapes is always a complex 
of intractable powers, whose formation is part of their own movement, and thus 
dynamic, restless, transitive, elusive. It is a formation, which partially expresses and 
thus illuminates the nature of longing, and from this standpoint, it is the logic of the 
longing. However, this formation is itself movable, transmutable, mostly ineffable, 
and yet recognisable and familiar- as the colours- and from this standpoint, it is the 
logic of a riddle; a logogrif. 
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Logogrif, as the reflection of longing upon itself, is not only the word of longing but 
also its act. As such, logogrif contains not only the thoughtful reflection on experience 
but it is a form of experience itself. The image which longing sees in its reflection is 
not its representation, but what is caught in the net of its bending movement, for 
grifos originally means plait, and logogrif, the plaited image of longing which sees 
and utters itself. This image apparently is not the image of perception, which 
replicates the pre-existing forms. Instead, it is the image which unfolds the sensual 
density of longing, interrupts momentarily its flow, and depicts an elusive form which 
utters its unity. The logic of longing consists more in the creative formation of 
speaking images, and from this point of view, we call it the imagination of the 
longing, the expression of cosmic imagination. For man's longing is part of cosmic 
longing and its movement re-enacts the movement of life and cosmic becoming and 
recalls their paradoxical creativity. Logogrif then stands for the active engagement of 
man with the cosmic enigma: it portrays man's play with the world, in its multiple 
configurations, wonder and fascination, manipulation and frustration, arrogance and 
humility, domination and paralysis, joy and despair. These moments are no longer 
aspects of the subject' conscious life only, but configurations of the uncontrollable 
movement of the "nexus of living forces", as part of the cosmic nexus and thus 
conscious and unconscious, uttcrablc and incffablc, transparcnt and inscrutablc, but 
always lived and experienced. Logos, though caught in the net of enigma, seems thus 
more flexible and liberated; for it is freed from its duties to conquer the 
'unconditioned' and to organise the 'conditioned'. The strict boundaries between them 
seem to blur in the all-infusing mystery of life, which yet is accessible and tangible, 
experienced and enacted by man's life itself, which is but part of the cosmic enigma. 
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Logos does not strive to impose its laws on the sensible, or to prescribe its precepts to 
the contingent. It rather prefers to play with both, to let the contingent free, and 
recognise a fascinating opponent in cosmic spontaneity and contingency. Logos, rather 
than being frustrated by its inability to conquer the absolute, rediscovers meaning in 
its activities, precisely by virtue of its finitude; not by a self-heroising resolution to 
perform the extraordinary, but by means of its ability to get perennially fascinated, 
intrigued, provoked by a puzzling cosmos. Accordingly, the world is no longer 
comprehensible as potentially conformable to the Architectonic of Reason. The latter 
gives its place to the Cosmic Theurgy. This term attempts to grasp the dynamism and 
paradox of cosmic and non-cosmic becoming, by means of multiple, self-generative, 
interdependent and yet self-moving potencies, transmutable and transformable to each 
other, vanishing and ever-recurring, generating and destroying new potencies; or 
simply, in Schelling's terms, the " magic of insoluble life". 
Schelling readdresses the questions of experience, judgement and subjectivity in the 
context of the cosmic theurgy, where their aporias are no longer resolved by Reason's 
positing solutions, nor expelled to the untrespassable, sacred realm of noumena. 
Schelling rather draws the aporias to their extremes; for he brings the sacred back to 
the profane, eternity in time, and renders the sacred accessible through the profane, 
and the profane inaccessible through the sacred, both fused into the enigmatic 
movement of " insoluble life", transpiring its universal theurgy. Schelling's logogrific 
thought attempts to introduce to the notion of experience the imminence of the divine, 
in the irrational marriage of time with eternity, sensuality with spirituality, all-present 
and unexpectable, liberating and paralysing, immanent and transcendent, nourishing 
the vital engagement of man with the world's paradoxes. From this point of view, 
15 
Schelling's thought is a powerful voice for the re-enchantment of the world, not by 
means of the uncritical adoption of old religious doctrines, but by virtue of the 
discovery and re-discovery of the theurgy of life, the history and prehistory of cosmic 
becoming, in our unique experiences and deeds. 
now turn to a more detailed exposition of the structure of the thesis. 
The first chapter examines Kant's response to his main question about the possibility 
of a priori synthetic judgements. The latter apply to judgements constitutive of 
experience, and therefore the foundational conditions of their possibility are sought 
via the deduction of the categories of understanding. This, as already mentioned, is 
derived from the establishment of the formal identity of the self and its a priori 
certainty of this identity. Experience is conceived as being constituted by the formal 
rules of the understanding, which are spontaneously produced by the reflective act of 
the subject upon its cognitive faculties. 
The second chapter pursues Kant's reconsideration of the same question, this time 
from the standpoint of the contingent, namely from the particular relations pertaining 
to empirical experience, which are not exhaustible by the general rules of the 
understanding. Through the investigation of Kant's attempt to provide the 'lawfulness 
of the contingent', we find the prescriptive character of experience, in terms of the 
precepts of Pure Reason, according to its Architectonic structure. 
In both the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Judgement, the notion of 
experience is defined by means of the subject's constitutive or normative order. We 
consequently consider it relevant to corrunent on Kant's notion of experience by 
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discussing Heidegger's critical appraisal of Kant's enterprise of the Deduction of the 
categories, which argues for Kant's ultimate underestimation of the notion of finitude 
and his resorting to the notion of the absolute subject. This is undertaken by Appendix 
I, in which we examine the relevance of Heidegger's critique, as regards Kant's 
alleged shift from the "uncomprehended finitude" of imagination to the "comforming 
infinity" of the understanding. This position falls within Heidegger's major criticism 
of German Idealism, which, following the tradition of Western Metaphysics, neglected 
the fundamental issue of finitude and instead founded its systems on the concept of 
the absolute person. Heidegger's critique unfolds as part of his wider philosophical 
project to establish his Fundamental Ontology. In the appendix, we do not intend to 
discuss Heidegger's project as a whole, but only focus on those aspects that relate 
tangentially to our research. In this context, we argue that Heidegger's critique of 
Kant's account of the relation between finitude-infinity, eventually replicates the same 
pattern of 'resolutions' to the antinomies as Kant's. For, as will be shown, Heidegger 
conceives the relation between finitude and infinity in the same terms, substituting the 
resort to understanding, with man's seizure by his suppressed moment of infinity, as 
the means of redemption from his "original finitude". We will argue, consequently, 
that the notions of radical finitude and absolute subject are essentially supplementary, 
so long as infinite and finiteness are conceived as mutually exclusive and separate 
concepts. 
It is Fichte's response to Kant's representational model of experience that attempts to 
found the notion of an absolute subject, although, surprisingly, his project has not 
been the object of any sustained critique by Heidegger. According to Fichte, the aporia 
of synthetic a priori judgements cannot be resolved as long as their ground, namely, 
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the transcendental unity of apperception, is not itself grounded. Fichte's project 
consists in a systematic attempt to establish the identity of the self, which in Kant's 
context remains insufficiently thernatised. In Fichte's system, the formal identity of 
the self is now conceived as the primordial act of the ego's self-positing: the latter is 
declared to constitute the fundamental ground of any kind of experience, theoretical 
and practical, thereby dissolving the antinomy between necessity and freedom, 
phenomena and nournena, knowledge and will, in the identical act of the self-positing 
ego. Fichte's enterprise is expounded in his major work, The Science of Knowledge 
(1794). Here, he deploys his account of The Fundamental Principles of the Entire 
Science of Knowledge, which are claimed as common to both theoretical and practical 
activity, the latter being conceived in terms of knowledge. The core of his argument is 
presented in the Second Part of The Science of Knowledge - where we mainly focus 
our attention -, which consists in his attempt to deduce the grounding principle of the 
self-positing ego. The content of the third chapter of this thesis is an investigation of 
Fichte's enterprise to resolve the Kantian aporia, by means of the radical revision of 
the transcendental unity of apperception. We argue that Fichte not only fails to deduce 
his grounding principle, but also provides a narrow theoretical framework that 
essentially brings the movement of philosophical investigations to a dead-end, so long 
as any contradiction between man, world and himself seems to be engulfed by the 
4'ego's absolute power", which is declared to ground, generate and determine 
experience in its totality. 
The remaining four chapters of the thesis engage with Schelling's philosophy. His 
thought presents an extraordinary versatility. Almost every single work has a different 
and unique terminology and an imaginative approach towards the same underlying 
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themes, namely, the investigation into a non representational account of the relation 
between man and nature, freedom and necessity, mind and matter, finitude and 
infinity. However, Schelling's thought has predominantly been reduced to a specific 
phase of his intellectual development - probably due to Hegel's monochromatic and 
devastating critique -, namely that of the Identity System Philosophy(1801-4). Hence, 
we begin the investigation of Schelling's philosophy with a thorough examination of 
the System of Identity, in order to gain a deeper insight into the most influential aspect 
of his thought, and, moreover, in order to understand its relative position within the 
whole. This constitutes the topic of the fourth chapter. Here, we argue that the Identity 
Principle has indeed been the locus of Schelling's early writings, which considerably 
restricted the promising dynamism of these works. We proceed to a critical account of 
the Identity System along with an assessment of Hegel's and Heidegger's critique. 
Heidegger's is an instantiation of his typical pattern of critique towards German 
Idealism, namely, the unfolding of the latter's philosophical systems from the 
standpoint of the notion of the Absolute and the 'forgetting' of the notion of finitude. 
We argue that Heidegger's fixation on this position prevents him from seeing 
Schelling's radical conceptual shift, which leads him to interpret Schelling's Of 
Human Freedom Treatise in the light of the Identity System. Instead, we argue that the 
Of Human Freedom treatise inaugurates Schelling's rupture with Identity philosophy, 
and provides his substantial self-critique, along with the introduction of his new 
approach towards the notion of the Absolute and finitude, which allows his radical 
revision of the notion of experience. Our research on Schelling focuses on his middle 
works (1809-1815), since from this transitive phase we can gather the transition from 
logic to logogrif, which is the main issue of this thesis. 
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In the fifth chapter, we pursue further Schelling's new conceptualisation of the 
relation between Absolute and finitude, as this has been deployed in the Ages of the 
World. Schelling's break with the Identity principle - in the Of Human Freedom and 
the Ages of the World - enables him to perform a disturbing exodus from the 
transparent realm of logic and his quasi-theological commitment to the Absolute and 
provide a new context for the examination of the notions of cognitive experience, 
judgement-power, subjectivity and freedom. This new context, mainly expounded in 
the Ages of the World, consists in the dynamic and enigmatic nexus of cosmic 
potencies, of which man is an active part. From this point of view, experience can no 
longer be conceived as conditioned or reconstructed by logic's abstracting conceptual 
presuppositions, since logic itself is already a form of experience, and moreover, part 
of the cosmic enigma itself. However, what seems to deprive logic of its 'authority', 
namely its conceptualisation as part of the cosmic potencies, is precisely what 
provides it with the new dimensions that liberate it from the perennially tormenting 
duties for the attainment of universal and necessary objectivity and unconditioned 
freedom. Logic as a part of, and reflection on, the cosmic enigma, is not destroyed and 
entirely paralysed by the 'forces of chaos': it rather plays with them, recognises them 
in its own dynamics, it allows itself to experience and blend with them, and becomes 
logogrif. It is as if Schelling's thought performs this sort of movement, and transmutes 
the potencies of the Ages of the World into the gods of the Deities of Samothrace, in 
order to provide his logogrific depiction of the cosmic enigma, as will be seen in the 
concluding chapter. Prior to this, we attempt, drawing on the conclusions of the 
previous chapters, to gain a new approach towards the notion of the self, which 
constitutes the topic of the sixth chapter. 
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The sixth chapter exan-ýines the different accounts of the notion of the self, as the latter 
are derived from Schelling's differentiated approaches toward the notion of the 
Absolute, before and after the break with the Identity principle. Hence, we first 
discuss Schelling's account of the self, as this has been expounded in his early work, 
the System of Transcendental Idealism (1800), in which we identify the normative 
character of his account, due to the transcendental requirements of the predominant 
concept of identity in this phase. In turn, we endeavour to provide an alternative 
account, which, although not explicitly presented by Schelling, can nonetheless be 
garnered from the Freedom treatise and the Ages of the World. Through this, we gain a 
new insight into the notion of the self, the question of judgement power and freedom, 
especially by virtue of the discovery of the role of the unconscious. 
We conclude our research on Schelling with his logogrific account of the cosmic 
becon-ýing, as it has been portrayed in the Deities of Samothrace. This final chapter is 
expounded as an experimental example of an alternative mode of thinking, i. e. the 
logogrific, and is written in a different style to the previous chapters, reflecting 
Schelling's change of style as well, in the light of his attempt to create a new 
mythology. 
The conclusion defends the need, which emerges from the whole of our research, for a 
radical reconceptualisation of the notion of experience, through the break of its 
transcendental account and by means of its logogrific grasp. This points to the 
requirement for further investigation into the relation between Logos and Mythos, 
possibly, this time, beginning with a thorough exploration of mythical thinking in its 
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implicit relation to Logos, and the story of the marriages and divorces between 
philosophy and mythology. In this context, it would be possible to re-appraise and 
further explore the horizons that the logogrific approach opens toward the potential of 
an alternative to the pure logical or traditional mythical patterns of thinking. 
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Section I 
The Logic of experience 
Chapter 1 
Kant's Transcendental Deduction: The conceptual reconstruction 
of experience 
In Kant's theoretical philosophy "pure reason leaves everything to the understanding", for 
"the understanding alone can apply immediately to the objects of intuition" (CPR, B383). 
Hence, in the first part of the Critique of Pure Reason Kant explores "the territory of pure 
understanding", which is "... the land of truth- enchanting name! - surrounded by a wide and 
stormy ocean, the native home of illusion ... (CPR, B295). However, "that a concept 
should be produced completely a priori and should relate to an object , is altogether 
contradictory and impossible" (CPR, A96) How then, he asks, do the concepts of pure 
understanding apply to experience? By what right can we possess knowledge that is 
produced only by means of this application? 
In Kant's time, deduction was a legal procedure that decides a quaestio quid juris by 
demonstrating that a particular claim or possession is not obtained surreptitiously but 
lawfully. The deduction of the concepts of understanding means then, that the latter are 
likewise brought under such a procedure of proving entitlement. As Kant noted "everyone 
must defend his position directly, by a legitimate proof that carries with it a transcendental 
deduction of the grounds upon which it is itself made to rest" (A794/B822). Since the 
grounds in question are the subjective conditions of possible knowledge, he also claims 
that "only a single proof is possible, namely, from the concept of the subject. " This general 
guideline gave rise to a predominant interpretation of the deduction in terms of the 
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unelaborated notion of 'consciousness in general', missing thus the implicit result of 
Kant's enterprise, which is not the successful deduction of the categories, but rather, the 
construction of the main tenets of the representational pattern of thinking and the 
establishment of the notion of self-consciousness in terms of this model. 
Kant himself considered the task of the deduction in question extremely difficult. Indeed, 
both editions of the text on the deduction present considerable entanglement, obscurity and 
internal contradictions. These problems, in combination with the real difficulty of 
understanding the depth and complexity of Kant's thought, have led to a vast amount of 
different interpretations and reconstructions of Kant's enterprise. In the present chapter, we 
do not intend to provide a historical exposition or critique of this literature, but only to 
interpret some basic critical points of a specific but influential kind of reading, to the 
extent that they facilitate the presentation of our understanding and the extraction of the 
conclusions from Kant's undertaking that are relevant for our research. Hence, we will first 
present a reading which, based on the spirit of the Prolegomena to Any Future 
Metaphysics, places at its centre the notion of objectivity of 'consciousness in general'. 
This not only fails to provide a sufficient argument for the deduction, but generally reads 
Kant in a fruitless way, accentuating the most negative features of his thought. We will 
then, present a reading that attempts to deduce the categories from the notion of the identity 
of the subject. In this section, we mainly employ D. Henrich's elaboration of the notion of 
identity. We will try to show that this reading is not only a more suitable ground for the 
deduction, but also brings out Kant's elaborate problematic of the notion of self- 
consciousness. 
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Deduction from knowledge of objects 
In this group of arguments, Kant first assumes, in different ways, the already existing 
knowledge of objects' and then deduces the categories from this very assumption, since 
only by means of the categories is this kind of knowledge possible. The common feature of 
the arguments is a firm contrast between experience of objects - which includes necessary 
connections - and subjective states - which are deprived of any kind of necessary 
connection. This pattern of argument, under the guise of the very idea of judgement itself, 
exists in both the Prolegomena and in the heart of the Critique. The judgements produced 
by the use of the categories are objective, in the sense that they assert necessary and 
universal validity and are distinct from subjective judgements which consist in contingent 
and arbitrary representations. This sort of argumentation already anticipates the limits and 
the outcome of a possible deduction, since it restricts the task of the deduction itself, 
which, therefore, predetermines its failure. In other words, in the context of this dichotomy, 
the task of the deduction is narrowed to the justification of the use of the categories merely 
by virtue of their 'objectivity-conferring' role. The function of the categories is presented 
as a rather external super-addition of truth and necessity to otherwise arbitrary, subjective 
states. The latter are somehow created through mere logical connections, as Kant states in 
the Prolegomena, and hold good only for the subjeCt. 2 In contrast, the subordination of the 
1 "Since these sciences exist, it is quite proper to ask how they are possible; for that they must be possible is 
proved by the fact that they exist " (CPR, B 21). 
' In the Prolegomena, Kant distinguishes between "judgements of experience" and "judgements of 
perception". The distinction is made in terms of the employment of the concepts of the understanding, which 
render the first kind of judgements objectively valid, and the use of mere logical connections of perception in 
a thinking subject, which render the latter judgements subjective and contingent. Kant does not sufficiently 
clarify the features of the mere logical connections of a thinking subject. He rather provides as explanation 
only the result of their employment, namely judgements that are valid for a specific subject and are deprived 
of universal validity. He does not, though, elucidate, at this stage, the relation between these mere logical 
connections with the concepts of understanding. It is only in the CPR that the formal character of the concepts 
of understanding is brought into relief, and the notion of self-consciousness acquires, concomitantly, formal 
status. This may also be the reason for the hypostasised interpretation of the term " consciousness in general", 
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subjective statement under the category transforms the former into a "judgement of 
experience", which holds true for anyone, since it relates to an object which is 'there' for 
everyone and distinct from the subject3. 
However, once the role of the categories is thus reduced to discrin-ýination and addition of 
objectivity, the attempt of their deduction is an already foregone failure, due to the way that 
the subjective/objective distinction is posited. This problem, as will be seen, recurs with 
any similar attempt at the deduction; for the required objectivity is taken as something 
externally imposed, which leads inevitably to a regressive tactic. 
Deduction in Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics 
In the Prolegomena, Kant deduces the categories from the claim that it is only by means of 
them that a "judgement of experience" is rendered possible. The latter however, is merely 
assumed and taken for granted. The notion of experience already assumes knowledge of 
objects: 
"Experience consists in the synthetic connection of appearances (perceptions) in one 
consciousness, in so far as this is necessary and so 'judgements of experience' possess a 
new relation, namely to an object" (§22), which signifies nothing else than its universal 
validity. Any such claim to universal and necessary validity however, as a claim to an a 
that appears in the Prolegomena as the source of the objectivity-conferring concepts. 
. ...... if we have reason to hold a judgement to be necessarily universally valid ( which never rests on 
perception, but on the pure concept of the understanding under which the perception is subsumed), we must 
consider it to be objective also, that is, that it expresses not merely a reference of our perception to a subject, 
but a quality of the object. For there would be no reason for the judgements of other men necessarily to agree 
with mine, if it were not the unity of the object to which they refer and with which they accord; " 
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priori knowledge, requires "special concepts originally generated in the understanding" 
((§ 18), under which "the perception is subsumed". These a priori concepts are but the 
categories. 
The notion of the category, as that which by means of its application discriminates an 
object and contrasts it with mere subjective representations, corresponds to its role as an 
textra-logical constraint' upon the employment of the merely logical function of 
judgements. Hence, in the subject-predicate relation, the object which is represented by the 
subject-concept has rigidly to be in the position of the subject and can never be a predicate. 
As Kant clearly states, 
They are concepts of an object in general, by means of which its intuition is 
regarded as determined in regard to one of the logical functions of judging. Thus 
the function of the categorical judgement was the relation of the subject to the 
predicate, e. g., all bodies are divisible. Only in regard to the merely logical 
employment of the understanding it remains undetermined which of the two 
concepts one is to give the function of the subject and which that of the predicate. 
For one can also say: something divisible is a body. Through the concept of 
substance, however, if I bring the concept of body under it, it is determined that its 
empirical intuition in experience must always be considered only as subject, never 
as mere predicate; and so with all the other categories. (Prolegomena 128) 
Therefore, the notion of the category is not taken as a form of a mere logical function 
within a judgement, but as a constraining rule that somehow makes the use of the mere 
logical function necessary. The rigid relation between subject-predicate in the judgement 
reflects the equivalent rigid separation between subject-object, the lack of any mutual inter- 
penetration or interchange of their roles and eventually, as a result of this, their mutual 
estrangement (for this indisputable knowledge produced by the application of the 
(Prolegomena, 298) 
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categories is only a phenomenal one). 
Furthermore, the claim on the universality of the application of the categories appears 
doubtful. For if, as the Prolegomena states, "judgements of perception" are based upon 
mere logical connections and not upon categorical ones, how can the categories assume 
their universal applicability to any kind of unity? Are combination and the term of 
judgement relevant only for objective judgements, and should every subjective state always 
be considered as incoherent? 
Here, Kant's argument fails to deduce the categories, not only because he begs the question 
- assurning a kind of knowledge which necessarily presupposes the use of the categories - 
but also because he is inevitably led to this kind of regression by virtue of the role itself 
which is initially ascribed to the categories (i. e. truth-conferring, external constraints). This 
role however, is hardly deduced by Kant in the Prolegomena, but is only postulated 
through the axiomatic introduction of the vague concept of 'consciousness in general'. 
Nevertheless, this failure is not the result of the analytical method of the Prolegomena. 
Even in the CPR, where Kant introduces the so-called synthetic method, which forswears 
appeal to the a priori knowledge of objects, there are considerable sections that can be read 
according to this line of argument. For both the synthetic and the analytic approaches 
derive from Kant's higher standpoint, namely, that of transcendental logic. 
29 
Deduction from the "objectivity of self-consciousness" 
In the CPR, though the texts of both editions provide a much more sophisticated exposition 
of the Deduction than the teaching version of the Prolegomena, there are many passages 
that allow a reading in terms of the Prolegomena. In the Critique, Kant's path is the reverse 
of that found in the Prolegomena: instead of assuming the a priori knowledge of objects 
and seeking to justify the employment of the categories by means of this original 
assumption, he puts at the centre of his enterprise the necessity of the subject's self- 
consciousness as the source for the justification of the employment of the categories. As 
will be shown, neither does this more elaborate strategy succeed in deducing the categories, 
for it is again built on a transcendental assumption, namely the transcendental unity of 
apperception. However, through the investigation of this key concept, we gain a deeper 
understanding of the main tenets of conceptual-representational thinking, and the 
concomitant conceptualisation of the identity of the self. The success of the deduction 
endeavour, may lie then, not in the achievement of its original task, but in its side-effects, 
that is, the thernatisation of the critical notion of the transcendental unity of apperception, 
and along with it, the elucidation of the meaning and the limits of transcendental logic. 
However, if the notion of the transcendental unity of apperception is considered as a static 
concept, as is frequently suggested by Kant himself, we do not gain any further insight into 
Kant's notion of experience, since we can easily slip into a kind of reading - indeed 
dominant in the Kantian and neo-Kantian literature - which reiterates, in a reverse way, the 
argument of the Prolegomena. 
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According to this interpretation, the categories are deduced from the very fact of making 
judgements whose ground is the "objective unity of consciousness". In this context, we 
first find the introduction of the notion of the transcendental unity of apperception, which 
is considered objective as opposed to the mere subjective states of inner sense. 
... the transcendental unity of apperception is that unity through which all the 
manifold given in the intuition is united in the concept of an object. Therefore, it 
is entitled objective and must be distinguished from the subjective unity of 
consciousness that is a determination of inner sense (B 139) 
At this stage, Kant does not specify the kind of objectivity that he ascribes to the unity of 
apperception. The character of this objectivity is disclosed when Kant collapses the 
transcendental unity of apperception to our truth-capacity, to the ability of making valid 
judgements which express knowledge of external, and independent-of-the-subject, objects: 
"A judgement is nothing but the manner in which given modes of knowledge are brought 
to the objective unity of apperception. This is what is intended by the copula is .... it 
indicates their relation to original apperception and its necessary unity"(B141). 
Kant specifies more clearly the nature of objectivity as follows: 
Thus to say the body is heavy is not merely to state that the two representations 
have always been conjoined in my perception, however often that perception be 
repeated; what we are asserting is that they are combined in the object, no matter 
what the state of the subject may be. (B 142) 
Therefore, the judgements have objectivity as long as they assert something about objects 
on the basis of perception. An object is something whose reality can be established in many 
circumstances by anyone and consequently, this is also the kind of objectivity which is 
ascribed, as immanent property, to self-consciousness; an objectivity understood in terms 
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of the unchangeable unity and sameness of the I think". As W. Walsh -a contemporary 
commentator in this line of interpretation - describes it: "The unity of apperception ... refers 
not only to any actual self but only to an ideal subject-self which is the same in all of us or 
would be if we were wholly rational vv4 . Consequently, he himself posits the question: "But 
why should we take at all seriously the supposed self-identical self which represents 
consciousness in general? 115? 
In brief, the above reading of the Critique proceeds as follows: it introduces the notion of 
transcendental unity of apperception as the ground of the deduction of the categories. 
However, instead of exploring the possible inner relation between the unity of 
apperception and the categories - as will be seen later-, it identifies the transcendental unity 
of apperception with the ability of making objective judgements, which draw their validity 
by virtue of their claim to express knowledge of objects. Since the categories are but the 
constitutive elements of objective judgements, they can be deduced from the very 
possibility of making such judgements. The ground of this possibility is the"objective unity 
of consciousness". Therefore, it is assumed, almost by flat, a 'strong' kind of objectivity as 
immanent property of self-consciousness, by virtue of which the capacity of truth-claims, 
in the form of judgements, is rendered possible. The argument is again regressive: it sets 
out to derive the conditions for knowledge of objects from the conditions of self- 
consciousness, but instead, it ends up merely identifying them, through the arbitrary 
nomination of the latter as 'objective'. 
4 Walsh W. H., Kant's Criticism of Metaphysics, p. 50. S Ibid., p. 56. 
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"The Ego .... the crucible and the fire 
There is, however, another sense of objectivity that may apply to the analysis of self- 
consciousness, that is, one that is directly related to self-consciousness and not defined 
through its relation to an external object. The unity of self-consciousness may be 
considered as objective, in this sense, as long as it consists only in the "I think"- 
consciousness in its relation to every content which can be a thought: it indicates the ability 
to have the simple consciousness of myself to whatever I represent, regardless of its 
content. This notion of objectivity (as formal universality and necessity) was demonstrated 
by Hegel in his critique of Kant: 
The Ego is what is originally identical, at one with itself, and utterly at home with 
itself. If I say "I", this is the abstract self-relation, and what is posited in this unity 
is infected by it, and transformed into it. Thus the Ego is, so to speak, the crucible 
and the fire through which the indifferent multiplicity is consumed and reduced to 
unity. This, then is what Kant calls "pure apperception. 6 
We have to bear in mind this sense of objectivity if we are to further investigate the 
possibility of the deduction of the categories, especially with regard to their a priori 
character. However, if this notion is equated with the actual structure of self-consciousness 
and is hypostatised in terms of a latent T, which allegedly underlies and thus unifies all 
thoughts, we may relapse into the notion of a general, impersonal consciousness, which 
will again constitute the basis of the 'objective' unity that we previously discussed. Instead, 
we will try to examine the unity of apperception, not as a unity of thoughts-contents 
effected by a latent, non-transitory T, but in terms of the unification of the internal states 
I Hegel G. W. F., The Encyclopedia Logic, p. 84. 
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of the self itself, and to use the notion of objectivity pertaining to this process only as the 
thought of the forinal dimension of self-consciousness. This mode of employment of the 
notion of objectivity avoids the recurrent problem of the hypostatisation of 'consciousness 
in general'. The choice between these two directions depends on the way we read the 
following critical proposition: "It must be possible for the "I think" to accompany all my 
representations" (B 131 CPR). If we read it, as Kant suggests, as an analytic judgement and 
also fix the roles of subject and predicate, the most possible outcome is to understand the 
notion of "I think" in terms of an entity, which unifies, by means of its formal sameness, all 
its possible representations as if it were an underlying substratum quite external to them. If 
we, rather, consider the "I think" as possibly being and possibly not being identified with 
every representation, we may read this statement in a more dynamic way, as the prefix "it 
must be possible" hints at; i. e., that I do not immediately unite all my representations in one 
"consciousness in general, but that the "I think"-consciousness may well not accompany all 
my representations, since it is no longer conceived as a permanent underlying substratum. 
Instead, the "I think"-consciousness is inextricably attached to its specific content, and it 
can be considered as pure fonn only as a logical abstraction. In other words, the above 
proposition has to be read not as an immediate unity of thoughts under a simple T, but as a 
reflexive and moreover, prescriptive process: in each one of my thoughts I have to become 
conscious of this thought as mine, and so long as I am conscious of a representation, I must 
also be said to 'apperceive' my thus being conscious. Hence, the unity of apperception 
refers to the necessity of the unification of the infinite "I think"-consciousness. If 
previously we read the prefix with the accent on the aspect of possibility, now the stress is 
on the necessity, i. e., it must be possible. However, the abstract thought that I can be self- 
conscious in each of my thoughts, regardless of the concrete content of any particular 
thought, can exist, and refers to the formal constitution of self-consciousness. 
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Deduction from the transcendental unity of apperception 
We now turn to a more promising interpretation through the detailed examination of the 
deduction of the categories from the notion of the transcendental unity of apperception. In 
this context, the notions of category, object, and experience acquire new meaning and even 
the task of the deduction is redefined in terms of this new meaning. According to this 
reading, Kant intends to prove the 'objective validity' of certain rules that prescribe a 
priori a variety of kinds of unity among representations. He intends to prove that without 
such unity, experience would be impossible. He tries to show that this necessity (i. e. the 
unity of experience) essentially amounts to the possibility of the existence of a permanent, 
self-conscious self through time. The unity of the latter is rendered possible only under the 
unifying activity of the categories and in this sense, the categories are necessary and 
universal conditions for the possibility of all experience and thus objectively valid. 
Categories then are considered as rules which function a priori, i. e. universally and 
necessarily, as unifying operators of experience which render it possible. Kant, however, is 
not content with this claim. He also asserts that only such rules can account for the 
possibility of experience, otherwise, there can be no notion of experience at all. How can 
Kant make such a strong claim? As we will try to show, its strength is derived from Kant's 
severe claims for the identity of the self, since the conditions of the possibility of 
experience are essentially reduced to the conditions for the establishment of the self- 
conscious self. 
We cite once more the key proposition, this time, in order to read an implicit determination 
of experience: "It must be possible, for the I think to accompany all my representations; for 
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otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought at all, and 
that is equivalent to saying that the representation would be impossible, or at least would 
be nothing to me" (CPR, B 13 1). Here, experience is conceived as being inextricably linked 
with the self-conscious states of the self, with the taking up of each representation by self- 
consciousness, the activity of the self upon its own contents as continuous self-affection, 
and from this point of view, as a continuous process of unification. The latter should not be 
considered as the bringing of many representations under one consciousness, but as 
unification of these representations simultaneously with the unification of the infinite "I 
think"-consciousness of the self, which includes the former. Kant does not claim that the 
self first experiences the intuition, and then subsumes it under the concept. The only way 
the I think" can accompany its representations is to grasp their manifold at once as unity. 
In this sense the unity of apperception is not just an analytic unity, as Kant himself 
misleadingly states (CPR, B 135), but a synthetic one, since it consists in a unifying process 
rather than in the tautological connection implied by the statement, "in so far as all 
representations are nune they are connected in one consciousness". The analytic conception 
of unity cannot account for the necessity of rules, that is, for the necessary connecting 
relations among the different representations, since the latter would be unified by a simple 
act of one consciousness (the crucible of the Ego). 
Kant does not clarify this distinction, thus allowing for the reading that we previously 
discussed. He generally states that the basic idea of the unity of any experience must be 
effected by the understanding, which is the only possible active faculty of combining, as 
opposed to the passive receptivity of sensibility: 
the unity which the object makes necessary can be nothing else than the formal unity 
of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations. " (CPR, A 105). 
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The following passage, however, provides a new perspective for our inquiry into the nature 
of the transcendental unity of apperception: 
Whatever the origin of our representations is, whether they are due to the 
influence of outer things, or are produced through inner causes, whether they arise 
a priori, or being appearances have an empirical origin, they must all, as 
modifications of the mind, belong to inner sense. All our knowledge is thus 
finally subject to time, the formal condition of inner sense. In it they must all be 
ordered, connected and brought into relation. This is a general observation which, 
throughout what follows, must be bom in mind as being quite fundamental. 
Every intuition contains in itself a manifold which can be represented as a 
manifold only in so far as the mind distinguishes the time in the sequence of one 
impression upon another; for each representation in so far as it is contained in a 
single moment, can never be anything but absolute unity [my emphasis] (A99) 
Kant conceives the diversity as being eventually generated by time, and consequently, its 
synthesis in turn can occur in temporal terms. Since each representation belongs to inner 
sense, and is thus subject to time, its taking-up by self-consciousness occurs concomitantly 
in time and accordingly the unity of apperception has to be conceived in terms of the 
temporality of self-consciousness. 
Why, though, should this unity be prescribed according to a priori rules? Why could not a 
unity be effected by custom, habit, by the empirical association of the various 
representations, a posteriori? Why should a 'transcendental ground' exist for this unity? 
One response could be attained through the recalling of the necessary character of 
experience, the assumption that if there were not necessarily and universally connected 
representations, then experience would not exist at all, but only ineffable glances. 
However, if the answer rests on the definition of experience, the argument becomes 
regressive in the way we discussed in the first section. Therefore, the necessity of this kind 
of unity should not be derived from the definition of experience, which constitutes the 
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result rather than the point of departure for the proof: experience is conceived as being thus 
united because otherwise there would not exist a permanent self through time. This is the 
essential point and the core of the whole enterprise of the deduction: "... only in so far as I 
can grasp the manifold of the representations in one consciousness, do I call them one and 
all mine. For otherwise I should have as many-coloured and diverse a self as I have 
representations of which I am conscious to myself. "(CPR, B 132) In other words, each time 
I am conscious of a representation, I have to become conscious that I am the same self as 
that which had the former representation. This condition has to be understood only as a 
fonnal one; for only the formal requirement of the identity of the self can account for the 
necessitation of the a priori nature of the rules. Kant' s thought is determined by the notion 
of identity as absolute and undifferentiated 'sameness' and 'oneness', which can exist only 
so far as - as it is argued in the Paralogisms, of Rational Psychology - there is not the "least 
trace of intuition" in the "I". 
That the "r' of apperception and therefore the "r' in every act of thought, is one, 
and cannot be resolved into a plurality of subjects, and consequently signifies a 
logically simple subject, is something already contained in the very concept of 
thought, and is therefore an analytic proposition. But this does not mean that the 
thinking "F' is a simple substance. That proposition would be synthetic. The 
concept of substance always relates to intuitions which cannot in me be other than 
sensible, and which therefore lie entirely outside the field of the understanding 
and its thought. (CPR, B408) 
This formal condition - that I have to be one and the same self-conscious subject in each of 
my thoughts, regardless of the concrete content of each thought - can be prescribed only by 
a priori connections. Only a priori rules can guarantee the formal identity of the self for, 
otherwise, an empirical consciousness would arise, which "is in itself diverse and without 
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relation to the identity of the subject" (CPR, A120). As already mentioned, Kant is rather 
obsessed with the notion of the identity of the self as pure unity, but since he also wants to 
radically demarcate himself from the metaphysical tradition - where the T is identified 
with the soul that is simple substance - he conceives the identity in an entirelyformal way. 
Also, in the Paralogisms, he claims: 
Consciousness is indeed, that which alone makes all representations to be 
thoughts, and in it, therefore, as the transcendental subject, all our perceptions 
must be found; but beyond this logical meaning of the "I", we have no knowledge 
of the subject in itself, which as substratum underlies this "I", as it does all 
thoughts. 
The above extract presents Kant's understanding of the 'I' in terms of a mere logical, 
empty vehicle of all thoughts. As we have seen, Kant's use of this notion undermines his 
attempt to deduce the categories; for if any such non-transitory empty T pre-existed 
representation, then the need for rules would not arise. However, Kant in the Third 
Paralogism makes space for a formal, though time-determined, notion of numerical identity 
of the self, which can supply a sufficient ground for the need of both rules - in order to 
mediate the transitions -, and their a priori nature as well. He claims that from the notion of 
the self s identity, nothing about the knowledge of the personality can be inferred - as 
rational psychology does -, but only the notion of self-consciousness in time: "For really it 
says nothing more than that in the whole time in which I am conscious of myself, I am 
conscious of this time as belonging to the unity of myself-, and it comes to the same 
whether I say that this whole time is in me, as individual unity, or that I am to be found as 
numerically identical in all this time. " (CPR, A362). Kant's reference to time has no 
relation to any empirical, social or historical conceptualisation of it, for these forms imply 
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empirical consciousness and preclude the transcendental construction of the identity of the 
self The notion of time is introduced in terms of an a priori form of intuition that is 
compatible with the requirement of the formal identity of the self. Moreover, the 
transcendental account of time is provided in terms of a linear succession of time-units, 
which is compatible with the requirement of mediating rules for their unification. "We 
represent the time-sequence by a line progressing to infinity, on which the manifold 
constitutes a series of one dimension only; and we reason from the properties of this line to 
all properties of time, with this one exception, that while the parts of the line are 
simultaneous the parts of time are always successive. " (CPR, B50) Therefore, according to 
the preceding analysis of the notion of the unity of apperception, in a schematic way, the 
deduction of the categories would be achieved as follows: 
1. There can exist the thought, as condition, as requirement, that I am one and the same 
self-conscious self in all of my thoughts, regardless of the concrete content of each thought. 
This thought refers to the formal structure of self-consciousness and as such determines the 
nature of the required unity of apperception as a priori, i. e. universal and necessary and in 
this sense o ective. 
2. Nevertheless, the very fact of being conscious in the sense that I can be one and the 
same self-conscious being in all of my representations, is itself an actual thought, which 
exists as an instance of the "I think" -thought, and not as a non-transitory "I think". Hence, 
in every instance of my self-consciousness there is a reference to the totality of all other 
instances, and it is through this reference that the self s identity may be constituted. From 
the above, the need for an ordered transition of the self from one state to another, emerges, 
so that the constantformal sameness and oneness of the self may be secured. This type of 
ordered transition can only be effected by means of universal and necessary rules. 
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3. The categories then, are nothing but functions for the co-ordination of all possible "I 
think"-instances which render possible the identity of the self and establish its persistence 
through time. The argument is completed by the confirmation of the unity of the self 
through its relation to experience, since the synthesising function of the categories is 
crystallised into an 'object in general' and is expressed in the form of judgement (object as 
that under the concept of which the manifold of an intuition is united). 
In brief, the formal unity of the self requires the a priori ordering of its representations. 
This makes experience a coherent, ordered whole in which, in turn, the self recognises its 
own unity: ".. if cinnabar were sometimes red, sometimes black, sometimes light, 
sometimes heavy, if a man changed sometimes into this and sometimes into that animal 
form . ...... my empirical imagination would never find opportunity when representing red 
colour to bring to mind heavy cinnabar. " (CPR, A 101) 
Hence, Kant establishes the "supreme principle" of all possible employment of the 
understanding, which is "that all the manifold of intuition should be subject to conditions 
of the original synthetic unity of apperception" (CPR, B306). 
However, the critical question arises: how can the spontaneous activity of the 
understanding take the form of rule-delivering in the first place ? Kant needs to resort to a 
further crucial presupposition, which, however, is never subjected to the need of any sort of 
deduction. This is the fundamental assumption of the self's a priori certainty of its formal 
identity. 
All possible appearances belong, as representations, to the entire possible self- 
consciousness. From this however, as a transcendental representation, numerical 
identity is inseparable, and a priori certain, since nothing can come into cognition 
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except by means of its original apperception. (CPR, A 113) 
For the mind could not possibly think the identity of itself in the multiplicity of its 
representations, and indeed this a priori, if it did not have before its eyes the 
identity of its action. (CPR, A96) 
However, the a priori certainty of the self is never deduced, and thus the limits of the 
transcendental method appear, as is the case for every transcendental argument, which in 
order to establish a priori knowledge has to resort to another a priori assumption. 
We are thus provided with a more sophisticated and seemingly consistent argument for the 
deduction, based on the notion of the identity of the self, but we question precisely this 
notion, and moreover, the ungrounded certainty which is required by virtue of the nature of 
the required identity. The latter, though, does not deliver Kant's enterprise from consequent 
internal inconsistencies. 
As we saw, Kant established the supreme principle of the employment of the 
understanding, according to which any kind of combination of all possible representations 
should be subject to the categories. The employment of the categories becomes the 
condition of all awareness. Accordingly, even empirical or subjective unity of 
consciousness - which is a determination of inner sense - should be derived from the 
original unity of apperception: ".... only the original unity is objectively valid; the empirical 
unity of apperception upon which we are not here dwelling, and which besides is merely 
derived from the former under given conditions in concreto, has only subjective validity" 
(B 140, my emphasis). Kant does not suggest - as he does in the Prolegomena - that there is 
either mere subjective unity of empirical association, or objective judgement by means of 
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the employment of the categories. Instead of sharply cutting off the subjective unity from 
the objective, he considers the former as arising from the latter. How then are we to 
understand the notion of subjective unity as being 'derivable' from the transcendental unity 
of apperception? A possible interpretation could run as follows: when I make a claim based 
on subjective association, e. g., I conjoin two events as being causally connected according 
to my subjective judgements of perception, the unity of this claim may be considered to 
derive from the original unity of apperception in the sense that I make my subjective claim 
in terms of causality. In other words, only because I have in my mind the notion of 
causality, as a formal rule which has to order the manifold, do I ascribe causal connection 
to the relation between the two representations, regardless of any further specification 
according to which I can subsume the proper content under the category of causality. But if 
this is the case, which then are the criteria - if they are not the categories whose application 
is claimed as universal - according to which we could clearly discriminate between 
subjective and objective claims? 
This problem remains unsolvable in the context of the Kantian sharp distinctions between 
form and content, concept and intuition, truth and illusion. It especially reveals the impasse 
caused by any notion of category, either as an objectivity-conferring constraint, or as a 
universal and necessary rule of unification of any manifold of intuition, because both 
notions are derived from the sharp dichotomy between form and content, according to 
which objectivity and necessity are ascribed to the former, subjectivity and contingency to 
the latter. 
Furthermore, the requirement of the static, formal identity of the self excludes the 
possibility of dreams, visions, or any states where the subject does not recognise in them its 
continuing and absolutely same Ego - in fact, states which, as will be seen in following 
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chapters, may lead to even deeper levels of self-consciousness. Instead, according to Kant, 
these states do not count at all as synthesised representations but as mere ineffable glances, 
and ultimately as irrational ones; the formal unity of the self excludes the possibility of any 
sense of break, loss, or change of its pure abiding identity. 
However, the deduction from the unity of apperception, as we tried to present it above, 
provides a serious contribution to the notion of self-consciousness, which consists in the 
conception of self-consciousness as a mediated and conditioned process, as opposed to the 
Cartesian revelation of the Ego through the immediate introspection of the inner sense. The 
unity of self-consciousness is not conceived as pre-existing or immediately acquired by the 
cogito, but can be achieved only through the mediation of the synthetic activity of the 
understanding, the recognition of a coherent experience which reconfirms the unity of the 
self. Self-consciousness is constructed through a continuing self-mirroring to its 'objects in 
general'. The a priori certainty of the self s identity can be actualised only through the 
mediating synthesis of the self's representations. However, this notion of mediation is too 
weak and elementary and in fact is spurious. For, as we will try to elucidate in the next 
section, the issue of the relation between subject-object in Kant is eventually internalised 
within the self, between its two faculties - understanding and receptivity-, where the former 
ultimately determines the latter. The mediation of self-consciousness is then a play between 
the 'selves' within the same self, the transcendental and the phenomenal one, as in the 
practical philosophy between the noumenon and the phenomenal ego. One could object 
that in Critical Philosophy empirical realism is a permanent feature and that Kant 
systematically tries to avoid any solipsistic reduction of empirical reality to consciousness' 
products. The Refutation of Idealism section is indicative. This may well be the case, but 
so long as empirical realism has no consistent relation with Kant's arguments in the 
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deduction, especially with regard to the role of the understanding and its relation to 
intuition, it ends up as a mere assertion: empirical realism is ultimately equated with the 
assumption of the 'things in themselves', and, consequently, does not essentially intervene 
in the understanding-intuition relation, despite Kant's permanent efforts to incorporate 
empirical reality in his cognitive enterprise and render legitimate - by delineating the limits 
- the concepts of the understanding. 
We turn then to an examination of the nature of this mediation and its consequences for the 
deduction. 
The spurious mediation 
So far, we have seen how Kant established the supreme principle of the understanding. 
However, in §2 1 (CPR), he claims that only a beginning of the deduction is made. Hence he 
states: 
In what follows (§26) it will be shown, from the mode in which the empirical 
intuition is given in sensibility, that its unity is no other than that which the 
category (according to §20) prescribes to the manifold of a given intuition in 
general. Only thus, by demonstration of the a priori validity of the categories in 
respect of all objects of our senses, will the purpose of the deduction be fully 
attained. (CPR, B 145) 
However, the remaining task for the completion of the deduction is not as stated above7, 
7 See Henrich D., "The Proof-Structure of Transcendental Deduction", Review of Metaphysics (88), where 
Henrich claims that Kant up to §20 "does not clarify the range within which unitary intuitions can be found". 
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i. e., the applicability of the categories to all objects, as their universal and unrestricted 
validity. The latter, in our view, has already been proved by the claim on the use of the 
categories as necessary conditions of the persistence of the self in time. For the requirement 
of the unity of the self necessitates the unity of all possible representations of the self, and 
from this point of view, the categories have to be applicable to any manifold which may 
possibly count as experience. Instead, the remaining task for the deduction is that the 
categories are actually capable of taking up the 'given' into the unity of apperception; that 
all the manifold, not only should be subject to the original unity of apperception, but also, 
can be so. In other words, that there is no possibility for the case that: "Appearances might 
very well be so constituted that the understanding should not find them to be in accordance 
with the conditions of its unity. " (CPR, B 123). Hence, by means of this second step, Kant 
intends to prove that the applicability of the categories is not only a condition for the 
possibility of experience, but also an actuality which makes systematic knowledge of 
experience and self-consciousness possible. This crucial and indispensable step, however, 
is proved in such a way that undermines even more the legitimate use of the concepts of the 
understanding. 
Kant says that until this stage of the deduction, he had abstracted from the proof, the mode 
in which the manifold is given and paid attention solely to the unity of the understanding. 
He will now try to prove that all the manifold can be taken up by the categories and that its 
unity is no other than that prescribed by them precisely by virtue of the mode in which this 
manifold is given. He transfers the centre of gravity of the deduction from the necessity of 
the unification of the given, to the 'givenness' itself which allows for this unity. He 
completes the deduction by proving that there would not exist intuitions that would fail to 
conform to the categories due to the mode of their 'givenness' in space and time. The 
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following footnote is quite illuminating: 
Space, represented as object, contains more than mere form of intuition; it also 
contains combination of the manifold, given according to the form of sensibility, 
in an intuitive representation, so that theform of intuition gives only a manifold, 
theformal intuition gives unity of representations. 
In the Aesthetic I have treated this unity as belonging merely to sensibility, simply 
in order to emphasise that it precedes any concept, although, as a matter of fact, it 
presupposes a synthesis which does not belong to the senses but through which all 
concepts of space and time first become possible (my emphasis). For since by its 
means (in that the understanding detennines the sensibility) [my emphasis], space 
and time are first given as intuition ... (CPR, Bnl6 I) 
Deciphering this obscure and dense passage, we can make the following remarks: the mode 
of 'givenness' which renders all intuitions conformable to the categories, relies on the 
assumptions that: a) all intuitions belong to the a priori framework of space and time (form 
of intuition), and, consequently, their form can be conformable to a priori rules, b) space 
and time themselves, thus everything which is intuited in their terms, presuppose a 
synthesis which is deterniined by the understanding (fonnal intuition). Kant, in trying to 
show the possible way through which given intuitions are conceptualisable, claims that 
conceptual conformity to the intuitional conditions of human sensibility, itself presupposes 
their minimal conceptualisation (not in temporal but in epistemological terms). Hence, he 
refutes his own dichotomies between the strict roles of spontaneity and receptivity, concept 
and intuition, thereby radically relativising the notion of the object. If Kant claimed that 
Locke sensualised concepts and Leibniz idealised intuitions, he himself seems to be 
trapped by a similar way of bridging the dichotomies that he himself created. 
The point that we want to illuminate is that the understanding that was supposed to be 
conditioned by sensibility, ends up itself conditioning and determining its 'other'. Self- 
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consciousness is supposed to be mediated by its experience, but the latter, precisely 
because it is exclusively its experience, renders the mediation 'spurious' and finally always 
remains alien to both - real but unknowable - world and Ego. 
From the previous inquiry into the attempt of the deduction of the categories, we can trace, 
regardless of the degree of success of the deduction per se, the formulation of the main 
features of the conceptual-representational mode of thinking and of transcendental logic. 
We now offer the following general remarks by way of concluding our discussion. 
1. Conceptual thinking proceeds from the assumption of an external manifold which stands 
opposed to the subject of knowledge. This manifold is conceived as the passive material 
which is immediately given to the subject. However, it seems that nothing breaks 
immediately into the subject. The manifold is given to the subject through the subject's 
faculty of receptivity. The immediacy of the material is mediated through the a priori 
conditions of sensibility, namely, time and space, and becomes, from mere presentation, 
representation. 
2. We understand time as an a priori form of intuition, as an indication of the finiteness of 
the human mind, in the sense that all possible sensible representations of outer and inner 
sense, are eventually subject to inner sense, which appears to function as the sieve through 
which the world is filtered by the faculty of a priori sensibility. As such, time pertains only 
to the mode of givenness, or to the conditions of receptivity, which is conceived in entirely 
passive terms. Time is associated with the structural limitations of human sensibility and 
thus only with the concept of human finitude. Moreover, this conception of time takes on a 
more specific meaning. It acquires the structural form of the mind that conditions it to 
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intuit every possible sensual material as continuous, infinite, successive, isolated units, 
given in a linear mode. Through this conceptualisation of time, we identify a second basic 
element of conceptual thinking, namely, that it proceeds through the path of thorough 
analytical distinctions in terms of precise temporal determinations. These analytically 
distinguished sensible elements in turn, lie in need of synthesis, if they intend to constitute 
objects of knowledge. This conceptualisation of time proves to be the key mediating form, 
through which self-consciousness is perceived as a process of unification. The temporal 
dimension of self-consciousness is a fruitful contribution. However, as we saw, time stands 
for an a priori form of intuition, and as such is not associated with the spontaneity of 
concepts themselves. In addition, the confinement of time exclusively to the domain of 
finitude of human receptivity does not imply that the latter should be specified in the form 
of a linear succession of isolated representations. It seems that the Kantian concept of time, 
which claims a priori status, rather reflects the predominant 17th century scientific 
conceptualisation of time. The restriction of the concept of time to the conditions of 
sensibility, fixes a rigid separation between the finite nature of sensual representations - 
which are subject to temporality - and the infinite nature of the concepts of the 
understanding - which spring spontaneously out of time. Time and Eternity appear to 
pertain to two sharply distinct realms. The highly modem conceptualisation of time then, 
paradoxically, reintroduces the old distinction of a traditional mythological pattern of 
thinking between the temporal and the eternal, the profane and the sacred, in the modem 
forms of the dichotomy between phenomenal knowledge and faith, sensuality and moral 
autonomy. 
The essential contribution of Kant's enterprise is the establishment of the problematic of 
self-consciousness in terms of time and mediation. He thereby introduces the possibility of 
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a rupture with both the asocial, ahistorical Cartesian and the empiricist models of self- 
awareness. However, the limitations of this problematic of self-consciousness, which 
derive from its restriction within the realm of a transcendental conceptualisation of time, 
suggest the need for a further rupture with precisely this way of conceptualising time and 
the concomitant model of self-consciousness in terms of formal identity. 
3. The above analytically distinguished sensible representations lie in need of synthesis. 
The latter is an act of spontaneity, perfonned by the faculty of understanding, which is 
considered as a pure self-legislating activity. Understanding, by means of the spontaneous 
production of laws, transforms the fragmented sensible representations into a coherent, 
rule-governed unity; into objects of experience. The concepts of understanding, as they 
ground the 'land of truth, are required to prove their right to employment. They have to be 
legitimate, otherwise their use would lead to illusions, paralogisms, and antinomies, as the 
illegitimate use of Reason does whenever the latter transcends the bounds of experience 
and seeks the unconditioned. This, however, belongs to faith, not to knowledge. Only the 
conditioned use of the understanding within the limits of experience could be justifiable: 
only a legal contract between the understanding and the senses would render the former 
legitimate. Nevertheless, as we saw, this contract ultimately amounts, after a long journey 
in the realm of appearances, to the conditions for the existence of the self-conscious, 
persistent-in-time selL 
The self can secure its unity only so long as its representations and corresponding states 
can be synthesised in an a priori way. However, these representations are already 'inwardly 
determined' by the understanding: the legal contract turns into the domination of the 
understanding upon the sensibility. The requirement for the formal unity of the self is none 
other than that which pertains to the assurance of the bearer of the faculty of the 
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understanding. Therefore, the understanding eventually acquires its right to use its concepts 
by virtue of the requirement of its own existence! This striking contradiction is but the 
result of the transcendental method itself-, a method that pursues the validation of the 
faculties of Reason as autonomous and so a priori. A faculty thus considered is one that 
finds its law in itself and at the same time, because of its self-legislating nature, has to 
judge itself in order to legitimise - i. e. to give universal validity - its own right to legislate - 
8 
which is particular. The reduction of the 'enchanting land of truth' to the 'mere play of our 
representations', is then, an unconfessed acceptance of this antinomy by Kant himself. 
Hence, in the context of transcendental logic, spontaneity is specified as a rule-giving 
activity and experience is confined to the representations that are taken up by the formally 
identical self. Experience is the unity through which the self confirms its identity, and from 
this point of view, experience is essentially conceived in terms of the conditions for self- 
affirmation and thereby of property relations. 
4. In Kant's conceptual thinking the world is turned into a representation of the subject. 
The latter not only implies a dualistic separation between subject-object, but also the 
suggestion that, in this relation, only the subject is active, while the object assumes a 
passive, lifeless character. In fact, this distinction is replicated within the subject itself in 
the form of the internal distribution of active and passive roles for the understanding and 
sensibility respectively, and the predominance of the former over the latter. The 
representational account of experience derives not only from Kant's dualism, but also from 
his restricted conception of spontaneity. The latter pertains only to the faculty of 
understanding and indeed is conceived as a rule-giving activity. Moreover, spontaneity is 
eventually reduced to a logical concept. Transcendental logic essentially claims its right to 
Rose G., Dialectic of Nihilism, p. 15 - 16. 
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engulf experience, but so long as this claim is based on the self-legislative character of 
spontaneity, the objectivity of representations is transformed into a mere play, and the 
legislator into an impotent subject, confronting the realm of noumena where its laws have 
no authority. 
Hence, we can hardly see in Kant's resort to the understanding's self-legislative 
spontaneity, a claim for the establishment of the notion of the absolute subject, as 
Heidegger suggests9. Rather, we recognise here, Kant's attempt to construct a notion of the 
self s identity that intends to protect it from its severe limitations - namely its paralogisms 
and antinornies - whenever it engages with the paradoxes of the cosmos. It is not the 
subject but its limitations that appear as absolute, and these appear so, due to the role that is 
ascribed to the subject's spontaneity, i. e. law-giving. The main problem does not consist in 
the resort to the spontaneity of the understanding, but in the confinement of spontaneity to 
the domain of transcendental logic. 
Kant's response to his central question on the possibility of synthetic a piori judgements is 
provided by the conceptualisation of experience as a transparent and orderly unified whole 
and, simultaneously, by the acknowledgement of the radical limitations of this notion, since 
it pertains only to the realm of phenomena. Cognitive experience is conceived at once as 
formally transparent and impenetrably opaque: this is an aporetic account of experience, 
where aporia is intended to be solved and yet - ironically by virtue of its solution - becomes 
fixed and static. 
I See Heidegger M., Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. We discuss this issue in detail in Appendix I. 
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Chapter 2 
From Determinant to Reflective Judgement: The normalisation 
of experience 
In the previous chapter, we examined Kant's response to his main question on the 
possibility of synthetic a priori judgements. The necessity and universality of the latter has 
been deduced by virtue of the requirement of the formal identity of the self through time. 
The latter, in turn, can be attained by means of the synthetic activity of the understanding, 
which spontaneously generates the universal and necessary unifying rules. Synthesis is 
carried through the law-giving spontaneity of the understanding. However, the laws, which 
I 
understanding prescribes for nature, do not exhaust the multiplicity and infinite variety of 
the particular relations that abound in experience. These also need to be lawfully organised 
if experience is still intended to be considered orderly unified. The lawfulness of the 
particular arises as the new problem, and indeed in terms of its compatibility with the laws 
of the understanding, for otherwise the identity of the self would be suspended by the 
lawless irruption of the particular. The difficult task for the resolution of this problem is 
now assigned to a new type of synthetic judgement, the reflective judgement. This 
judgement, starting from the particular, is called to find its law, so that it be commensurate 
with the laws of the understanding. According to Kant, if this aim is met, a feeling of 
pleasure emerges in the subject: "The attainment of every aim is coupled with a feeling of 
pleasure"(0, § 10). Hence, the central question of the possibility of synthetic judgements 
arises anew, in the form: 
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How is a judgement possible which, going merely upon the individual's own 
feeling of pleasure in an object independent of the concept of it, estimates this as a 
pleasure attached to the representation of the same object in every other 
individual, and does so , i. e., without being allowed to wait and see if other 
people will be of the same mind? ( CJ, §36,288) 
Reflective judgement lies in need of deducing its claims. However, since the former is not 
carried through the concepts of the understanding, what is the bearer of synthesis, or rather 
how is synthesis now conceived, and on what ground are the results of this synthetic 
activity conceived as universal and necessary? 
We need then to proceed to a close investigation of Kant's account of reflective judgement. 
As a preliminary remark, we would like to emphasise that synthesis now is introduced in 
terms of feeling, and indeed as one of pleasure, which usually for Kant pertains to the 
empirical rather than to the conceptual realm. Moreover, synthetic unity is associated with 
the innovative conception of free play, occurring between the interactive parts - 
understanding and imagination - in the reflective procedure. This approach endows 
reflective judgement with new dynamic features, which may potentially break Kant's 
transcendental standpoint and open new insights into the notion of experience and the 
relation between man and the world. However, as far as the free play pertains exclusively 
to the subjective cognitive powers, reflective judgement is conceived as a syn-thetic act, 
and its promising dynamism is absorbed by the positing principles of Reason. 
Nevertheless, reflective judgement is characterised by an internal tension, which, despite 
Kant's ultimate determination to resolve it, is worthwhile considering. 
In fact, the tension of reflective judgement originates in the unresolved aporias of 
determinant judgement. These are not traced in the concept of the identity of the self, since 
this seems to constitute an unquestionable condition of experience in Kant's problematic. 
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The aporias are associated with the faculty of judgement itself, with our ability to judge at 
all, namely, to think the particular as contained under the universal. 
In the First Critique, Kant argues that, in fact, there can exist no further rule that would 
instruct judgement on how to subsume a particular under a rule: 
If it [general logic] sought to give general instructions how we are to subsume 
under these rules, that is, to distinguish whether something does or does not come 
under them, that could only be by means of another rule. This in turn, for the very 
reason it is a rule, again demands guidance from judgement. Thus, it appears that, 
though understanding is capable of being instructed, and of being equipped with 
rules, judgement is a peculiar talent, which can be practised only, and cannot be 
taught. It is the specific quality of so-called mother-wit; and its lack no school can 
make good. (CPR, A133, B172) 
Not only is there a logical problem of infinite regress implied in these rules, but also a 
problem with the very act of the determinant judgement itself, that is, the subsumption of 
particulars under pre-existing, rigid and formal universals. However, while natural talent 
cannot be taught, and for its lack "there is no remedy.... transcendental philosophy has the 
peculiarity that besides the rules (or rather the universal conditions of rules), which are 
given in the pure concepts of the understanding, it can also specify the instance to which 
the rule is to be applied" (B 175, my emphasis). It is the Analytic of Principles, the 
Schematism and the System of the Principles of pure understanding, under the common 
title, the Transcendental Doctrine of Judgement, which will provide the canon for 
judgement. 
In this section, Kant attempts to solve the problem of the judging-power, but in fact only 
specifies the terms of the subsumption of the particulars under the universal, without 
actually addressing the issue of the instance of the subsumption, namely, the problem of 
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how this particular could be subsumed under a given concept. The Schernatism merely 
attempts to give a plausible exposition of the way in which a pure intelligible concept can 
apply to an entirely sensible intuition, i. e., how these entirely heterogeneous entities could 
be united. The answer to this enigma is given by the notion of time, the pure intuition that 
is claimed to be homogeneous with both concept and intuition. The schema is a formal 
determination of time provided by the productive imagination, according to the demands of 
the understanding. It is therefore a method, a rule in terms of time, and not an image, as M. 
Heidegger and H. Arendt have argued. ' 
An 'image -version' of the schema would be a universal, determining, substantial eikon of 
the particular, which would allow for a Platonic eikastic reading of the Kantian concept, 
leaving out hisformalist methodology which is central to the whole critical project. In fact, 
the whole enterprise of the deduction of the categories is based on Kant's formalism, 
particularly as regards the requirement of the unity of the original apperception as the 
exigency for the formal identity of the subject. On Arendt's reading, taking the schema to 
be a substantial image, there could not exist any organisation and unification of the 
manifold under rules, but merely the recognition of a 'faint copy' in its perfect eikon. 
The conceptualisation of the schema as given by the productive imagination and as 
partaking in the rules for the subsumption of the manifold, can be properly understood by a 
consideration of the relationship between imagination and understanding in the CPR. 
1 Hannah Arendt interprets schema as an image, in order to parallel it with aesthetic judgement: "It is 
something beyond or between thought and sensibility; it belongs to thought insofar as it is outwardly 
invisible, and it belongs to sensibility insofar as it is something like an image" (H. Arendt, Lectures on Kant's 
Political Philosophy (LKPP hereafter), p. 82. Arendt is influenced by Heidegger's reading of Kant's notion of 
the schematism, and the role of imagination in his work. In Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Heidegger 
interprets the schema as a schema-image, but distances himself from a Platonic interpretation. He uses the 
term merely in order to emphasise the 'sensual' dimension of the schema (KPM p. 97). This is again 
problematic, since the schema is considered by Kant as purely formal. 
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In the 'A' deduction we read: 
A pure imagination, which conditions all a priori knowledge, is thus one of the 
fundamental faculties of the human soul. By its means we bring the manifold of 
intuition on the one side, into connection with the condition of the necessary unity 
of pure apperception on the other. (A 124) 
Imagination (we are mainly concerned with productive) appears as a mediating faculty 
between intuition and concept that belongs either to sensibility or understanding. 
Imagination is the faculty of representing in intuition an object that is not itself 
present. Now since all our intuition is sensible, the imagination, owing to the 
subjective condition under which alone it can give to the concepts of 
understanding a corresponding intuition, belongs to sensibility. But inasmuch as 
its synthesis is an expression of spontaneity...., and which is therefore able to 
determine sense a priori in respect of its form in accordance with the unity of 
apperception, imagination is to that extent a faculty which determines the 
sensibility ; and its synthesis of intuitions, conforming as it does to the categories, 
must be the transcendental synthesis of imagination. This synthesis is an action of 
the understanding (my emphasis) on the sensibility. (B 152) 
Here, imagination seems to hold an equivocal status, between sensibility and 
understanding, similar to that of time, which is assumed to pertain to both concept and 
intuition. However, this twofold nature does not address the main question of the 
applicability of the universal upon the particular, as long as the latter pertains to the 
empirical realm. The same confusion appears concerning the various definitions of inner 
sense, which, on the one hand is associated with mere subjective or empirical 
representations, and on the other, as the site of time, with forms of intuition. 
The tension which accompanies determinant judgement with regard to the applicability of 
its concepts, is deflated by means of the 'Solution' of the schernatism. In the latter though, 
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the twofold status of imagination and time loses its transitive, mediating role between 
universal and particular, concept and intuition, so long as imagination and understanding 
are restricted to the subjective sphere. This becomes more obvious by briefly looking at the 
nature of imagination's activity. In the CPR, imagination appears responsible for two 
crucial functions: the figurative synthesis, and the production of the schema. The figurative 
synthesis concerns the synthesis of the manifold of sensible intuition, which constitutes 
what Kant names formal intuition. It is a unity that belongs to space and time, and from 
this point of view, hangs on the sensible aspect of imagination, but is determined by the 
understanding (B 15 1, B 153, B 161 note 1). The schema, as has been mentioned, is a 
transcendental product of imagination that enables the application of the concepts of the 
understanding to the already synthesised formal intuition. Therefore, in both activities, 
imagination works under the tutelage of the understanding, in order to enable the latter's 
subsumptive action. Imagination's creativity is restricted to the possible ways of bridging 
the gap between sensibility and understanding, under the latter's authority. In this context, 
imagination plays a secondary role to that of the understanding, and its activity is in fact 
only an extension of the understanding's power. 
Schernatism thernatises the riddle of judgement-power and despite its claims on its solution 
by means of time, the unresolved tension between universal and particular, recurs through 
the perplexity of reflective judgement. 
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In Search of a principle of Judgement 
Despite Kant's attempt to elaborate through the transcendental doctrine of judgement, "the 
conditions under which objects can be given in harmony with these concepts" (B 174), and 
thus to answer the riddle of the capacity to judge (urteilskraft), the mystery remains 
unsolved. "This schernatism of our understanding..... is an art concealed in the depths of 
the human soul, whose real modes of activity nature is hardly likely ever to allow us to 
discover, and to have open to our gaze. " (B 180). In the CJ, Kant confesses that the very 
nature of judgement itself entails that "the discovery of a principle peculiar to judgement 
must be a task involving considerable difficulties. " Yet, "a critique of pure reason, i. e., of 
our power of judging on principles, would be incomplete if the ability to judge, which is a 
cognitive ability, and as such lays claim to independent principles, were not dealt with in 
its own right, " And so "the critical search for a principle of judgement... is the most 
important in a critique of this faculty" (CJ 174). Indeed, in the Third Critique, we do not 
have the exposition of cognitive, moral or aesthetic judgements, but rather the judging- 
power itself reflects upon itself, and becomes reflective. 
There is a tendency among most of the commentators on the CJ to rush to give solutions to 
the aporias of the judging-power, confining their readings to the search for a principle, and 
thus to the transcendental realm. We would not disagree that the organisation of the Third 
Critique suggests this reading, but an exclusive concentration on the remarks in the 
Introduction leads to a lack of consideration of the internal contradictions of Kant's 
procedure. Consequently, there is often little identification of the points in Kant's - often 
perplexing - ramblings in search of a principle of the j udging-power, where he exceeds his 
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own analytical distinctions. Thus the problernatizing of the transcendental area itself in the 
Third Critique, and the new, yet incomplete, and often self-contradictory, dynamism that is 
here introduced into the critical project, remains under-theorised. Therefore, D. Bell argues 
that in the Critique of Judgement we find Kant's solution to the aporia of judgement. 2 The 
latter consists in "our ability to enjoy a spontaneous, criterialess, disinterested, 
presumptively universal, non-cognitive, reflective feeling that certain diverse elements of 
experience as such belong together, and that they comprise an intrinsically satisfying whole 
,, 3 in virtue of their seeming to have a point. The origin and expression of this feeling is our 
spontaneous and primordial 'feeling at home in nature'. "This is the principle of nature's 
formal finality for our cognitive faculties in its particular (empirical) laws -a principle 
without which understanding could not feel itself at home in nature. " (CJ 193/5) According 
to the same commentator, the riddle of judgement is solved by such a direct awareness of 
an intrinsic coherence, a primordial, innate feeling at home in nature that is the subjective 
condition for the possibility of objective knowledge. Without this feeling, phenomena 
would always be problematic and opaque. Bell gives as the following example of this 
feeling: 
As I walk into the gallery, my attention is caught by a particularly large canvas, a 
work of abstract expressionism, a Jackson Pollock, for example. I walk over and 
stand before it...., and look. But it remains stubbornly problematic, obstinately 
refusing to yield whatever sense it may have.... I persist, however, and after a 
while I begin to find a pleasure in the painting that causes me to smile: it has 
begun to work for me- on me. And in the pleasure I feel in contemplating it, I 
approach, I believe, as closely as I know how to an exclusively aesthetic 
response.... [This response] is a feeling.... an immensely complex one, and 
involves the feeling that the whole has an integrity, a point. 4 
2 Bell D., "The Art of Judgement" In Kant. ý Critical Assessments, Yo 14. 3 Ibid., p. 24. 
4 Ibid., p. 28. 
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In other words, the solution to the mystery of judgement is revealed in the aesthetic 
response, by dint of our primordial familiarity with the world which enables us to have an 
immediate awareness of unity, to make sense of the unstructured manifold of the world. 
The notion of finality is hypostasized as an immediate personal awareness of our harmony 
with the world, or as the super-sensible substratum of humanity. Through this approach 
though, Bell misses the prescriptive character of the notion of finality, and thereby the 
cultural connotations of the term, in a similar manner as the hypostasized conception of the 
notion of 'consciousness in general', which we discussed in the first chapter, misses the 
fonnal character of the transcendental unity of apperception and its temPoral 
determinations. 5 
Kant indeed gives crucial importance to the principle of finality, and, as will be discussed 
later, is concerned with integrating his whole search eventually within the transcendental 
field. However, this is not to be taken as the end of the story; for, even in the Introduction, 
a few lines below the statement of this principle, he says: 
[But] the transcendental principle, by which a finality of nature, in its subjective 
5 This kind of conceptualisation of the notion of finality, namely in terms of the primordial familiarity in the 
aesthetic, recalls Heidegger's notion of pre-understanding. Arendt, in turn, projects this principle onto the 
realm of the social, through the notion of communicability. Communicability, based on common sense, 
represents the transcendental sociability of man, which enables him to establish a harmonious integration 
within society, which parallels to the harmonious pre-adaptation between man and nature. As Arendt 
characterises it: The term 'common sense' meant a sense like our other senses- the same for everyone in his 
very privacy. By using the Latin term (sensus communis), Kant indicates that here he means something 
different: an extra sense- like extra mental capability (menschenverstand)- thatfits us into a community (my 
emphasis)5 )( LKPP, p. 70 ). 
Arendt is concerned to advocate such a reading in order to invoke a principle which would prove man's 
essentially political nature: "The Critique of Judgement is the only one of Kant's great writings where the 
point of departure of the world, and the senses and capabilities which made men (in the plural) fit to be 
inhabitants in it. This is perhaps not yet political philosophy, but it certainly is its condition sine qua non. If it 
could be found that in the capacities and regular traffic and intercourse between men who are bound to each 
other by a common possession of a world (the Earth), there exists a principle, then it would be proved that 
man is essentially a political being "(H. Arendt, unpublished lecture from a course at the University of 
Chicago on Kant's political philosophy, Fall 1964- Hannah Arendt papers, Library of congress, Container 41, 
032272, Cited in Beiner, 1983). 
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response to our cognitive faculties, is represented in the form of a thing as a 
principle of its estimation, leaves quite undetern-dned the question of where and in 
what cases we have to make our estimate of the object as a product according to a 
principle of finality, instead of simply according to universal laws of nature. It 
resigns to the aesthetic judgement the task of deciding the conformity of this 
product (in its form) to our cognitive faculties as a question of taste (a matter 
which the aesthetic judgement decides, not by any harmony with concepts, but by 
feeling). (CJ p. 35) 
Thus, it is within the aesthetic judgement's procedure of decision that its rich and creative 
activity is unfolded, along with its social and cultural presuppositions, which together show 
that the judging-power cannot be so easily exhausted in the assumption of its hypostasized 
primordiality. 
Understanding and Orientation towards the World. 
We propose to set up our investigation of reflective judgement by accepting, initially, a 
more 'open' conception of finality, in the sense that it does not exhaust the search for the 
judgement's art in its primordial breath. Kant, in introducing finality as the principle of the 
judging-faculty, points out that judgement, according to this principle, does not legislate for 
any realm at all, but only for itself. Finality is a regulative, and not a constitutive principle. 
This is an implicit avowal of the inadequacy of the legislative activity of the subject upon 
the world. The principle of finality guides only the subject's attitude. It gives the subject the 
confidence to come to grips with the world. In this sense, finality is like the remains of the 
self s old pride, rather than the source of the laws that would construct the world out of the 
understanding's certainty. However, there is still a certainty about the world's pre- 
62 
adaptation to the subject's cognitive faculties. Now, though it appears more as a primary 
assumption about the familiarity of the world, so that the subject orients itself toward it in 
order to investigate and to explain it through its particularities, rather than imposing its 
own self-certain structural complexes on it. 
We provisionally assume the notion of finality as a positive disposition of the subject 
toward the world, which as such enables its actual interaction with it. This is again a 
subject-centred assumption which, however, being at a minimal and regulative level, has 
its role restricted to the stimulation of an orientation of the subject towards the world. It is 
an assumption that carries with it the presupposition of a break in the subject's interiority, 
and a retreat from a self-complacent inwardness, which may enable us to explore the 
potential of reflective judgement. 6 
The type of aesthetic response which allows a feeling for the depth of the world, however, 
is not due to the status of the reflective judgement, but, rather, comes about because of a 
non-authoritative concern for the world, an interest in the particular, and an interaction 
with it. Aesthetic judgement, as Kant has expounded it, is concerned with the singular, 
with the disclosure of new deeper aspects of the world. The experience of the beautiful 
breaks through the quotidian in the sense that it silences our familiar - i. e., by means of 
conventional categories - view of the world, and evokes in our subjectivity an abundance of 
thoughts and images which do not solidify into a single perspective, but seem to present 
ever new facets of the world. 
6 The assumption of finality as an a priori principle lies, in our view, in an original ontological separation of 
and juxtaposition between man and the world, i. e. the Cartesian subject-object relation. The reconciliation of 
this gap, in turn, dictates solutions either of the kind presented by Leibniz as a pre-established harmony 
between man and nature, or that of the Kantian Copernican revoiution, where the world conforms to the 
subject. 
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We can now move on to a closer examination of reflective judgement. We will not use the 
term 'faculty', which implies the existence of a certain mental capacity or innate structure of 
the mind, but will rather approach judgement as a procedure, an activity. 
The Activity of Judging. 
As we have already mentioned, when Kant addresses the issue of the judgement of taste in 
the CJ, he faces the problem of judging the particular, and, as we will see below, he opens 
new avenues for dealing with the riddle of the judging-power. His answers oscillate 
between a powerful undermining of the understanding's authority, and an attempt to restore 
its status. Kant both abolishes the concept and keeps it in an indeterminate form. It is the 
understanding now which is subject to the imagination, but imagination still schematises 
without a concept (A287). This equivocation has led to a variety of different kinds of 
readings, which can roughly be distinguished between those which keep the third Critique 
exclusively in the transcendental sphere, and those which stress the exceeding of the 
transcendental realm, leaving aside the foundation of Kant's enterprise on a principle. Both 
readings are justifiable and consistent with various sections of the text. Here, we will try to 
show to what extent Kant really exceeds the transcendental realm, and to what degree the 
limits of his enterprise are dependent on his simultaneous establishment and undermining 
of the foundational principle of the aesthetic judgement. 
It has often been argued that the basic distinction between determinate and reflective 
judgement is that the former is mediated by concepts, while the latter - due to the absence 
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of concepts - is immediate and spontaneous. 7 We will argue that the distinction is much 
more complex, and in fact, as regards their mediate nature, the case may be exactly the 
opposite. This has to do with the relation between understanding and imagination which, as 
we already saw in the determinant judgement, leads to a rather spurious notion of the 
mediate nature of that form of judgement, where the latter appears as a mere extension of 
the understanding's activity. We will see that the reflective judgement arises out of the 
formative activity of the imagination in its interaction with the understanding and as such 
has both a mediate and immediate nature. 
In the Analytic of the Beautiful, judgements of taste are characterised by relating them to 
the four general logical functions of judgement, i. e., quality, quantity, relation and 
modality. Each of the four highlights an aspect of the pleasure that is peculiar to aesthetic 
judgement. At the outset of the first moment, Kant remarks, "if we wish to discern if 
anything is beautiful or not, we do not refer the representation of it to the object by means 
of imagination (acting, perhaps, in conjunction with the understanding)" (CJ 203). 
Reflective judgement is thus intimately concerned with imagination, and a new role will be 
given to it, as we shall see. The negative determinations of the judgement of taste, with 
regard to the four moments of its possible determination, also illustrate the degradation of 
the role of the understanding. The exclusion of judgement's conceptual subsumption does 
not imply its sheer immediacy, but only the implicit avowal of the inadequacy of the 
methodology of the schernatism. Here, Kant reveals a structure of judgement which is not 
only prior (both epistemologically and temporally, as has been argued) to any 
determination by the categories, but also one which could not accommodate concepts as 
they have been defined in the first Critique. Nevertheless, Kant insists on the need for a 
7 See, for example, J. F. Lyotard, Lessons on the Analytic of the Sublime, and Bell, 1992. 
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kind of concept (CJ 207), even an indeterminate one. This insistence, and its implications, 
which are more obvious in the Deduction and the Solution of the Antinomy of Taste, 
informs a discrepancy between the Analytic and the rest of the text of the aesthetic. Hence, 
it will be seen that while Kant, in his search for a principle of the judging-power, actually 
does exceed his transcendental field, eventually retreats to it. 
In the Analytic of the Beautiful, Kant sets out to explore "a new mode of judging", a "quite 
separate faculty of discriminating and estimating" which is not based on the application of 
concepts, but on the feeling of pleasure and displeasure (CJ 204). The heart of this new 
mode of judging consists in the unfolding of imagination's activity in itsfree interplay with 
the understanding. Imagination is identified as "our power of intuitions" (CJ 292), or as 
equivalent to our "power of sensibility" (CJ 354). The important point here is the 
convergence of intuition and imagination, and the latter's gaining a much more independent 
and autonomous status than it had in the first Critique. In the imagination's activity, we also 
see a new role for intuition. Imagination, in its free interplay with the understanding, 
differentiates and discriminates the manifold; it moulds its own forms for its own 
pleasure 8, and not under the command of the understanding. It is no longer the working of 
an active understanding upon the passive material of sensibility, but intuition producing its 
own possible configuration out of the manifold. However, the feeling of pleasure, which 
arises in this free movement of interplay, arises only when imagination settles the 
proportion of the manifold that brings about a harmony with the understanding. This stage 
is called common sense (CJ 238). 
What is the meaning of this balance, this harmonious conformity of the imagination with 
8 If imagination worked exclusively in order to conform to the requirements of the understanding, and not for 
its own pleasure as well, then it would simply perform the work that it did in the first Critique, merely 
gathering together and uniting the manifold indiscriminately. 
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the understanding? A preliminary answer is that imagination has arranged the manifold in 
such a way that the understanding is satisfied with the unification of the manifold by means 
of the attainment of its optimum ratio. The latter though has been effected without the use 
of understanding's concepts. If this is the case, in what sense can the understanding be 
satisfied with imagination's activity? In what sense does imagination show conformity with 
the understanding, since the latter does not subsume it under its usual restrictions? The 
understanding is usually satisfied when it discovers the invariant homogeneous features 
that are shared by different manifold-configurations. It can then classify them according to 
its rules, leaving aside any particularities and assuming authority over the imagination. 
However, this does not seem to hold in this case. Understanding is now satisfied by virtue 
of the achievement of an alternative unity, a unity of play. This is not a unity achieved by 
the external application of concepts, mutilating the particular for the sake of homogeneity. 
Rather, it is a unity emerging out of a playful interaction between the two faculties, in 
which none assumes a predominant role. It seems then, that unity results by means of an 
internal self-sustenance of the manifold which comes about through the manner of its 
formation in its active interplay with the understanding, that is, through the playful 
interaction among the different parts, which together constitute a whole displaying a 
transitive order. It is a unity that preserves the particular, and indeed is based on it. This 
unity can mainly be felt; it is a "feeling which the subject has of itself' and, "what is more, 
[is referred to] its feeling of life - under the name of pleasure or displeasure. "(CJ 204) The 
pleasure in turn involves a turning toward the subject. We come in touch with "the entire 
faculty of representations, of which the mind is conscious in the feeling of its state. " (CJ 
204) The feeling is of the vitality of our cognitive powers, and the unity is one whose order 
is that of life. Here, pleasure is linked to the feeling of life and life to the feeling of play. 9 
9 This interesting insight has been fruitfully endorsed by Schiller in his Letters on the Aesthetic Education of 
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Therefore, in reflective judgement there is revealed, as in the determinant, the unity of the 
subject. However, the subject now, being liberated from its imperative need to organise and 
appropriate the world according to its determinant categories, appears relaxed and playful, 
able to feel pleasure and discover the feeling of life in it. Hence, its unity is now conceived 
in terms of the unity of life - though the latter is conceived as hartnony of internal diversity 
- as opposed to the abstract, absolute and undifferentiated unity of the formal identity of the 
subject in the first Critique. 
In the General Remark to the first section of the Analytic of the Beautiful, Kant makes 
explicit the nature of the proportion that occurs in the aesthetic judgement. He contrasts it 
with the static uniformity obtained by the application of concepts with which - beyond the 
satisfaction of cognitive or practical ends - we "grow tired" as "all stiff regularity is 
inherently repugnant to taste. " Instead, the proportion achieved in the judgement of taste, 
where productive imagination works as the "originator of arbitrary forms of possible 
intuition" looks dynamic, movable, of "quite irregular beauty.... subject to no constraint or 
artificial rules", like when "we watch the changing shapes of the fire" (CJ 242). In this new 
kind of order, imagination's freedom can be simultaneously reconciled with its conformity 
to law, which now arises from the dynamic of the mutual interaction, rather than from an 
act of subordination. Understanding may be puzzled by this flagrant contradiction (CJ 
241), nevertheless, it is satisfied because the harmony with the imagination is there 
achieved, and the condition met for the possibility of judgement. 
Man. Schiller, however, modified Kant's mental state of free play, tuning it into the play of two impulses - 
sensual and formal - and breaking the subjective character of aesthetic condition. Moreover, he elevated the 
notion of play into an alternative mode of man's interaction with the world and with himself. 
"In the midst of the awful realm of powers, and of the sacred realm of laws, the aesthetic creative impulse is 
building unawares a third joyous realm of play and of appearance, in which it releases mankind from all the 
shackles of circumstance and frees him from everything that may be called constraint, whether physical or 
moral..... For, to declare it once and for all. Man plays only when he is in the full sense of the word a man, 
and he is only wholly man when he is playing" (Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man, p. 137,80). 
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The achieved accord between understanding and intuition is not like that achieved in the 
Copernican Revolution, where intuition was taken up by the understanding, but is rather 
closer to its opposite, in that intuition is the active element, unfolding in its self-orienting 
activity in order to meet the understanding. In fact, the universal is never 'there', cut off 
from the particular, but is, rather, always inherent in it. Understanding's satisfaction, 
therefore, cannot come from the potential application of its categories. This is the case not 
only because of the nature of the proportion which resists all levelling, but also for the 
simple reason that if this was the case, every single object of possible knowledge would be 
judged as beautiful. However, if understanding is satisfied with this kind of unity, then this 
anticipates a new conception of the notion of cognition as well. This might be the meaning 
of 'cognition in general', implying a more holistic and dynamic notion of cognition than 
that achieved by the rigid alignment of intuitions with concepts. Indeed, it implies a 
cognition that might be attained by means of both feeling and reflection, beyond categorial 
synthesis, but rather by means of a playful interaction with the world, in which the subject 
appears freed from its 'convulsive self-importance' and combines cognition with pleasure. 
In the structure of reflective judgement, we can also assume an anticipation of a different 
notion of time, inherent in it. In the first Critique, the particular (not distinct from the 
individual) was conceived as "nothing but absolute unity", insofar as it was "contained in a 
single moment" and its unification with the other particulars was achieved by external 
categorial synthesis that unified temporal moments as well. Now, the particular is no longer 
taken as an absolute unity, as the Leibnizian legacy bequeathed to Kant in the first Critique. 
Instead it gains a rather 'organic' nature, being in connection with other parts, thus forming 
a whole that is sustained through them, and no longer stands opposed to them. In turn, this 
could contribute to another conceptualisation of time, since the latter may no longer be 
conceived as a continuous linearity of successive moments, but as the expression of a 
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process, where every moment already contains its past and anticipates its future, and yet it 
may arise unexpectedly, by a sudden interruption of the continuity of the process, as the 
unpredictable moment of the rise of the balance invokes. In this case, there would not 
really be any temporal synthesis in the aesthetic judgement, as Lyotard claims. However, 
this by no means leads to the latter's contention that for this reason there is no subjectivity, 
but merely the dazzling immediacy of a "pure feeling that promises a subject. "10 In the 
aesthetic response, we might not have the 'I think' which accompanies each representation, 
but we do have the emergence of a more vital and substantive subjectivity. Aesthetic 
judgement involves reflexivity and self-awareness of one's feeling of pleasure or 
displeasure. The lack of the categorial, temporal synthesis does not imply the absence of 
any synthesis at all. There is another kind of synthesis, due to the interactive activity of the 
imagination and the understanding, which allows a subjectivity in a fuller and more 
complex manner through its correlation with life and the world. It is a synthesis arising out 
op ayll. 
Sensus Communis, Culture, Humanism 
Reflective judgement, however, claims universality and necessity. Despite its wanderings, 
it eventually has to conform to the laws of the understanding and thereby to resolve its 
antinornies. This task is carried out by the section on the Deduction of the aesthetic 
0 See Lyotard J. F., Lessons on the Analytic of the Sublime, p. 20. 1 This new type of subjectivity is associated with the particular mental state of Gemir, rather than with Pure 
Reason and its distinct faculties. As Howard Gaygill notes, Gemit "does not mean 'mind' or 'soul' in the Cartesian sense of a thinking substance, but denotes, instead, a corporeal awareness of sensation and self- 
affection. " (See H. Gaygill, A Kant Dictionary, p. 210, Blackwell, 1995). In particular, Gemii in the CJ is 
described as the 'life principle itself, which is quickened in the subject during the enlivened harmonisation of 
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judgement. It has been argued that to the extent that we do not make a traditional reading 
of the third Critique (i. e., waiting for the deduction text to prove what was built up in the 
analytic part), but read it as the exploration of the riddle of the art of judgement, we should 
put less weight on the Deduction as a foundational element. 12 Indeed the Deduction as 
such, that is the procedure of proving the legitimacy of using the judgement that was built 
up in the Analytic, concerns the legitimacy of logical properties, i. e., universality and 
necessity, and marks the exit point for the quaestio quid juris. The procedure of the 
Deduction itself confers legitimacy, and makes the judgement legal, universal and 
compulsory. The Analytic, on the other hand, despite the structure of the logical analysis 
in terms of categories, eventually builds up, as we have seen, the structure of a judgement 
that cannot conform to a logical form. From this point of view, the Deduction would not 
only be secondary, but pointless, unless Kant could introduce a new conception of 
universality and necessity beyond the categorial area. This would imply a further 
elaboration of the relation between universals and particulars, and that of the exemplary 
necessity that we met in the Analytic. The text of the Deduction, and that of the Dialectic, 
intends precisely to meet this need and proves to be particularly important since it provides 
new aspects of transcendental patterns of thinking and its implications on the 
conceptualisation of the notion of experience and the relation between man and the world. 
These issues will be elucidated by focusing our research on the illumination of the key 
concept of sensus communis, which holds central position in the undertaking of the 
deduction of the reflective judgement. This will help us to make a retrospective reading of 
the Analytic, to clarify contradictions in Kant's thought, and to further explore the notions 
of communicability and common sense, which have outstanding significance for Kant's 
the cognitive powers - imagination and understanding - in their free interaction. 12 See Caygill H., Art ofJudgement. 
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moral and political philosophy. In the following text we will explore the notions and status 
of common sense and communicability, and the implications for a new understanding of 
the structure of reflective judgement. 
Reflective judgement has been so attractive for political thought because of - among other 
properties - its reference to the social. It has been presented as "inherently social" 13 , or as 
the faculty of men's minds where "sociability of men [is] the condition of its functioning" 14 
This may seem well justified, since most of the part of the text of the aesthetic judgement is 
permeated with the notion of the communicability of the judgement of taste as its condition 
sine qua non, and the concomitant notion of a common sense. 
Kant, referring to the key to the critique of taste, addresses the issue of the logical priority 
between the communicable character of the specific mental state of balance that pertains to 
reflective judgement and the feeling of pleasure (CJ §217). He defines taste as "the faculty 
of estimating what makes our feeling in a given representation universally communicable, 
without the mediation of a concept" (CJ §205). 15 However, Kant, in CJ section 9, where he 
deals with the question of the relative priority in a judgement of taste between the pleasure 
and the estimating of the object, immediately after the exposition of the fundamental need 
for the judgement to be universally communicable, shifts the emphasis to a thorough 
exposition of the specific mental state of the mutual accord (common sense) between the 
13 See Beiner R., "Judging In a World of Appearance", in Political Judgements. 
14 LKKP, p. 14. 
15 Arendt founds her reading of the third Critique precisely on this 'property' of communicability along with 
its 'mental status. According to Arendt, the communicable character of the judgement is the constitutive 
element of the pleasure or displeasure attending the judgement. "It says it pleases or it displeases. It is called 
taste because, like taste, it chooses. However, this choice is still subject to yet another choice: one can 
approve or disapprove of the very fact of pleasing.... The very fact of approbation pleases, the very act of 
, 45 disapprobation displeases. 
. In short, "the condition sine qua non for the existence of beautiful objects is 
communicability"(LKKP, p. 14 ). 
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cognitive faculties, setting aside the question of priority. It will be seen that the specific 
nature of common sense provides the ground of both pleasure and communicability, 
regardless of the issue of their relative priority. It will also prove to provide the solution to 
the antinomy of reflective judgement and to qualify its distinctive universal and necessary 
dimension, rescuing it from its potential illegitimacy. 
Sensus Communis: Back to the Unity of Apperception? 
As it has been already mentioned, in this section we will be less concerned with the success 
or failure of the deduction of the judgement of taste, than with the nature of the common 
sense, and its relation to the communicability of the aesthetic judgement. In order to 
I 
demonstrate the universal and necessary character of the judgement of taste, Kant mentions 
that the subjective conditions of the employment of an aesthetic judgement, i. e. common 
sense, are those "which we may presuppose in all men (as requisite for a possible 
experience" (CJ 290). Here, Kant seems to be suggesting something rather interesting with 
regard to his general theory of experience, undermining again his first Critique, that is, that 
it is the mutual interaction between imagination and the understanding which is 
considered to be the necessary prerequisite for experience, and not the subsumption of the 
former's activity under the categories of the latter. It is here where we can trace the 
suggestion made by certain commentators, that in the reflective judgement there are the 
origins of the determinant also. 16 However, in the significant §38, footnote, Kant remarks: 
16 See Bell, 1992 and Caygill, 1989, where reflective judgement is considered as a precursor of determinant 
judgement, and in which the properties of the former are hidden or forgotten. However, the features which 
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In order to be justified in claiming universal agreement for an aesthetic judgement 
merely resting on subjective grounds, it is sufficient to assume: (1) that the 
subjective conditions of this faculty of aesthetic judgement are identical with all 
men in what concerns the relation of the cognitive faculties, there brought into 
action, with a view to a cognition in general. This must be true, as otherwise men 
would be incapable of communicating their representations or even their 
knowledge. (CJ 38n 1). 
In this section, in combination with §2 1, Kant seems to classify aesthetic judgement within 
the field of judgements of 'cognition in general'. In these types of judgements, what 
actually happens is that the cognitive powers demonstrate a relative proportion, differing in 
accordance with the diversity of the objects that are given. The aesthetic judgement is that 
which corresponds to one specific mental ratio "which is best adapted for both mental 
powers in respect of cognition (of given objects) generally.... This disposition can only be 
determined through feeling (and not by concepts). Since, now, this disposition itself must 
admit of being universally communicated, and hence also the feeling of it (in the case of a 
given representation), while again, the universal communicability of a feeling presupposes 
a common sense" (CJ 239). The communicability of aesthetic judgement is explained by 
virtue of the communicability of the judgements of cognition in general, as their subset, or 
in other words, the mental state of the aesthetic judgement appears as a particular case of 
the mental state of those judgements. Whence, though, does the communicable character of 
the judgements of cognition in general derive, according to Kant? 
Cognitions and judgements must, together with their attendant conviction, admit 
of being universally communicated; for otherwise a correspondence with the 
object would not be due to them. They would be a conglomerate constituting a 
mere subjective play of the powers of representation, just as scepticism would 
have it(CJ 238). (my emphasis) 
have been revealed in the activity of the reflective judgement are rather petrified and typified in determinant 
judgement. 
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In the above statement we discern the recurrence of the sort of Prolegomena argument, 
since it is founded on the distinction between judgements of experience (judgements that 
correspond to the object, and thus assume universal agreement), and judgements of 
perception (subjective judgements). To be sure, Kant cannot consider as granted - i. e. the 
universal agreement upon an object - exactly that which he wants to prove - i. e. the 
universality of those judgements that refer to an object. Moreover, Kant now reduces 
aesthetic judgements not merely to judgements of 'cognition in general', but to 
judgements that coffespond to an object, i. e. to judgements of cognition as they are 
described in the Prolegomena. In fact, in the Prolegomena and the CPR, it is not the 
assumption of the communicability of knowledge that justifies the communicability of the 
correspondent mental state to those judgements of knowledge, but exactly the other way 
around; it is the identity of the concepts of the understanding that renders possible the 
communicability of cognition. Furthermore, the existence of the concepts of the 
understanding is founded on the requirement of the formal identity of the subject (the 
original unity of apperception), which is a logical assumption on the identical structure of 
human consciousness. The factor of communication among people, actual or possible, 
does not enter the argument at all. 
We have therefore traced the gradual reduction of aesthetic judgements to judgements of 
cognition in general, and in turn to judgements of cognition of objects, where the quite 
promising introduction of the notion of different proportions between imagination and 
understanding, is deflated suddenly to the unity under a feeling that stands more as a 
category - since it validates the correspondence with an object - rather than as an indefinite 
sensation. Accordingly, the nature of common sense in this context, is reduced to "the 
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subjective conditions [of this faculty of aesthetic judgement] [which ] are identical with all 
men in what concerns the relation of the cognitive faculties" and to its strict formal status: 
"that the judgement has paid regard merely to this relation (consequently merely to the 
formal condition of the faculty of judgement), and is pure, i. e. is free from confusion either 
with concepts of the Object or sensations as determining grounds (CJ 38n 1). Taking into 
account that common sense is conceived as a state which is i) identical with all men, ii) 
pure and formal, and iii) possesses a cognitive status which conditions aesthetic judgement 
and allows its communicability, we could conclude that common sense now acquires the 
features of a mental structure shared by all human beings as judging subjects. The strict 
formal condition of common sense inevitably cancels imagination's former creative role, 
which was intelligible only as formation and configuration of the manifold. Imagination 
thus loses its formative character, and becomes concerned with the spatio-temporal form of 
the perceptual object. "Admitting that in a pure judgement of taste the delight in the object 
is connected with the mere estimate of its form, then what we feel to be associated in the 
mind with the representation of the object is nothing else than its subjective finality for 
judgement" (CJ§ 38). The feeling of pleasure results exclusively by virtue of the attainment 
of an internal balance between the mental faculties of the subject, rather than by 
discovering a moment of attunement to the world. The latter seems to withdraw from 
reflective judgement's domain and imagination is aligned more closely with the 
understanding's commands on universal validity. Objectivity is not based on an object in 
nature, and yet an act of objectification is at work in the play of the cognitive powers, 
securing thereby the subject's illusory self-contentment. Aesthetic judgement becomes 
purely formal, and consequently, entirely disinterested, sensually or cognitively. In this 
way, aesthetic judgement becomes distanced, and impartial, losing any interest in its object, 
confining itself to the distant, pure contemplation of its form. The former judgement, 
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deeply interested in the world, arises now as merely interested in its inner harmony, thus 
losing its free playful character and its penetrating ability. In this context, common sense 
seems to lie within the chain of conditions that connect the original synthetic unity of 
apperception with the concepts of the understanding. The harmony acquires rigid, static 
features, and loses its dynamic character, resembling a more static, peaceful conjugality. 
This accord signals the end of any further movement, and the communicability of this 
judgement is due only to the identity, the uniformity and the sameness of men as subjects. 
We must now turn to a further, antipodal development of the notion of common sense in 
Kant. For, in addition to aligning it with a fundamental, minimal rational ability common 
to all human beings, Kant also appears to conceive common sense as a result of a long- 
lasting culture -a historical Bildung. 
Sensus Communis: Back to Tradition? 
Kant, after having given (according to him) adequate reasons for presupposing a common 
sense in section §21, moves immediately to his next strong claim in section §22: "The 
necessity of the universal assent that is thought in a judgement of taste, is a subjective 
necessity which, under the presupposition of a common sense, is presented as objective. " 
The Deduction, in combination with §21, as we have presented it, was supposed to 
demonstrate this peculiar objectivity of common sense (i. e., the universality and necessity 
of an individual feeling), by virtue of those rational faculties which are identical in all 
human beings and, as such, necessary for knowledge and experience. He thereby reduces 
feeling to cognitive attributes and to the conditions of objective experience. However, in 
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§22, he poses some further important considerations, which, although they have not been 
taken into account in the Deduction, already anticipate a more complex account of the 
common sense. 
Kant asks at §240 - though without investigating possible alternatives - whether such "a 
common sense in fact exists as a constitutive principle for the possibility of experience, or 
whether it is formed for us as a regulative principle by a still higher principle of reason, 
that for higher reasons, first seeks to beget in us a common sense. Is taste, in other words, a 
natural and original faculty, or is it only the idea of one that is artificial, and to be acquired 
by us, so that a judgement of taste, with its demands for universal assent, is but a 
requirement of reason for generating such a consensus? " 
Up until now, we have a positive answer to the first part of the question without, however, 
it being very convincing. Instead, we read already from §20 that sensus communis "differs 
essentially from common understanding, which is also sometimes called common sense. " 
Or again, even more clearly, in § 40: 
Common human understanding which, as mere sound (not yet cultivated [my 
emphasis]) understanding, is looked upon as the least we can expect from anyone 
claiming the name of man, has the doubtful honour of having the name of 
common sense (sensus communis) bestowed upon it; and bestowed, too, in an 
acceptation of the word common.... which makes it amount to what is vulgar what 
is everywhere to be met with- a quality which by no means confers credit or 
distinction upon its possessor (CJ 293). 
It is therefore obvious now that Kant no longer ascribes the notion of common sense to the 
subjective conditions of the cognitive faculties that are identical in all men (§38nl) i. e. the 
common ground with which we are all fortified. The universality and necessity of the 
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aesthetic judgement cannot lie in these commonly shared rational faculties. However, there 
is now a distinct quality conferred upon the bearer of sensus communis that is presented as 
a cultivated understanding, in contrast to a mere sound one. Moreover, in §32, 
There is no employment for our powers, no matter how free, not even of reason 
itself (which must create all its judgements from the common source), which, if 
each individual had always to start afresh with the crude equipment of his natural 
state, would not get itself involved in blundering attempts, did not those of others 
lie before it as a warning. Not that predecessors make those who follow in their 
steps mere imitators, but by their methods they set others upon the track for 
seeking in themselves for the principles, and so of adopting their own, often 
better, course. (CJ §283) 
and 
Following, which has reference to a precedent, and not imitation, is the proper 
expression for all influence which the products of an exemplary author may exert 
upon others- and this means no more than going to the same sources for a creative 
work as those to which he went for his creation, and learning from one's 
predecessors no more than the mode of availing oneself of such sources. Taste, 
just because its judgement cannot be determined by concepts, or precepts, is 
among all faculties and talents the very one that stands most in need of examples 
of what has, in the course of culture, maintained itself longest in esteem. Thus, it 
avoids an early lapse in crudity, and a return to the rudeness of its earliest efforts. 
(CJ §283) 
With justification then, Howard Caygill has suggested, that "the universality of the 
judgement of taste is legitimated, surprisingly, by the appropriation of tradition, a 
remembrance which surpasses both autonomy and heteronomy". 17 Accordingly, for 
Caygill, "the sensus communis is this critical relation to tradition, the principle of its active 
18 
appropriation, but it also refers to the fundamental proportion which evokes pleasure" . 
However insightful, the above statement does not capture the main role of sensus 
communis, as this is envisioned by Kant. The appropriation of the tradition may be one 
17 Caygill, 1989, p. 350. 
18 Ibid. 
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factor, as far as the function of the judgement of taste is concerned, but it exhausts neither 
the requirement for its grounding in a principle, nor, moreover, the, function or role 
ascribed by Kant to sensus communis. The interpretation of sensus communis as merely 
the "active appropriation and relation to tradition" has an element of whitewash towards 
Kant's political philosophy. We suggest that in order to understand the meaning of sensus 
communis, we have to incorporate in it the solution to the Antinomy of Taste. It has been 
argued that Kant's suggested solution to the antinomy is obscure, often unintelligible and 
metaphysical. 19 Contra Guyer, we should not be surprised by the sudden introduction of the 
metaphysical realm, nor do we have to surmise what Kant might mean by his 
supersensible, rational concept, and his distinction between the phenomenal and nournenal 
elements in the case of an aesthetic judgement. 20 We will argue that the introduction of the 
supersensible concept, as underlying ground for the aesthetic judgement, is not at all 
sudden or obscure. The supersensible element in the sensus communis does not lie in any 
2 
mysterious new ontological realm, as Guyer claims, 1 but only in its normative character, 
and in the kind of social order that it implies. This interpretation allows for the 
accommodation of sensus communis understood in terms of the active appropriation of 
tradition, yet without exhausting the former in the latter. 
19 See Guyer P., Kant and the Claims of Taste, p. 31 1. 
20 See Coleman F., The Harmony of Reason. Here, Coleman, in order to make intelligible the solution to the 
antinomy of taste, proposes to interpret Kant's distinction between phenomenal and noumenal aesthetic 
properties as a distinction between mechanical (dead, wooden) and vital (inspired, fecund) ones. He then 
proposes, according to this model, that aesthetic judgement has to be characterised as 'vitalistic', i. e. having a 
soul, and from this point of view, can be understood as having a supersensible ground. He also mentions that 
he draws the opposition between the vital and the mechanical from Aristotle's account of the soul. 21 See Guyer, 1979, p. 3 10. 
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Sensus Communis: In the Architectonic of Pure Reason. 
We now turn to the final part of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgement, the Dialectic. Here 
we acquire a complete image of the judgement of taste and its conditions. We may thus be 
able to find the thread that unifies the apparently different versions of the notion of 
common sense. The principle of taste exhibits an antinomy: 
1. Thesis: The judgement of taste is not based upon concepts; for, if it were, it would be 
open to dispute (decision by means of proofs). 
2. Antithesis: The judgement of taste is based on concepts; for otherwise, despite 
diversity of judgement, there could be no room even for contention in the matter (a 
claim to the necessary agreement of others with the judgement). (CJ §339) 
The suggested solution to this antinomy is that a judgement of taste does depend upon a 
concept, which however, is an indeterminate one. This is a rational concept, i. e. an Idea of 
Reason, which stands as an indeterminate idea of the supersensible within us, and may be 
regarded as the supersensible substrate of humanity. In a quite illuminating sentence, Kant 
says: 
All contradiction disappears, however, if I say: The judgement of taste does depend on 
a concept (of a general ground of the subjective finality of nature for the power of 
judgement) [my emphasis], but one from which nothing can be cognised in respect of 
the object, and nothing proved, because it is in itself indeterminable. (CJ §340) 
In the following Remarks, Kant also clarifies his notion of the rational concept and the 
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supersensible, both as a principle of the subjective finality of nature for our cognitive 
faculties, and as the ends of freedom (CJ §346). From these remarks therefore, we see that, 
for Kant, the indeterminate concept which underlies aesthetic judgement, and provides it 
with universality and necessity, is the "concept of the general ground of the su ective 
finality of nature for the judgement", i. e. the Idea of Reason as an harmony (a finality) 
between our cognitive faculties and nature. For example, in a judgement about a beautiful 
natural object, this object is seen as a work of art, as if it had been designed so that its form 
was to be harmonised with our cognitive faculties. In a judgement of taste, we enjoy the 
harmony both between our cognitive faculties, and between nature and our mind, precisely 
because we have assumed that nature is final for us. Nevertheless, not everybody is able to 
have this feeling of internal and external harmony, because this presupposes ability for 
disinterested contemplation, an ability to abstract from charm, emotion or any sensual 
agreeableness, and to judge only according to the pure form. It is the ability to appreciate 
the beautiful, and the ability to discriminate nature's finality, which can be brought about 
through culture. By the introduction of the supersensible substratum of the judgement of 
taste, Kant simply reiterates, in a more general way, the foundation of the judgement of 
taste on the form of finality of an object, which generates the finality of form of our 
cognitive faculties (CJ sections 11,12). The form of the finality of an object is just an 
instance of the form of the finality of nature in general. In the aesthetic judgement 
therefore, we feel the harmony of our cognitive faculties by virtue of our ability to 
recognise in nature its preadaptation to these faculties. What is then, the relation of finality 
to sensus communis? Sensus communis is the ideal harmony of our cognitive faculties 
which comes about not merely through their harmonisation with the form of the beautiful 
object, but, indeed, with society as a whole. In other words, sensus communis is the ideal 
normfor the attainment of a perfect harmony within and between individuals, and between 
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their cognitive faculties. The attainment of that harmony presupposes culture. This kind of 
culture enables the individual to judge and act in such a way that it becomes an active 
member in a harmonious whole, and contributes to the attainment of this ideal order. In 
order to do that, the individual has to strive to overcome its personal, private, subjective 
bias, and narrow personal interests. Its reflection therefore must constitute a weighing of its 
judgement with the collective reason of mankind. 
By the name sensus communis is to be understood the idea of a public sense, i. e., a 
critical faculty which, in its reflective act, takes account of the mode of representation 
of everyone else, in order, as it were, to weigh its judgement with the collective reason 
of mankind, and thereby avoid the illusion arising from subjective and personal 
conditions, which could readily be taken for objective, an illusion that would exert a 
prejudicial influence upon its judgement (CJ 340). 
Therefore, the significance of sensus communis lies in its normative character for the 
attainment of a harmonious social order, which would, in turn, reiterate the internal 
harmony between the mental faculties of each individual. It is the attainment of a mutual 
osmosis between society and individuals, which is reminiscent of the Platonic Republic or 
the Rousseauian ideal society of the social contract. However, this raises the question of 
how the common sense and the concomitant social unity could arise. Kant suggests that it 
is through the reflective act, which takes account of the mode of representation of everyone 
else, the weighing of judgement with collective reason. This again suggests the relation to, 
and the active appropriation of tradition, as Caygill suggested. Appropriating tradition 
involves remembering, the exercise of the faculty of the reproductive imagination, and 
concern with the accumulated, actual, crystallised judgements of our predecessors. Thus, 
judging according to tradition plays a harmonising role in society, as this judgement 
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incorporates the wisdom of the past, the weight of endurance through time, and the respect 
for history. Sensus communis, however, may be accomplished by weighing the judgement 
not so much with the actual, but rather with the merely possible judgements of others. 
Accordingly, sensus communis is concerned with possible consciousness, which points, not 
only to the appropriation of tradition (where these possible judgements may lie), but to any 
kind of consciousness that might be imagined, and would enable social unity. Thus, this 
allows for the possibility of breaking with tradition, and in this way enabling social 
cohesion. As sensus communis is an ideal norm, the achievement of a harmony between 
and among individuals is one for which ideals of participation in dialogue, persuasion as 
opposed to force, and mutual respect for reasoning individuals are required. It is these 
features which underlie aesthetic judgement, along with the exclusion of any sensual and 
natural inclination. In this sense, the contemplation of the beautiful becomes a symbol of 
morality as well, and aesthetic judgement is assigned a general humanising role. The 
proposed model of social order under the norm of the sensus communis hardly exceed, 
either the ideality of the Kingdom of Ends, or the principle of the universalisability of the 
moral law. 22 The notion of culture as it is expounded in the Third Critique does not imply 
any constitutive social character underlying the aesthetic judgement, and this is further 
borne out when we look at Kant's ethical and political texts. In the Doctrine of Virtue (51/8 
1), culture is understood as man's power to set and work for an end which he chooses 
'independent of nature'. In the Metaphysics of Morals, culture comes to be associated with 
the struggle for perfection, and "the ideal of morality belongs to culture. " (Universal 
History, 21/26) The task of culture progresses through skill and discipline. Discipline helps 
the control of sensual impulses, so that culture serves to bring about the conditions 
necessary for following the moral law and exercising freedom. Culture as discipline is 
22 The respective feeling is, in this case, the respect for the moral law. 
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directed to a community in which "no member shall be a mere means, but should also be 
an end, and, seeing that he contributes to the possibility of the entire body should have this 
position and function in turn defined by the idea of the whole. " (CJ 375 footnotel). The 
development of culture is connected with the emergence of humanity; culture deals with 
"Man as such (humanity, really). " (Doctrine of Virtue 45/386) 
The question that Kant poses in section §22 must now be considered. 
Is taste ... a natural and original faculty, or is it only the idea of one that is artificial and 
to be acquired by us, so that a judgement of taste, with its demand of universal assent, 
is but a requirement of reason for generating such a consensus, and does the 'ought', i. e., 
the objective necessity of the coincidence of the feeling of all with the particular feeling 
of each, only betoken to the possibility of arriving at some unanimity in these matters? 
(CJ 240) 
Kant eventually answers positively to both alternatives since, in the Deduction, he 
demonstrated the identity of our rational faculties which, however, constitute merely the 
potentiality, the common ground that, through culture, could be elevated to the higher, 
cultivated feeling underlying aesthetic judgement. The universality and necessity of this 
judgement is normative and prescriptive. The necessity of judgement implies, essentially, 
the necessity of culture, and thereby a universal assent to the same feeling is expected and 
demanded. 
Sensus communis, as an Idea of Reason, is intended to restore a harmony between our 
rational faculties, between man and nature, and between man and society. Together, these 
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are ultimately equivalent to "the expedient to bring reason into harmony with itselU (CJ 
341) Reason, after an exhaustive trial of successive tribunals upon itself, seems to pursue 
the restoration of its internal harmony, and, along with it, the justification of its possessions 
(cognitive, moral and aesthetic). 
We conclude our discussion with the following remarks. The question of reflective 
judgement emphasises the enigma of judgement-power, since it is addressed from the 
standpoint of the contingent particular, which is assumed to fall beyond the laws of the 
understanding. We consider that Kant's major contribution is precisely the very 
thernatisation of this enigma. In his theoretical ramblings throughout the Critique of 
Aesthetic Judgement, we find the interesting problematic of the feeling of pleasure, as 
mediating form between concept and intuition, in which may be detected the potential for 
enriching the notion of cognition, by including in its process experiences of pleasure and 
the feeling of life, thereby breaking the stiff distinctions between pure logic and will, 
thought and desire. We also meet the possibility of an order, which emerges not from the 
imposition of rigid, constraining rules, but through the feeling of pleasure, rising out of the 
free play between the interacting parts. The order of pleasure arises as self-regulated, 
unplanned, unruled, transitive and yet surprisingly energising, since it quickens in the 
subject the feeling of life itself. However, these insightful conceptions lose their dynamism, 
to the extent that they become constituents of the undertaking of the solution of the enigma 
of reflective judgement. This is the requirement of Transcendental Logic, as long as 
reflective judgement has to align with the conditions for the possibility of experience as 
established in the CPR. Since experience cannot now be exhausted as the legislative realm 
of the understanding, the alignment of the particular with the laws of the understanding 
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does not take on a constitutive character but only a normative one. Hence, we enter the 
realm of Reason, whereby we are provided with an additional feature of Transcendental 
Logic, namely its nonnative character. 
The conditions for the possibility of experience, from the standpoint of reflective 
judgement, consist in the normative Idea of Reason of harmony between its faculties and 
nature. In this context, the feeling of pleasure is but Reason's satisfaction, arising from the 
assumption of the attainment of the particular's alignment with its principles. The mental 
state of free balance between the understanding and imagination functions as the bearer of 
a new type of synthesis, which transforms the contingent particular into a necessarily final 
object of judgement with regard to the laws of the understanding. The order of pleasure 
gives way to the pleasure of order, since the free play proves to be but a programmed 
ceremony for the celebration of the principles of Reason. Experience is again the outcome 
of a synthetic act, this time, not through the rules of the understanding, but through the 
precepts of finality which render possible the harmonisation of the subject's cognitive 
faculties. Accordingly, spontaneity may be released from its rule-giving function, but still 
assumes a unifying role, and indeed a harmonising one. Universality and necessity of 
judgement in turn, are secured not by means of the concepts of the understanding but by 
means of the precepts of Reason, and the order of rules is coupled by the prescription of an 
order of han-nony. The normative and communicable character of the universality of 
reflective judgement, however, necessitates the transposition of its conditions from the 
conceptual identity of the self to the prescriptive inter-subjectivity of sensus communis. 
Experience in turn, is redefined in normative terms, according to the conditions for 
compatibility between the laws of the understanding and the principles of Reason, so that 
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Reason itself attains its self-generated systematic unity. Yet, although the tension of 
reflective judgement is eventually settled in the Architectonic of Reason, its implicitly 
restless demands betray the unbearable limits of this settlement, since the contingent may 
well resist its final normalisation and the feeling of pleasure may well turn into an 
intractable bewildennent. 
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Chapter 3 
Fichte's Will to Freedom: The appropriation of experience 
Fichte is the main philosopher, preceding Schelling and Hegel, who questioned Kant's 
representational model of experience. According to Fichte, Kant's major aporia, with 
regard to the legitimacy of the possibility of synthetic a priori judgements, is not ultimately 
resolved, as long as the ground of their deduction - the apperceptive subject - is not 
properly thernatised and itself deduced. This ground in turn, would lay the foundation not 
only for theoretical but also for practical experience, thereby providing a radical solution to 
the aporias generated by the Kantian dualism, disentangling the subject from the 
antinornies between necessity and freedom, phenomena and noumena. However, for Fichte, 
the legitimacy of the apperceptive subject can not be attained in the context of Kant's 
representational-dualistic method. For, as we will discuss later in detail, the 
representational model of apperception is based on an inherent reflexive act of the pure T 
upon itself, which can never be deduced, since this act always presupposes what precisely 
attempts to found. Consequently, Fichte's major project is to provide an account of 
apperceptive subjectivity that would be liberated from the perplexities of the reflexive 
model. ' This task is carried through Fichte's major insight, which consists in his 
1 Here, the term reflection is used in the Hegelian sense. Hegel uses the term reflection in a broad sense, 
referring to philosophy in general insofar as it is developed as reflection upon externally given objects, rigidly 
cut off from the subject, which usually stands above to them. Reflection, thus conceived, is a way of thought 
permeated by dualisms and the positing of rigid dichotomies. This, according to Hegel, reaches its height in 
Kantian philosophy, where the mere positing of these oppositions leads Reason to irresolvable antinomies. 
This way of philosophising could not but include the investigation of the subject itself and the conditions of 
its self-consciousness, wherein the self turns itself into its own object. In turn, it was again Kanfs philosophy 
which built, in Hegel's early terminology, the "totality of limitations", that is the realm of the understanding, 
attesting to the limitations of Reason itself. 1 
In Kant's thought Reflection appears in the CPR only in the Appendix on the amphiboly of the concepts of 
reflection, arising from the confusion of the empirical with the transcendental employment of the 
understanding. Here, reflection is mentioned as a state of mind, which intends to distinguish the 
representations that belong to pure understanding from those that pertain to sensible intuition, in order to 
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conception of the subject in terms of activity, as opposed to a static substratum or a logical 
concept. 
The intellect, for idealism, is an act, and absolutely nothing more; we should not even 
call it an active 
2 
something, for this expression refers to something subsistent in which 
activity inheres. 
Through the introduction of the subject as sheer activity, indeed as productivity, Fichte 
mainly attempts to give a unified account of theoretical and practical reason, which would 
found the unitary nature of subjectivity. One of the fundamental goals of his thought, as he 
,, 3 declares in 1795, is to "bring unity and coherence into the entire human being. 
In this chapter, we will pursue a thorough investigation of Fichte's project to unify the 
Kantian contradictions. We will begin with Fichte's account of the contrast between his 
own method and that of reflective theory, as it is expounded by himself and by a 
contemporary thinker, D. Henrich. This will allow a perspective on how Fichte attempts to 
formulate his alternative theory and to what extent he has really detached himself from the 
reflective method. 
Fichte's Critique of Reflection: In Search of an Absolute Ground. 
Fichte's critical insight against Reflection occurs within his concern for the possibility of a 
unified account of subjectivity, a theme arising from Kant's two distinct accounts of 
Reason. The search for unity of reason has indeed been of fundamental importance to 
several generations of Kant critics. The source of this possibility in the form of a common 
faculty or structural identity of theoretical and practical reason has often been assigned (as 
avoid misuse of the concepts of the understanding and antinomies of Reason. 
2 Fichte J. 0, The Science of Knowledge, p. 21, 3 po. Cit., p. 21 
90 
intention or incomplete task) to Kant himself, as is the case with Heidegger's concept of 
the role of the imagination and in Fichte's further elaboration of the subject within the 
Kantian system. As already mentioned though, the unity of reason arose for Kant only 
either as aporia, accompanied by antinomies and paralogisms of Reason or as regulative 
ideal. Fichte's basic concern with the unity of subjectivity is presented in the Science of 
Knowledge (1794) as a fundamental question concerning the difference between our 
representations of freedom and those of necessity. It is followed by his statement of his 
goal to provide a unified, fundamental principle grounding all experience and thereby 
celebrating human autonomy. 
D. Henrich has proclaimed a rediscovery of Fichte, presenting him as a powerful voice 
against reflective models of thought, particularly on the question of the self-consciousness. 
Henrich praises Fichte mainly for the discovery of the difficulty embedded in the reflective 
models and, consequently, the new status given to the theory of self-consciousness. 
According to Henrich, Fichte was the first philosopher to recognise the circle around which 
the reflective theory of self-consciousness revolves. In Henrich's formulation the circularity 
consists in the following: According to the reflective model of self-consciousness, in order 
to become aware of myself, I have to direct attention to 'me' as an object of consciousness. 
However, if I do that, then, insofar as I know I am doing it, I am already self-conscious. 
Therefore, the 'act' of self-consciousness presupposes it, and I can only become self- 
conscious if I already am so. 
For Henrich, Fichte was the thinker who discovered and also experienced this perplexity. 
Accordingly, Fichte's attempt to get out of this circle generated his radically different 
account of the type of subjectivity that pertains to self- consciousness. Fichte understands 
the latter not only as a force capable of acting upon itself, but also as an objective activity 
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constructing the notion of subjectivity itself. In Henrich's words, 
Fichte's view can be elucidated in the following way: The reflection theory does indeed 
begin with a subject-self-, but it then proceeds to think of it only as a force capable of 
acting upon itself. With this, the theory gives up the distinctive sense of subjectivity 
that belongs to self-consciousness. The latter is interpreted instead in terms of a 
matter-of -fact activity that really belongs to the sphere of objects. 
4 
Thus, the formula Fichte counterposed to the reflective model was an account of 
subjectivity, which posits itself as both subject and object, without assuming for its 
existence any priori subject-self5 In Henrich's formulation: 
The whole of self-consciousness cannot be derived from the subject-factor. Hence, it 
will not emerge from anyone of its factors, but simultaneously with them all, in a trice, 
as it were, or EýatTvqq as Plato had already taught in the case of the highest 
knowledge.... Thus, we have no basis for objecting that something that does the positing 
must precede the act of positing. The self is the act through which it comes to be for 
itself, through which a subject-self becomes aware of itself as Object-Self . 996 
Thus, Henrich points out that Fichte, first, avoids the problem of circularity by means of 
the immediate self-positing, and second, that he develops a new theory of self- 
consciousness in which the subject does not pre-exist its activity, but instead, is part of it 
and constituted through it. Nevertheless, for Henrich, there is still a sense in which Fichte 
is never completely disentangled from the reflective model; "we can see that elements of 
the reflection theory are now insinuating themselves into Fichte's counterproposal. 197 On 
Henrich's reading, Fichte himself becomes aware of a continuous problem with his whole 
4 Henrich D., Fichte's Original Insight, p. 21,22. 
5 Henrich expounds the evolution of Fichte's theory of the self-positing subject in three stages in a detailed 
discussion. In the present chapter, we will not deal with details in the evolution of Fichte's thought, but treat it 
in a unified manner from the angle of the needs of our discussion. Elements of the internal subtle distinctions 
among the 3 stages will be only mentioned, as the detail would detract from the heart of the matter that 
inheres in all the versions, i. e. the subject-object structure of immediate self-consciousness. 6 Henrich, ibid, p. 23 
7 Ibid. p. 26. 
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enterprise; namely, that in the act of immediate self-positing, such a positing does not 
simply occur, but, even such a self-caused originary act, is itself a self-conscious activity. 
"Now the T has to be a self-positing, and know itself as a self-positing, which seems to 
,, 8 mean positing itself as a self-positing, ad infinitum. The same problem appears even 
more acutely in Fichte's expansion of the first formula as "the self posits itself absolutely as 
positing itself. Or, in Henrich's terms, Fichte never achieves a unity of the intuitive and 
conceptual components of his position. However, Henrich does not explain why Fichte 
never freed himself from the model per se. That is to say, his account focuses on what 
elements in Fichte's theory point beyond a reflective model, but avoids the problematic 
associated with reflection itself and of the elements being themselves still embedded in a 
reflective model, and hence shot through with contradictions in their entirety. 
In our view, Fichte's relapse back into reflective theory seems to be the crux of the issue in 
any re-evaluation of Fichte, and its proper explanation reveals the severely limited 
contribution of Fichte's account of self-consciousness, especially when this is deployed, as 
Henrich does, against the philosophy of Existenz. 9 To be sure, Henrich is coffect in his 
analysis as long as the inseparability of the subject and its activity (activity and product) 
can be sustained. The self is indeed immanent in its activity and thereby the criteria of its 
self-perceiving are likewise immanent. The articulation of the notion of the self presented 
also as product (object) of its own activity is indeed a real contribution. This is to be 
understood in context as in opposition to a dirempted or primary agent whose 'being' 
consists in an 'essence' prior to its deeds, who chooses or plans his actions and is never 
conditioned by them. In this sense, we consider that the notion of the self as both subject 
8 Ibid., p. 19 
911enrich, P. 15. 
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and object is positive, i. e. as the self who not only posits, but is posited as well. How 
successfully, though, is this element preserved in Fichte's thought? Is this indeed what 
Henrich describes as Fichte's "distinctive sense of subjectivity that belongs to self- 
consciousness.... that is the latter being interpreted in terins of a matter-of-fact activity that 
really belongs in the sphere of objects"? 10 Indeed Fichte, in his lectures on the 
Wissenschaftslehre novo methodo in 1797, in analysing the self -positing self of the 
Wissenschaftslehre of 1794, describes the subject as that which discovers itself as acting as 
both discoverer and discovered. He claims "I simply posit myself. " This means I am 
conscious of myself, first as the object of consciousness, and then again as the subject, i. e. 
the subject who is conscious. The discovered and the discoverer are one and the same; the I 
is identical with immediate consciousness. "" However, the discovered, as Fichte explains 
a few pages later, is the intuition of the subject's absolute freedom! "The object in question 
is freedom, productive activity, the intuiting subject, I-hood in its entirety.... The immediate 
object of consciousness is no object as such, but is rather the productive activity itself, i. e., 
freedom. " 12 This appears to be the provision of the missing evidence for the most desired 
proof of "the most prized" 13 of Reason's possessions, i. e. freedom. In fact, however, this 
alleged proof - the intuition of freedom - goes no further than the Kantian claim of the fact 
of the moral law. Only as irony then could we understand the postulate that the self is 
posited by the fact - the object - that it is absolutely free, i. e. able only to posit. 
Accordingly, when Fichte claims that the self is constituted by its activity, we can now 
understand by what sort of activity this is so. In fact, it is not any kind of activity, but rather 
a specific self-interaction, an act of self-reverting, of thinking oneself immediately without 
reference to any mediating factor. Thus, the self turns out to be constituted exclusively by 
10 Ibid., p. 21 
11 Fichte J. G., Foundations of Transcendental Philosophy. WL nove methodo, 1796-99, p. 118. 
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its thought about itself, and in particular its thought as an absolutely free agent. 
Nevertheless, even in this case this self-constitution could be fruitful if the self allowed his 
self-perception to be exposed in a real interaction with the world. In this exposition, the 
self might, possibly, experience the strength and validity of its immediate self-certainty. 
However, this exposition never occurs since self-positing has a transcendental status, as 
will be seen later. 
It becomes clearer now why Fichte is never completely freed from the reflective model, 
since his immediate self-positing reproduces precisely the heart of this model, i. e. the 
concept of a subject-self as pure concept: the vicious circle of abstract reflexivity. The 
lineage of the problem can be seen here between the agent of freedom in the Cartesian 
cogito, of formulating objective judgements of experience in Kantian transcendental 
subject, and of self-positing in Fichte. This conclusion is opposed to Henrich's argument. 
This can be seen if we look at this issue further. Henrich considers Fichte's critique of 
circularity in reflective theory as a powerful immanent critique against it, and thus, the 
latter's model of self-conscious is classified as anti-reflective. It is our contention, however, 
that Fichte's critique of the circularity of reflective theory occurs within the bounds of this 
way of thought, and he thereby replicates the difficulty. The motivation for his critique lies 
in his inner need of an assertion of the existence of a fundamental ground that would allow 
the firmest establishment of human autonomy, rather than in the overcoming of reflection 
itself. Fichte does not identify the origin of the circularity problem. He rather presents it as 
an infinite regress in which the essence of the problem becomes even more obscure. In his 
words, the problem is formulated as follows: 
12 op. cit. p. 144. 
13 Rose G., Dialectic of Nihilism, p. 12. 
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I am conscious of some object, B. But I cannot be conscious of this object without also 
being conscious of myself, for B is not I and I am not B. But I can be conscious of 
myself only insofar as I am conscious of consciousness. Therefore, I must be conscious 
of this act of consciousness, i. e., I must be conscious of this consciousness of 
consciousness. How do I become conscious of this? This series has no end, and 
therefore consciousness cannot be - explained 
in this manner.... The only way to avoid 
this objection is to discover some object of consciousness that is at the same time the 
subject of consciousness. One would thereby have disclosed the existence of an 
immediate consciousness, i. e. an object to which one would not have to oppose a new 
subject. 14 
It is worthwhile considering closely the way Fichte conceives the problem and why, 
consequently, he does not exercise an immanent critique of the problem of the reflection 
model. The first two sentences constitute a loose statement of the Kantian condition of 
experience, i. e. the original unity of apperception. Kant, as we know, specified the required 
unity of apperception as the self-consciousness of the self s formal sameness in all its 
representations (I =1, as formal identity). In the next 4 sentences, Fichte poses the 
condition of the unity of apperception itself or, in other words, the requirement of 
apperception of the unity of apperception. As we have discussed in the first chapter, Kant 
did not specifically address this issue, but rather took it for granted by assuming arbitrarily 
the a priori certainty of the self s formal identity through time: "For the mind could not 
possibly think the identity of itself in the multiplicity of its representations, and indeed this 
a priori, if it did not have before its eyes the identity of its action. " (CPR A 96, my 
emphasis), or "numerical identity is inseparable [from self-consciousness in its entirety], 
and a priori certain, since nothing can come into cognition except by means of its original 
apperception. " (CPR A 113, my emphasis. ). The latter statement is illuminating. For Kant, 
original apperception is the exclusive condition of all possible consciousness, so even of 
self-consciousness itself, taken as object of consciousness. Thus, he was obliged to assume 
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the a priori unprecedented certainty of the unity of apperception. Hence, it was Kant who 
first posited the a priori certainty of the identity of the self implicitly, and thence Fichte 
isolated and developed further the conception of a priori certainty as activity of the self- 
positing and gave it a strong practical dimension, that is, not only the attribute of the 
numerical identity of the self but the certainty of complete self-determination. By 
emphasising and rendering this a priori certainly as a necessary condition of the possibility 
of self-consciousness, Fichte essentially provided the transcendental condition not only of 
experience but also of the unity of apperception itself. 15 Now the issue, which Kant 
asserted implicitly and Fichte made explicit, is exactly the reason why could we never 
attain the apperception of the unity of apperception; or, more generally, why could self- 
consciousness within the reflective model never be attained. Although Fichte did indeed 
make the difficulty explicit, he never explained the origin of the difficulty, and therefore 
never extricated himself from it. The answer lies precisely in the character of this unity of 
apperception, or self-consciousness in the reflective model, where the latter is considered 
as a relation of pure, static identity, and thus what it presupposes is purely identical with 
what wants to attain. In turn, this relation of static and pure identity is the inevitable result 
and requirement of the reflective model where the subject is conceived in pure logical, 
formal terms. Besides, only in conditions of a transcendental context could the subject ever 
be considered so static, and cut off from any empirical or historical movement. Fichte, by 
positing a first beginning does not reply to the difficulty of the determinate circularity, but 
only to the problem of infinite regress or to circularity in general, to which he reduced the 
difficulty. However, circularity becomes vicious only within the reflective model; instead, 
if we try to think of self-consciousness beyond the reflective model, circularity does not 
14 FTP, p. 113 
15 See Second Introduction, Wissenschaftslehre, Fichte's discussion of Kant pp. 48-53. 
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constitute a problem at all. For, whenever we think of ourselves - become aware of 
ourselves - we always do it from a level of pre-existing self-awareness. This does not mean 
(as in the reflective model) that we already assume what we want to achieve. Self- 
consciousness is not a static, solid product of one single act or a state of an equation whose 
relata are perfectly equal and identical (I=I, as formal unity of apperception). Self- 
consciousness is an ever-evolving process, where the relation of a self to itself is both 
identical and non-identical, since it involves both moments of 'truth', and illusions, 
frustrations and self-confirmations, always mediated by the self s interaction with the world 
and the internal contradictions generated within it. The acknowledgement that we always 
discover ourselves mediated by and within an already existing level of self-consciousness 
is not necessarily related to any transcendental presupposition, which is always the same 
static and external condition. Instead, it signifies that the conditions of possible experience 
are conditioned by experience itself, and thus movable, dynamic, and immanent to the 
movement of self-knowledge. The beginning that we inevitably make some time, in this 
process, has nothing to do with any absolute beginning or foundation, but simply is a point 
in a circle, both mediated and immediate, contingent and yet necessary, insofar as pertains 
to the necessity of the movement itself. Hence, we have a further explanation of why Fichte 
cannot escape from the reflective model, at the methodological level: he seeks to overcome 
the reflective model by throwing the coin of reflection onto the other side. He replaces the 
rigid dichotomy of concept and intuition with their pure identity which, though, can never 
be attained and thus reproduces a similar vicious circle. Moreover, the conceptualisation of 
the act of self-positing as pure identity, essentially annuls the potentially fruitful 
connotations of the notion of productivity, which is claimed to characterise the self. For the 
notion of pure identity either - as an abstract concept - brings back the problematic of pure 
logic, or - as a pure and all-inclusive act - the problematic of a monotheistic theology, or 
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rather both in their mutual supplementary. On Henrich's reading, the issue of the true origin 
of the difficulty is never broached; perhaps, because Henrich's problematic itself develops 
from a reflective standpoint, thereby discovering Fichte's insight in his positing of the 
immediate, pure identity rather than in his potentially dynamic notion of productivity. Once 
this issue is raised, it points to severe limitations in Fichte's theory that Henrich does not 
acknowledge. The substance of these limitations will become clearer as we proceed. 
We move on now to look at Fichte's positing of his first principle, his internal 
contradiction, and thereby the generation of his entire system. 
The Discovery and Loss of the Ground 
As we have seen, Fichte articulated his basic contention in terms of the recognition of the 
above-mentioned difficulty of self-consciousness. 
Thus, Fichte counter-proposes the immediate emergence of the subject-object self for 
which, moreover, is claimed the status of the founding ground of all possible human 
activity. The requirement of such a self-grounded first foundation is justified simply in the 
name of the systematic character of any theory that claims to be science. The grounding 
principle is necessary in order to transfer its certainty to the rest of the propositions and 
thus to establish the systematic apodicticity of scientific knowledge. This first grounding 
principle consists in the absolute and unconditioned act of the self-positing ego, expressed 
by the pure identity I=I. 
The issue of an unconditioned beginning has been the object of severe critique in Hegel's 
Science of Logic. Hegel's critique develops as follows: the notion of a pure, undetermined 
beginning, which as such is intended to constitute the ground of experience, is self-refuted. 
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For, the concept of ground implies that the latter, by virtue of its grounding, is connected 
with all experience. But, if it is connected it is thereby determined, and so the ground 
ceases to be absolute or the unconditioned indeterminate. On the other hand, if it is not 
connected, it does not ground anything. Hegel cites Jacobi's eloquent expression of this 
logical paradox: "What brings about pure spontaneity (ego) into oscillation? Whence does 
its pure vowel get its consonant, or rather how does the soundless, uninterrupted sounding 
interrupt itself and break off in order to gain at least a kind of 'self-sound' (vowel) an 
accent?,, 
16 Or in Hegel's words: 
With this wholly abstract purity of continuity, that is, indeterminateness and vacuity of 
conception, it is indifferent whether this abstraction is called space, pure intuiting or 
pure thinking: it is altogether the same as what the Indians call Brahma, when for years 
on end, physically motionless and equally unmoved in sensation, conception, fantasy, 
desire and so on, looking only at the tip of his nose, he says inwardly only Om, Om, On 
or else nothing at all. 17 
Hegel's argument against the notion of an undetermined beginning unfolds from his 
general problematic that runs through the first section on Being of the Science of Logic. 
This can be succinctly formulated as the basic idea that, what appears as sheer immediacy 
is already mediated by a specific mode of thought which thinks in terms of static 
oppositions. Being, in the SL, stands precisely for a dualistic mode of thought, which does 
not recognise the immanent relations between things, the mobility of concepts, the 
alternation of contraries. Hence, Hegel argues that the notion of indeterminacy is already a 
determination. The notion of sheer indeterminacy, in contrast to any determination, can be 
sustained only by a mode of thought pertaining to the sphere of Being (in Hegel's SL 
terms). However, our contention is that the determination of indeterminacy refers to the 
notion of indeterminacy, that is, determination is attributed by thought to something that is 
16 Ibid. p. 95 
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already a thought. This in fact, is brought forward by Hegel himself in the second part of 
the SL, the section on Essence, in particular on the passages on Determining and Positing 
Reflection, which criticise the Kantian and Fichtean modes of thought. Apparently, we will 
not proceed to a further discussion on Hegel's Science of Logic. The point that we want to 
emphasise is that Hegel's refutation of absolute beginning occurs within the context of 
thought's determinations, which distil experience. By this we mean that the refutation of 
indeterminacy - as an already logical determination - is only partially sustainable, for 
otherwise, it is implied that indeterminacy, just by being thought, is cancelled. This would 
be the case if indeterminacy were only a thought itself Moreover, this sort of argument 
essentially enhances Fichte's account, for it is ego's thought itself that posits the 
determination, which thus allegedly annuls indeterminacy. Nevertheless, what happens if 
indeterminacy pertains to something more or even, beyond thought? What happens if 
indeterminacy pertains to a cosmic power? For if we consider the interaction of ground and 
experience not in terms of abstract concepts but in terms of powers - as living forces -, the 
process of their interaction does not imply their exhaustive and necessary 
intercletermination, for, as powers, they have their self-moving, relatively autonomous and 
indeterminable dimension. We will not pursue here the controversial issue to what extent 
Hegel claims that thought-determinations ultimately exhaust experience. This requires a 
separate research. However, our remark is that even in the case that also the Notion - the 
third section of the SL, which presents thought's determinations in its most richness - 
stands for an illusory conceptualisation of experience, Hegel's account of experience 
unfolds from the standpoint of its transcription at the conscious-logical level, whilst the 
remaining gap - between experience and its logical recollection - is never thernatised. We 
suggest then that the notion of an indeterminable beginning is sustainable, insofar as it is 
17 Ibid. p. 97. 
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considered as a moment, as a dimension in cosmic movement, which escapes its grasp by 
thought's determinations. Accordingly, our objection to Fichte's self-positing ego does not 
concern its indetern-ýinable aspect, so long as this act is considered as a spontaneous 
movement and a self-moving productivity. Instead, our objection concerns the absolute 
status that Fichte ascribes to ego's self-positing spontaneity, whose determinations are 
intended to ground and appropriate experience in its totality. In Fichte's system, thought's 
spontaneity is considered as an all-determining power. Its unconditioned status does not 
refer to its logical indeterminacy, for logically it is determined, namely, as sheer activity as 
opposed to sheer passivity. The unconditioned, absolute status refers to its overwhelming 
power to determine everything, evoking thus more the power of a transcendent god rather 
than the lifeless concept of abstract identity. 
However, Fichte lies in need of proving his extraordinary assertions, for he acknowledges 
that the all-powerful ego finds itself in lack of sufficient power, loss of control, being 
paradoxically suppressed by what was so far considered to be sheer passivity. 
Accordingly, the 'F is now defined in contrast to the 'not-I'. They are defined as utterly 
different, for this is the only sufficient way of retaining the ego's status as pure activity. 
Along with this - despite Fichte's project to raise the dichotomies of representational model 
-a whole set of rigid dualisms is set out: infinite activity, as opposed to finite, pure, 
unmediated self-activity as opposed to activity directed to objects, sheer agility as opposed 
to sheer passivity, consciousness as opposed to being and positive as opposed to negative. 
At this point we reach our initial and basic concern, that is, to see how Fichte attempts to 
unify the Kantian dualisms which, yet, he himself reproduces and reformulates at a new 
level. 
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Now Fichte is obliged to unify his own poles. In fact, these poles are but the positing of his 
two basic principles postulated in the Science of Knowledge of 1794. From now on, we will 
follow a close textual analysis of the Wissetischaftslehre, in conjunction with his lectures 
of 1797, in order to see the manner in which Fichte treats the contradictions that undermine 
his grounding principle. 
First, we turn to inquire into the mode Fichte poses the problem of the distinction between 
theoretical and practical reason, and from which perspective he attempts to bridge it. In the 
First Introduction to WL (1794), the main questions are formulated as follows: 
Some of our representations are accompanied by the feeling of freedom, others by the 
feeling of necessity"18 While for the representations which depend on freedom no question 
about their source reasonably arises, for the latter it does so. "But the question, 'what is the 
source of the system of representations which are accompanied by the feeling of necessity, 
and of this feeling of necessity itselff is one that is surely worthy of reflection. "19 By the 
word necessity in this context, Fichte means constraint and not objective validity. The rest 
of this short introduction is essentially devoted to explaining why he is going to treat this 
question from the angle of idealism. The latter corresponds to a "higher type of man who 
believes in his self-sufficiency and independence from everything that is outside 
himself.,, 20 This type of man lies in direct contrast to those "who have not yet raised 
themselves to full consciousness of their freedom and absolute independence [and thus] 
find themselves only in the presentation of thingS,, 21 (the dogmatist or realist). Apparently 
the Wissenshaftslehre is developed within idealism and the celebrated statement "what sort 
18 SK. p. 6. 
19 Ibid. 
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of philosophy one chooses depends, therefore, on what sort of man one iS,, 22 , has only a 
rhetorical character and is of no relevance to Fichte's allegedly anti foundationalism or 
relativism, as has been argued. 23 The latter argument has been mainly developed on the 
basis that Fichte postulates his first principle as something which should be discovered by 
everyone within his soul, and so should not be subject to the requirement of proof. True, a 
simple appeal to immediate self-evidence, as Fichte eventually does, fails to establish a 
first principle. However, this does not absolve Fichte from his foundationalism, but simply 
demonstrates his failure to found an absolute ground, a failure that will become clearer 
through our examination of his enterprise to deduce his grounding principle. To begin with, 
although Fichte claims his first principle as unproved and self-grounded, he himself 
implicitly confesses that he violates it, by means of the second principle, which is not 
derivable from the first. Hence, the third principle and its analysis - which constitutes the 
bulk of the WL - is an unacknowledged attempt at a deduction of the first founding 
principle; a deduction that consists in its attempt to synthesise the utterly opposed 
principles. 
The Grounding of the Ground 
Before undertaking in detail a discussion of Fichte's analysis of his third grounding 
principle in the foundation of theoretical knowledge, we would like to make a more general 
comment on his third principle. Through the first principle, Fichte asserts that the category 
of Reality in general is posited. Through the second, in contrast, the category of Negation 
in general is posited. Thus the following contradiction arises: "How can A and -A, being 
20 Ibid., p. 15. 
21 Ibid., p. 16 
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and non-being. Reality and Negation, be brought together without mutual elimination and 
destruction?,, 24 The suggested 'solution' is given by means of their mutual limitation so 
that they will be both partially posited. The latter assumes their divisibility. "To limit 
something is to abolish its reality not wholly but in part only, by negation. Thus, apart from 
reality and negation the notion of limit also contains that of divisibility (the capacityfor 
quantity in general)"25 . However, how is infinity divisible? What means 'Part of the 
infinite', either as being or as non-being? In which does this absolute difference between 
Reality and Negation consist, and if they are thus absolutely different, how can they limit 
each other? In fact, Fichte does not explicitly address these questions. However, the 
schema-solution provided by him suggests that the so far absolutely different realms of 
Reality and Negation be now considered in identical terms, namely as quantity in general. 
The incomprehensible divisibility of infinity claimed by Fichte, in our view, can only be 
explained by its converse as a quantifiable, self-same totality, divisible in infinite identical 
units. This quantitative homogeneous totality turns out to be the all-inclusive Fichtean self 
which simply posits itself now as infinite, total self, then as finite self along with its 
concomitant not-self, respectively, according to the different amounts, which are posited by 
the ego from its total quantity. Hence the final formulation of the third principle: "In the 
self I oppose a divisible not-self to the divisible self. "26 Thus, the absolute difference 
between self and not-self is turned into sheer self-sameness, and it is precisely the 
procedure of the dissolution of qualitative difference which we want to emphasise as the 
guiding thread of his thought. Therefore, in this light we can more easily follow the 
tortuous path of his attempt to perform the desired synthesis between self and not-self. 
22 Ibid. p. 16 
23 Williams R., Recognition, Fichte Hegel and the Other. p. 35. 11 WL' P. 108. 
25 Ibid., p. 109 
26 WL' p. 110. 
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a) Grounding by Means of Efficacy 
We now turn our attention to Fichte's method of unifying the contradictions in order to 
legitimise his anti-dualistic project. The third grounding principle, applied to theoretical 
knowledge, generates a fundamental contradiction that Fichte attempts to resolve. The 
application of the grounding principle in theoretical knowledge is that "the self posits itself 
as limited by the not-seIL" However, this stands in flagrant contradiction to the first 
principle, which thus requires re-affirmation. Thus the opposing propositions to be 
synthesised are: 
1. "The not-self (actively) determines the self (which is to that extent passive). " 
2. The self posits itself as absolute activity. 
Fichte presents the contradiction in quantitative terms and states: "If the self is to be 
determined this means that reality is destroyed therein. Therefore, if the self thus posits 
within itself only a portion of the absolute totality of the real, it thereby destroys the 
remainder of this totality within itself. And so... it posits a portion of reality, equal to that 
destroyed, in the not-self. 27 Hence, a first synthesis can be achieved by positing on behalf 
of the self a portion of its reality in the not-self. In that sense the not-self determines the 
self, while the latter remains self-determined since it posits by its own activity part of its 
reality. The above synthesis is rendered possible by the "higher generic concept" of 
"indetermination" according to which "the quantity of the one is posited in terms of its 
opposite, and vice versa. In determining the reality or negation of the self, we 
27 Ibid. p. 126. 
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,, 28 simultaneously determine the negation or reality of the not-self and vice versa. However, 
the contradiction remains in another form: "But how, then, are we able to remove parts of 
reality from the self? ", since all reality is posited absolutely in the self. How is the 
transference of reality, or of activity from the self to the not-self possible? Fichte, 
throughout various arguments constantly makes use of tautologous arguments and 
technical devices which never succeed in answering the main question of why the self 
makes this voluntary transference of activity to the not-self, or of reality (activity) to the 
not-self. He does give a merely implicit answer: "the not-self has reality for the self only to 
the extent that the self is affected, and in the absence of such affection, it has none 
whatever. ', 29 The implicit answer is that reality is removed from the self when it is affected 
by the not-self. The above synthesis is called the synthesis of efficacy (causality) where the 
active factor is the not-self. But if the not-self is considered as sheer passivity, how does it 
affect the self? Whence does the not-self find the energy before the self s voluntary 
donation of activity? And if the not-self already had the activity to affect the self, how 
would all activity be posited by the self? Fichte does not undertake to tackle such 
objections, so his first basic synthesis seems unsuccessful. 
Grounding by Means of Independent Activity 
Indeed, Fichte himself acknowledges the insufficiency of the preceding synthesis, and he 
accepts that the main question is still unanswered. He then asks again, why does the self 
transfer activity to the not-self? Consequently, "how, then, can a passivity be posited in the 
self? "30 . Fichte then turns his focus almost exclusively on the self, and essentially the rest 
28 Ibid. p. 126. 
29 WL, p. 130. My emphasis. 
311 WL, p. 132..... 
107 
of his exceptionally detailed and pedantic analysis consists in his attempt to further 
elaborate the notion of the self. Thus in the question mentioned above, Fichte first proceeds 
to show how the self could be both free and constrained. Here, we can discern some more 
positive and flexible elements in his thought, where he tries to combine freedom and 
necessity. He defines the self as substance in general in the sense of the infinite ability for 
infinite acts; but the manifestation of this substance becomes, through its determinate acts, 
the determinate choices of the self where freedom and necessity are conjoined. In this 
context, passivity is defined as simply a lesser degree of activity (always in quantitative 
terms). Then the question arises that if the self is infinite, why should it choose at all? Why 
should it determine its passivity through its activity? So, in spite of this elaboration, Fichte 
ends up at the same point, positing the same question: "why should the self posit passivity 
in itself, even if passivity is now called a lesser degree of activity 7v931 
At this crucial point, Fichte is no longer willing to linger on the problem, and he accepts 
the need for a radical solution. Here he introduces (in a completely arbitrary way) the 
concept of independent activity, which dissolves, as a deus ex machina, all these spells. 
Nevertheless, this activity, in the form of the imagination, constitutes the heart of his 
method. At this point in addition, he acknowledges that up until now he did not advance a 
single step from his initial point. 
If the self posits itself as self-determined, it is not determined by the not-self, if it is 
determined by the not-self, it does not posit itself as self determined.... But the question 
why in general a passivity must be posited, instead of letting matters rest with the 
activity in the first thing, that is, why in general, there has to be an interdetermination, it 
is not vet answered thereby. 32 
The answer to this problem is again given in an obscure and technical way, which is yet 
31 Ibid., p. 124 
32 WL, p. 140 & 144. 
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illurninating for the rest of his enterprise and for our interest. Fichte, instead of answering 
his own question directly, i. e. why in general a passivity must be posited in the self, sets 
about answering how - in which manner passivity can be posited - rather than why it is 
posited at all. However, even from this exposition we can infer a useful conclusion. Fichte 
asserts that in order for passivity to be posited in the self there must be possible the 
transition of the activity of the self towards the not-self. "In this transition, however, there 
is and must be a connecting link, or a ground which is here the ground of conjunction. 
This, as we know, is quantity, which is alike in both self and not-self. 9933 The transition is 
completely smooth since it occurs within the uniformity of quantity. Here, self and not-self 
are explicitly claimed to be self-same. Consequently, when the not-self takes on the form 
of another actual subject, it is considered as identical to one 's selý 4. He then asserts that 
this ground of conjunction is not dependent on the principle of interdetermination; instead, 
the latter is dependent on it. He claims 
64once passivity has been posited in the self, it will be granted without hesitation that 
activity is posited in the not-self; but why then, in general, is activity posited? The 
answer to this question is no longer to be found in the principle of interdetermination, 
but in the higher grounding principle. "35 
At last, this higher grounding principle is to give the account of the passivity in the self. 
Now, if the ground lies in the not-self, "we are no longer talking of mere quantity, but of 
quality", by means of which "we arrive at materialist Spinozism, which is a form of 
dogmatic realiSM.,, 36 Fichte excludes any possibility for the not-self to be different from the 
self and active on its own; this would lead directly to a lower type of man. Neither self nor 
not-self could be simultaneously active and passive. Therefore, the ground must necessarily 
33 WL, p. 145 
34 We would like to stress the authoritarian implications of the projection of this idea onto the sphere of the 
ýolitical. 
5 Ibid. p. 145 (my emphasis). 
36 Ibid., p. 146 
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be sought in the self itself, what Fichte calls the thirdfactor X. Fichte does not simply 
assert that passivity is able to be posited, to be transferred due to the sameness of quality 
between self and not-self, i. e. the determination of quantity. He asserts that this smooth 
transition should be allowed and, in turn, should be performed by a third factor X. 
"Passivity and activity as such are opposed; but if passivity is to be immediately posited by 
activity they must also concur in a third thing X which permits the transition from passivity 
to activity. This third thing, which is the ground of conjunction, is the independent activity 
,, 37 which constitutes a larger circuit which incorporates interdetermination. Therefore, 
Fichte here hypostasizes, or rather personifies, the positing of passivity in the self. This 
independent activity is nothing but imagination itself, i. e. the self itself which decides again 
to limit itself! The desired synthesis does not occur through any independent dynamics of 
the interaction between the two supposedly opposed poles. Instead, it is performed by a 
third agent who manipulates the alleged interaction from above. Next, we will examine 
how Fichte attempts to further elaborate the notion of this self-limiting self by means of the 
imagination. This is the true site of his critical idealism where the intellect operates by its 
own laws, self-determining, self-differentiating and synthesising anew its internal self- 
differentiation. 
The 'Baffled' Consciousness: Self-Grounded Ground, or the Fact Becomes Act. 
So far, Fichte has been left with two main syntheses, that of efficacy and that of the 
independent activity. The first seems too 'realistic', the second, too 'idealist'. The former 
accounts for an active not-self that directly affects the self that is thereby determined. 
According to this, the self's finitude is utterly dependent on something external. The latter 
37 WL, p. 147 
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accounts for an active self, which regulates the distribution of passivity and activity in 
itself, essentially taking no account whatsoever of the not-self. Fichte, though moving 
within idealism, is nevertheless concerned to avoid an extreme version of crude idealism 
that would give no reason at all for the restrictedness of the self. Hence, his next and final 
step is to attempt a sufficient synthesis, which could take account of the role of the not-self 
without, however, questioning the independence of the self. The above task will be 
performed within the context of a further elaboration of the concept of substantiality, that 
is, by a more profound analysis of the operation of the intellect. The latter, according to his 
critical idealism, would function in a law-giving manner of self-determination, delimiting 
itself from a totally lawless and chaotic activity. In what follows, we will see to what extent 
Fichte does attain a sufficient account of the synthesis in question. 
Fichte does not seek a fundamental divergence from the role of independent activity. 
Instead, the latter is considered as an important result of his investigation, which simply 
has to be elaborated further in order to incorporate in its explanatory framework the realist 
anomaly of the concept of efficacy. 
We have seen so far that the independent activity is the higher ground that accounts for the 
positing of the passivity of the self within itself. Fichte elaborates the way this process 
occurs through the further development of the concept of substantiality. As we have 
mentioned, Fichte defined the self as substance in general (the general notion of self- 
positing, infinite activity, absolute freedom) within this framework. Now, he states that the 
self does not posit the whole of reality at once; it simply posits a part of reality, a limited 
sphere A, (the positing of passivity) and thus the non-posited activity is posited as the 
sphere of exclusion B (negation through affirmation in his words. ). He gives the following 
example, comparing substance (the self) with a piece of iron that moves!!: 
III 
Suppose a determinate piece of iron = C, that moves. You posit the iron absolutely, as 
an absolute totality, as it is posited through its mere concept =A (in virtue of the 
principle A =A), and in the sphere of this you fail to find the movement =B; hence by 
the positing of A, you exclude B from its sphere. Yet you do not eliminate the notion of 
the iron =C, you have no wish to deny absolutely the possibility of this; so you posit it 
outside the sphere of A, in an indeterminate sphere, because you simply do not know on 
what condition, andfor what reason, the pieces of iron =C may move. Sphere A (is) if 
the totality of the iron, and yet is also not so, for the motion of C, which is also iron, 
after all, is not included therein. 38 
The sphere A is determinate, limited already, the sphere B is a detern-dnable one, and the 
totality C will be the result of the further determination of A (i. e. the concept of iron) by 
means of the new detern-driation acquired in the sphere B. "The absolute totality is to be 
neither A, nor A+ B, but A determined by A+ B. 909 Or, more simply, the self is not utterly 
determined but will be determined by means of its further interaction with the not-self. 
Substance, the self, is the totality as determinate detenninability. "40 
It has been argued that this procedure of determination consists in the fruitful interaction 
between self and not-self, subject and object: "The subject is itself, but must also always be 
related to an object in order to be a subject. The determinability of a subject needs both, 
i. e., only through both can one ever understand the intrinsic character of a subject 
Substance is only a relationship with nothing fixed iA 1 To be sure, it is here that we can 
find the most fruitful elements of Fichte's account of the constitution of the self, where the 
conception of the self as activity becomes meaningful, especially in his suggestion that 
self-consciousness results from the never-ending interplay between subject and world. 
Nevertheless, we have to examine closer the nature both of this interplay and consequently 
of the acquired detenninations. 
38 WL, p. 176. 
39 Ibid. p. 181 
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We first examine the way the self posits this limited sphere; in other words, how does the 
self limit itself and in what does the limit consist? It is here that Fichte seeks to take into 
account the concept of efficacy. His solution is to turn a crude realism into a refined one, 
that is, to reduce the uncomfortable affection to a gentle check (Anstoss), a resistance that 
instead of setting a definite bound to the I's activity, merely serves to give the I the task of 
setting bounds to itselL The '1' feels the resistance in its flight in the air, above the ground 
of experience 42 and thereby sets a boundary to itself, i. e. posits itself as limited (viz. sphere 
A). Sphere B is the sphere of its potential determination by means of positing its future 
boundaries during its outreaching activity. Thus, the object declares its presence simply by 
a mere check of the self' activity and the alleged interplay is but a clash, an instant contact 
which generates the feeling of resistance. 
The objective to be excluded has no need at all to be present; all that is required- if I 
may so put it- is the presence of a check on the self that is for some reason that lies 
merely outside the self s activity, the subjective must be extendible no further. Such an 
impossibility of further extension would then delimit- the mere interplay we have 
described, or the mere incursion. 43 
Hence, the object is translated into simply the boundary, which, since it is only posited by 
the ego, is arbitrary and indeterminate. Furthermore, in the lectures of 1797, the object is 
explained exclusively as an instant of the I's activity, and its origin is completely 
forgotten. The following statement is telling: "Why should we and why must we posit any 
object at all?... We posit objects precisely because we have posited an absolute acting, to 
which the objects of our experience refer and by mean of which these objects are given to 
40 WL p. 182. 
41 Hohler T. P., Imagination and Reflection in Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre, p. 39. 42 See CPR pp. 46,47 where Kant compares Reason, which seeks knowledge beyond sense conditions, to a 
light dove which "cleaving the air in her free flight and feeling its resistance, might imagine that its flight 
would be still easier in empty space. " 43 WL p. 189 (my emphasis) 
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us. "44 Now, the object has been absorbed by the subject, it has been appropriated by the 
self-assertive 1.45 Hence, the statement, 
it is not such a trivial matter as it appears to some people, whether philosophy should 
begin from a fact or from an Act (i. e., from pure activity which presupposes no object 
but itseýf creates it, so that action immediately becomes dead). For if it starts with the 
fact it places itself inside the world of existence and of finitude, and will find it hard to 
discover the way that leads from there to the infinite and the supersensual; if it begins 
from an Act, it will stand at the point where the two worlds meet and from which they 
can both be seen at a glance. 46 
However, the source of the check still remains inexplicable; the realist residue is still there, 
the desired synthesis still unattained. However, Fichte still claims a synthesis to have been 
accomplished. This happens within the internal world of the self itself, where the subject- 
object opposition has now taken its proper formulation, namely, as the clash between the 
self's certainty of its absolute indeterminacy and its feeling of finitude. The synthesis 
apparently is not the result of any procedure of interaction, since anyway the third term has 
been expelled, but is a mere holding-together of the opposed terms. 
This interplay of the self, in and with itself, whereby it posits itself at once as finite and 
infinite- an interplay that consists, as it were, in self-conflict, and is self-reproducing, in 
that the self endeavours to unite the irreconcilable, now attempting to receive the 
infinite in the form of the finite, now, baffled, positing it again outside the latter, and in 
that very moment seeking once more to entertain it under the form of finitude- this is 
the power of the imagination. 47 
Imagination proves to be the basic bearer of the uniting of the opposites, having first 
translated the object into the subjective feeling and quite easily justifying this feeling as a 
44 FTP, p. 162 
45 It is in this context that we can understand the caustic character of the criticisms, which Fichte initially 
received. Consider, e. g., the following extract from a letter from Schiller to Goethe: "To him the world is only 
a ball that the ego has thrown and that it catches again in 'reflection'! By this logic he could have really 
declared his divinity, as we recently expected him to. " (Schiller to Goethe, October 28,1794. cited by Hans 
Blumenberg in Work on Myth, p. 266. and note 5. The MIT Press, 1985. ) 
46 WL, p. 42 (my emphasis) 
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product of the I's infinite nature! The unification of the distinctions is nothing but the self- 
justifying activity of the self, which, in every encounter with the world, exhausts its activity 
as its self-projection. In the sight of the other it recognises only itself and thus absorbs it 
within it, by the activity of imagination. Imagination is but the power that enables 
intellectual intuition (the original self-positing) to shine upon the other. But the light is so 
blinding (absolute self-certainty) that the self cannot see the other, but only the reflection of 
its shining upon it. Thus the synthesis is nothing but the harmonious yet baffling co- 
existence of the self's infinite self-assertion and the illusory moments of its attainment. 
From this point of view, Fichte identifies infinite and finitude, whilst he previously 
considered them as utterly different. "Both are one and the same; this signifies, in brief. no 
infinity, no bounding; no bounding, no infinite; infinity and bounding are united in one and 
9948 the same synthetic component. Nevertheless, in the realm of the Practical49 things are 
radically difficult. Imagination is helpless, for the object, the negligible realist residue, now 
becomes monstrous, alien, unconquerable, the thing-in-itself. The feeling of resistance is 
no longer a moment of freedom, but an unbearable, infinite indication of the self's inability 
to be what it believes itself to be. The dominant duty for the self now is to transcend its 
limits, an ought, an infinite striving to jump beyond its shadow. The happy consciousness 
of harmony in the sphere of imagination now becomes grieving and mourning for the loss 
of its previous achievements. The determinations resulting from the process of the 
subject's unfolding self-determination are poor and repetitive, for the ego eventually 
remains a vacuous self-relation. The ego never allows a real interaction with its other, and 
therefore an essential self-differentiation never takes place, only a fictitious one between 
ego and its self-repelling. The third term - the other - functions merely as a remote echo; 
47 WL, p. 193. 
48 Ibid. p. 192 
115 
this only gives the ego the task for its determination. The thus received determinations are 
faded, vague, indefinite with the weight of a shadow - the shadow of the distanced other - 
and so floating in the midst of an illusory determinacy. The notion of contradiction itself is 
considered a blemish to be eradicated in the name of the inviolable unity of consciousness. 
The interaction of the opposed terms thus appears even more frightening, its outcome 
unpredictable and threatening to the ego's authority. The contraries never really interact; 
they are just conjoined and disj oined together by an intermediate neutral space: the space of 
the void where imagination oscillates. They are kept apart and move in a linear manner 
with separate roles, fixed and static. Accordingly, the sought unity acquires the status of 
either a normative duty for the sake of harmony, through subjugation (in the practical 
realm), or the monotonous celebration of an empty identity, which never dares to expose 
itself in its unconfessed, tormenting contradictions (in the theoretical one). 
Conclusion: The Act Becomes Fact: Fichte's Fundamental Ontology. 
Did Fichte eventually succeed in his Deduction of the first fundamental principle? In 
practical reason, apparently not, since the first principle assumes the form of an infinite 
ought. In theoretical reason, the principle took the form of an unjustifiable usurpation of 
the object by the subject: the claim of the first principle was rather repeated through the 
exposition of its various forms, and no deduction was forthcoming. Fichte's initial question 
in the first introduction regarding the source of the system of representations accompanied 
by the feeling of necessity is answered essentially by establishing the subjective act of the 
infinite activity of the self. This is the reason why the second introduction is much more 
far-reaching and conspicuously bent toward exposing the first principle as a matter of 
49 Ibid. p. 281 
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unquestionable validity. The question of the first introduction is now shifted to the question 
of the validity of the answer given by the Wissenschaftslehre. Despite his claims that his 
philosophy begins from an act (the self-positing ego) and not from a fact, the opposite is 
actually the case. "How then is the philosopher to ensure the objectivity of this purely 
subjective act?... I answer: this act is by its nature objective. That I exist for myself is a 
fact.,, 50 Thus, the failure of the deduction of his first principle in the 1794 
Wissenschaftslehre and other relevant critiques led Fichte to give more weight to the 
factual, unproved nature of the first principle, instead of questioning the veracity of that 
original fact. 5 1 The original fact is one that everyone must discover in himself, "the source 
of life is contained therein, and without it there is death. 9952 The unproved and assertive 
character of this fact, however, along with the confession of the Wissenschaftslehre that it 
eventually becomes a task for the ego, leads to a moderation of the nature of the original 
positing. Thus, in the second Introduction he insists that "it is not a conceiving; this it only 
becomes by contrast with a not-self, and through determination of the self within this 
opposition. Hence it is a mere intuition .... By the act 
described, the self is merely endowed 
with the possibility of self-consciousness, and therewith of all other consciousness; but no 
true consciousness comes into being as yet. ', 53 This is the reason for the wide discussion 
and controversy over the nature of the self-positing ego. Is it the positing of the reality of 
54 55 
self-consciousness, as Henrich claims , or a simple intuition as described above . 
Is it an 
50 Ibid. p. 35 
51 This is why Hegel, in Faith and Knowledge, classifies Fichte's philosophy as faith rather than knowledge. 
52 Ibid. p. 38. 
53 Ibid. p. 54. 
54 Henrich states "there is more to be seen in the thesis that the self posits itself absolutely than hubris and 
presumption; otherwise, we could not even begin to credit Fichte with a serious concern for truth. It can be 
read as the intelligible attempt to explain something whose existence no-one can doubt- the reality of self- 
consciousness. " For Henrich, this is the reason why 'the present age has turned a deaf ear' to Fichte. For 
contemporary philosophy replaced the talk about self-consciousness with the notion of 'existenz' and the 
analysis of language. Here, Henrich does not make any claim about the reality of self-knowledge as a 
completed act. He simply seeks to point out that the subject does come to a self-conscious state, that self- 
consciousness is a state that can exist and is not fundamentally impossible as the vicious circularity of the 
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underlying substratum of all consciousness or does it permeate self-consciousness 
throughout? 56 Is it a claim about the practical nature of the self, or merely for the 
theoretical? 57 We have given our response to this question implicitly through the 
reconstruction of Fichte's text. We shall here spell out our precise account of this question. 
As we saw, Fichte's enterprise of the deduction of the original self-positing develops 
mainly from the concept of substantiality, in quantitative terms, despite his introductory 
remarks which warn against anything "subsistent". Moreover, his successive attempts to 
give an account of synthesis is carried through the external introduction of new concepts, 
which appear themselves to be the bearers of the movement of his pedantic argumentation, 
rather than the promising dynamics of the process of productivity. In his later work, 
Science of Ethics, Fichte even claims the actuality of this original self-awareness, 
manifested in the whole ego as an impulse, a primordial momentum for absolute freedom. 
In fact, in our discussion we found it as the arrogant and naive level of consciousness of the 
absolute self-certainty of the self's pure autonomy, and its ability to determine anything 
external to it. It is a concrete disposition towards itself and the world, that of claiming 
complete conformity of the latter to the subject. This act is infinitely performed, an infinite 
number of times, with each encounter of the self with the world, and thereby the self- 
consciousness of the self is the process and result of these experiences. However, since the 
nature of these experiences is exclusively self-centred, the nature of the thereby recollected 
self-consciousness is concomitantly static. It is the same, unchangeable self-consciousness, 
reflective model renders it. Though Henrich's main point is sustainable - i. e. the reality of self-consciousness 
- the issue is to what extent this point can be convincingly defended by means of Fichte's self-positing ego. 55 Pippin also, in his reply to Henrich, uses the second introduction in Wissenschaftslehre, and stresses the 
'intuitive character' of self-positing. See Pippin R.: "Fichte's contribution" in Philosophical Forum 19. 56The latter dilemma has been posed in F. Neuhauser, Fichte's Theory of Subjectivity, and resolved in favour 
of the former version. 
57 Ibid. p. 44. Neuhauser mentions that this dilemma is one of the most fundamental controversies within 
Fichte scholarship. He supports the view that the first principle in the WL concerns only the theoretical part of 
the ego, as the "Cartesian r'. This interpretation misses the heart of Fichte's enterprise, i. e., the search for a 
principle which could found both theoretical and practical reason. 
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insensitive to its frustrations, now triumphant, in the vanity of self -affirmation, now 
miserable, in its self-refutation, but always stubborn and not susceptible to formation. 
Hence, the act of self-positing stands for both an underlying substratum of consciousness, 
and the reality of self-consciousness, and indeed for the transcendental condition of any 
activity. In fact, it does illustrate the "reality of self-consciousness", as Henrich claims, 
albeit, in the opposite direction of Henrich's intentions, namely, in the exposition of the 
limited, marginal or even negative role that the process of self-consciousness may have 
with regard to the constitution of the self. For self-consciousness, viewed as a self-oriented 
goal, seems to give rise to the validation of the ego's self-assertiveness rather than to its 
formative Bildung. This is concomitant with the nature of the ego's activity. Fichte has 
been mainly presented as the philosopher of praxis. This sounds relevant since all 
experience is generated by and reduced to the act of freedom. However, this act is 
successfully described by Fichte as the activity of the eye, i. e. a praxis of mere seeing, and 
indeed of self-mirroring, thus, a praxis with no formative strength for either the subject or 
the object, a praxisform the secure distance of the beholder. From this point of view, the 
unity of theoretical and practical reason is indeed accomplished. In addition, the ability for 
this praxis is not given to anybody. It is something that the philosopher attains by means of 
logical abstraction and by those few who are able to discover it in themselves. Thus, it is 
also highly esoteric, and elitist. 
In the light of these conclusions, we can gain a wider perspective on the substance of 
Henrich's analysis. Henrich justifiably claims that it is necessary to situate the 
philosophical problems within their historical context. From this viewpoint, Fichte's 
insight is powerful indeed, as being critically located in the tradition of reflective theories, 
including Descartes, Leibniz, Locke, and especially Kant. Moreover, exactly because, as 
Henrich points out, we have to treat philosophical issues historically, the central objection 
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to Henrich's orientation is that one cannot criticise the philosophy of Existenz from a 
subject-centred standpoint, eminently that advocated by Fichte. For, it is the latter way of 
philosophising that renders the former as a seemingly well justified one. In other words, the 
defence of the reality of self-consciousness could only be sustained not from the standpoint 
of a static self-certainty, but from precisely the refutation of that standpoint, working 
through the way of despair of self-consciousness, and along with it, the tradition of 
philosophy itself. 
Fichte's response to the Kantian question leads us to an exceptionally narrow field of 
philosophical problematic. The Kantian dualism is raised by an act of monolithic identity: 
the relation of man with the world is dissolved in the illusory power of the self-positing 
ego, the aporia of judgement is settled in the primordial impulse for absolute freedom, the 
notion of subjectivity is exhausted by the obstinate self-certainty or the perennial striving 
for sheer autonomy. Fichte's overwhelmingly self-centred philosophy constituted the 
theme of sharp critique by Schelling, to whose thought we now need to turn our research. 
Section 11 
The logogrif of experience 
Schelling's Notion of Experience. 
Introductory Remarks 
In the previous chapter we dealt with Fichte's endeavour to resolve the basic Kantian 
question of the conditions for the possibility of synthetic a priori judgements. For 
Kant, this issue was essentially reduced to the necessary assumption of the 
transcendental unity of apperception, along with the ability to schernatise the 
derivative categories. The latter appears to have been completely ignored by Fichte, 
who focused his enquiry instead toward that area in which Kant remained silent; 
namely, the conditions for the transcendental unity of apperception itself. 
In consequence, we have Fichte's resounding claim for the self-positing of the Ego, an 
act intended to suspend the old dualisms and consequent impasses of reflection, an act 
monolithic enough in its overwhelming drive to dissolve these conceptual gaps. 
It is in the same problematic that Schelling's Idealism originates, yet in such a way as 
if the Fichtean drive is but the impetus for his detachment from the subject-centred 
system. 
Schelling is tormented by the philosophical problems of his age which surface as 
questions in his own work. 
"How do ideas of external things arise in us? " 
"How it comes about that in us the object and the idea are inseparably united" 
[Ideasfor a Philosophy of Nature (1797)]. 
"How a subjective is annexed thereto [i. e. to the objective], which coincides with 
it" [System of Transcendental Idealism (1800)]. 
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How could a system that unites intuition and concepts ever be conceivable? [Bruno 
or On the Natural and the Divine Principle of Things (1802)]. 
The above questions receive various and differentiated responses, since Schelling's 
intellectual development is characterised by an exceptional multifariousness, as far as 
both the content and the fonn of his works is concerned. It is not the object of this 
thesis to give a thorough and systematic account of all the different phases of his 
thought and of the transitions between his intellectual transformations. We rather 
focus on illuminating those powerful dimensions of his thought that open new 
perspectives to our themes, but also, potentially, impinge on many areas of modem 
philosophical investigation, with regard to the relation between the absolute and 
finitude, thought and being, epistemology and ontology, philosophy and mythology. 
Schelling's thought, which remained for many decades in the darkness of Hegel's 
overriding critique, far from being 'the night where all the cows are black', presents 
an extraordinary richness and uninvestigated resources, which our research broaches 
only in a preliminary and preparatory way. 
As already mentioned in the Introduction, Schelling's originality consists in his 
radicalisation of the whole context and tonality of the debate around the conditions of 
cognitive experience, by transposing the aporias of logic from the realm of human 
subjectivity to the realm of cosmic becoming. As will be seen later, logic is considered 
itself as an immanent power amongst the infinite configurations and transmutations 
that the interaction of cosmic powers takes in a specific stage of the history of the 
engagement of man with the world. Through this idea, Schelling does not intend to 
develop an anthropological account, but simply to point to the historical dimension of 
the process of reflexivity: a history denoting man's rise from his immersion in natural 
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forces, which to the extent that it became completely cut off from nature, acquired an 
and and entirely abstract form. It is in the context of this abstracting separation of man 
from the worldly powers that the notion of the condition for the possibility of 
cognitive experience becomes a persistent theme in modem epistemology. The notion 
of the condition for the possibility of experience assumes the status of an isolating 
factor - by means of reflective abstraction from experience itself - which, as such, 
intends to found and justify knowledge. Schelling, by relocating logic within the realm 
of its origins, without dismissing logic's specificity, undermines its ability to found 
experience as a whole by means of an isolating, conceptual factor. For, if logical 
thought is manifestation and part of cosmic spontaneity, it cannot found the realm of 
its genesis itself. The question of justification and objectivity of knowledge, however, 
is not wholly discarded, but is implicitly re-addressed by means of a different 
approach: objectivity relates to the known and unknown powers that enable and 
sustain the interaction between man and the world, and in this sense objectivity stands 
for both clarity and confusion, necessity and contingency. Objectivity is not 
transferred or imposed upon the subject's representations by means of its conceptual 
conditions, but rather seems to signify the very process of interaction between the real 
forces pertaining to man and the world, the real powers that seize upon consciousness 
and consciousness' active response to them. However, the problematic of forces still 
assumes a transcendental status, so long as it becomes itself the new condition for the 
comprehension of experience, even though the notion of experience now embraces the 
cosrnic, and not only the subject's activity. In the first edition of the Ideas for a 
Philosophy of Nature (1797), Schelling, by a philosophical explanation of the 
dynamic polarity of nature, sets out to demonstrate that the concepts of "universal 
attraction and repulsion" must be "conditions for the possibility of all objective 
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knowledge"'. Indeed, Schelling deploys his early writings (1793-1804) from a 
transcendental standpoint, whose locus is his principle of Identity. This underlies the 
structure of his more important early writings, Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature 
(1797), System of Transcendental Idealism (1800), Bruno or On the Natural and the 
Divine Principles of things (1802), becoming the exclusive theme of his major project 
to articulate his Identity System (1801-4). The Identity principle takes different forms 
through these works, until it becomes consolidated in its most clear form in the System 
of Philosophy in General and of the Philosophy of Nature in Particular (1804), which 
will de discussed in detail later. We do not intend to provide here a thorough 
exposition of all the various forms of the Identity principle in the above works, though 
their main traits will be discussed in context. At present, we will provisionally provide 
a succinct formulation of the Identity principle, in order to see the connection with 
Schelling's early transcendentalism 
The notion of Identity in general is intended to constitute the highest principle which 
postulates the original identity of subject-object, spirit-nature, that has been split by 
reflection. At this stage, according to Schelling, philosophy's task is to demonstrate 
the ultimate identity between spirit and nature, thought and being. Hence the statement 
in the STE "The highest consummation of natural science would be the complete 
spiritualising of all natural laws into laws of intuition and thought', 2 and 
correspondingly, for transcendental philosophy, its 'highest consummation' would be 
to prove the rise of nature from the spiritual realm. A philosophy of nature and a 
'See SchellingF. W. J., Ideasfor a Philosophy ofNature, p. 171. "For forces, after all, are nothing that 
can be presented in intuition. Yet there is so much reliance on these concepts of universal attraction and 
repulsion, they are everywhere so openly and definitely assumed, that we are automatically led to the idea that, if not themselves objects of possible intuition, they must nevertheless be conditions for the 
possibility of all objective knowledge. " 
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philosophy of knowledge are therefore seen as symmetrical philosophical accounts, 
that in their supplementary would demonstrate the original identity of nature and 
spirit, object and subject. 3 To be sure, in both STI and PN, Schelling gives an 
interesting and dynamic account of both nature and subject. These are conceived in 
terms of polar forces, whose interaction and various dynamic balances result in the 
different forms of natural phenomena or subjective states. Their higher unity is 
conceived as an inclusive cosmic productivity, of operative, oppositional and 
interacting processes, where man and nature are but different moments. The dualistic 
terminology of mind/matter, idealism/realism, is suspended by a dynamic approach 
according to which everything would be apprehended as an interaction of forces. In 
the Ideasfor a Philosophy of Nature, for example, concepts are conceived as forces in 
equilibrium (quantity), whilst sensations as different deviations of this equilibrium 
(quality). Reflection is taken as a state of upset equilibrium in man, where man's 
productivity is disconnected from nature's productivity. Identity is therefore assumed 
on the basis of the common nature of these forces, which is conceived in terms of 
productivity. However, at this stage, Schelling assumes a higher type of productivity 
which is characterised by an ideal balance, or indifference, between the two postulated 
oppositional forces, that constitutes the original and ultimate identity of all forms of 
nature and spirit. From this point of view, particularity and multiplicity are considered 
as mere modification of this highest identical principle. Accordingly, the process of 
productivity is abstracted from its vital and substantial, internal diversity and is 
2 Schelling F. W. J., System of Transcendental Idealism, p. 6 3 Ibid. " To make the objective primary, and to derive the subjective from that, is, as has just been 
shown, the problem of nature-philosophy. If, then, there is a transcendental philosophy, there remains to 
it only the opposite direction, that of proceeding from the subjective, as primary and absolute, and 
having the objective arise from this. Thus nature-philosophy and transcendental philosophy have 
divided into two directions possible to philosophy, and if all philosophy must go about either to make 
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reduced to the status of an identical and abstract concept, which, in turn, is rendered as 
the transcendental condition of knowledge. This line of thought culminates in the 
System of Identity, where Identity is no longer conceived in terms of productivity, but 
as an immediate, self-positing, absolute, total Oneness. This is postulated as the 
essence of all beings, which shines through them in their illusory particularity. Hence, 
any dynamism and relative independence of the particulars, implied by the previous 
model of forces, is dismissed since the particular is considered as a non-essential, a 
non-being, as merely the medium through which the Absolute manifests itself. The 
way that the Absolute shines through in the subject is, accordingly, named after 
intellectual intuition. 
We suggest that it is the notion of the absolute Identity between spirit and nature that 
sustains Schelling's early transcendentalism, for this principle allows nature's or 
thought's full transparency by means of intellectual intuition, which stands for the 
fundamental condition for all possible experience. In fact, this condition is even 
stronger and more substantial than the Kantian conditions of the formal categories of 
the understanding, since the latter apply only to phenomenal knowledge, while the 
former, dissolving the realm of noumena, renders the universe fully transparent. It is 
only after Schelling's radical rupture with the Identity System that he abandons his 
transcendental standpoint. This rupture can be traced to the Of Human Freedom 
treatise (1809) and was further pursued in the Ages of the World (1811) and the 
Deities of Samothrace (1815). 
In these works, Schelling no longer seeks to establish the original and absolute 
identity of nature and spirit, nor does he conceive the forms of cosmic becoming in 
an intelligence out of nature, or a nature out of intelligence, then transcendental philosophy, which has 
the latter task, is thus the other necessary basic science of philosophy. ", p. 7 
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mere dual terms. Now, he discovers the inexhaustible richness and multiplicity of the 
cosmic movement, which does not originate from an ideal state of primordial balance, 
but has always been as the recurrent or unpredictable, balanced or disorderly interplay 
of 'real powers'. These are seen as multiple, transformable or transmutable to each 
other, but not reducible to a common, identical, allegedly elementary constituent, or 
derivable from a higher origin. In this context, the dynamism of his thought - 
previously restricted by the confines of the Identity principle - recovers its resources 
and acquires new dimensions: the forces are transformed into potencies, pointing to 
their autonomous and self-generative dimension, the potencies are transmuted into 
gods, pointing to the ineffable "magic of insoluble life". Logic is itself a potency of 
the cosmic becoming, a moment in the mystery of life itself, partaking of the 
paradoxical nexus of the powers of order and chaos. Being thus implicated, no logical 
abstraction can claim its right to condition or found experience, so long as its very au 
production is itself brought about by the very powers it attempts to found. One could 
argue that this account is just another transcendental presupposition for the possibility 
of experience. Schelling, however, at this stage of his development, is not pursuing the 
foundation for a new system of knowledge. The thought process is no longer 
conceived as an act of conceptual abstraction from experience - which would 
ostensibly escape the contingent and whimsical character of the subjective - but as an 
activity of the living powers of man in his engagement with the cosmic powers. 
Considered thus, thought's products take on a logogrific expression rather than a 
transparent, orderly and systematic classification of the world. However, the logogrific 
form, in its elusiveness and perplexity, seems to carry more cognitive weight than the 
clear and unequivocal universal and necessary concepts. For logogrif is woven by the 
real and intractable powers of a living experience - and thus re-enacts the paradoxical 
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powers of the cosmic becoming - rather than by the distillation of experience, which 
thereby claims a pure and thus meaningless objectivity. 
In this thesis we will explore Schelling's 'post-Identity' works, in particular, the Of 
Freedom treatise, the Ages of the World and the Deties of Samothrace, which we will 
treat as a trilogy. We begin, though, with a thorough investigation of his Identity 
principle, as this has been expounded in his lectures at Wurzburg (1804), the System 
of Philosophy in General and of the Philosophy of Nature in Particular - which 
condenses in its most clear formulation, the Philosophy of Identity - because the latter 
has been considered as the core of Schelling's philosophy4. However, the Philosophy 
of Identity constitutes only a phase in the history of his versatile intellectual 
development, and any reduction of the latter to this phase misses the exceptional 
richness and complexity of his ever-transforming thought. In fact, as will be seen, it is 
Schelling himself who provides the strongest critique of his own philosophical 
concept of identity. This gives rise to new and imaginative investigations, emerging 
from his inquiries into the nature of human freedom and his provocative account of 
the notion of good and evil. The rupture with the System of Identity and the 
problematic of the transcendental conditions of experience is accompanied by a break 
with the monotheistic conceptualisation of God, as an absolute, all-perfect Being, and 
a shift from the 'monotheism of Reason' to the 'polytheism of imagination'5. Indeed, 
in the course of this research, we discern a paradoxically close connection between 
monotheism and the faith in Logic's ability to explain the world. It would appear as if 
4 See Hegel in the Preface in the Phenomenology of Spirit and the Lectures in the History of Philosophy 
and contemporary commentators, as A. White, Absolute Knowledge, A. Bowie, Schelling and Modern 
European Philosophy, M. Vater, in his introduction in the Bruno, or on the Natural and the Divine 
Principle of Things 
5 See Cassirer E., The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, p. 3 
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the notion of the Absolute, which monotheism cultivates, after God's withdrawal from 
the world, is appropriated by Logic itself in its claims to organise and illuminate this 
disenchanted world. 6 The issue of the relation between modern logic and monotheism, 
which would constitute an interesting, though different project, will not be pursued 
here. We would merely emphasise that Schelling's decisive undermining of the notion 
of the absolute identity and transcendental logic is attained, in our view, only in the 
Deities of Samothrace, where he discovers the fascinating messages of this 
'mysterious polytheism' For the re-introduction of the gods in the world renders it 
alive, dynamic, unpredictable, enigmatic and yet not alien nor merely awe-inspiring, 
since none of the gods assumes an absolute status, but as multiple and transmutable, 
eternal and mortal, may even be partially discovered in man's living forces 
themselves. 
Schelling's re-enchantment of the world announces an innovative union of knowledge 
and faith, clarity and riddle, and from this point of view, we consider the Deties of 
Samothrace a work of major philosophical significance rather than a marginal 
religious study. With these introductory remarks, we can now proceed to the further 
examination of Schelling's controversial, elusive and disturbing thought. 
6A typical example of this connection lies in Newton's mechanistic philosophy of nature along with his 
adherence to the notion of a transcendent God. A more subtle version of this 'worldview' would be Kant's account of the separation between knowledge and faith. 
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Chapter 4 
Identity Philosophy: its critique and its self-criticism 
Schelling, despite the versatility of his thought, has been mostly registered in the history of 
Modern Philosophy as the philosopher of Identity par excellence, mainly due to Hegel's 
overwhelming critique. Therefore, we need to gain a view into this period of Schelling's 
philosophical development, with regard to Hegel's critique but also to its relative position 
within Schelling's thought as a whole. The Identity System was the focal point of Schelling's 
philosophical concerns for the short period of time during 180 1- 1804, mostly built on the 
basis of Schelling's blatant reaction to the Fichtean system and possibly due to this, 
negatively determined by it. 
In his System of Transcendental Idealism (1800), Schelling has already introduced his 
concept of Identity, in terms of his notion of Absolute Synthesis occurring in Intellectual 
Intuition. Through the latter Schelling broached the idea that everything in the history of the 
cosmos has already been posited and the only task for the philosopher, towards getting 
knowledge, would be his attempt - by an act of imitation - to rehearse the most distinctive 
phases of the history of cosmos. The latter, since they are intended to be reproduced by the 
philosopher's mind, will inevitably constitute phases of the history of consciousness itself in 
the broader sense of the tenni. 
In this sense, Schelling has already broken with the Fichtean model of intellectual intuition, 
inasmuch as his notion of intellectual intuition does not refer to the act of the self-positing of 
the individual ego but rather to the projection of the concept of Absolute Synthesis onto the 
multi-layered level of the human psyche. Our main point though, regarding the 
1 In the sense of including unconscious, reflective, volitional , moral and aesthetic moments. 
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conceptualisation of intellectual intuition in the System of Transcendental Idealism, is that 
Schelling introduces this term in a double sense, namely the dynamic and the geometric one. 
Accordingly, Intellectual Intuition is conceived both as an ongoing self-reproductive activity 
that generates the different configurations in the process of the self-constitution of one's 
personality, and as the abstract concept that describes an already immediate, one-act play 
event of creation whose limitations appear as the different modes of consciousness. Hence, 
the first conception introduces intellectual intuition in terms of a dynamic, productive process 
in time, while the second one depicts it as a static all-inclusive, closed totality whose 
determinations are but artificial delimitations of its uniform and homologous status. The latter 
is explicitly stated by Schelling when he parallels intellectual intuition with the concept of 
space in geometry: 
Intellectual Intuition is for the latter (i. e. philosophy ) precisely what space is for 
geometry. Just as geometry would be absolutely unintelligible without spatial 
intuition, since all its constructions are simply different ways and means of 
delimiting that intuition, so all philosophy would be unintelligible without 
intellectual intuition, since its concepts are simply delimitations of a producing 
having itself as object, that is of intellectual intuition. 2 
However, as long as the philosopher rehearses, by means of imitation, this original act of 
absolute synthesis, in order to recapture the compacted history of cosmos, he himself re- 
enacts a moment of creation. If so, creation is no longer original but recurrent, and thus both 
temporal and eternal. According to Schelling, in the action of imitation the philosopher enacts 
his freedom in a creative way and therefore the abstract tautology A=A is transformed into a 
synthetic one: 
Now by intellectual intuition there arises for us the self, in so far as it is its own 
product, at once producing and produced. This identity between the self as producing 
2 Schelling F. W. J., System of Transcendental Idealism, p. 28. 
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and the self as produced is expressed in the proposition, self=self. since it equates 
opposites to itself, this is by no means an identical proposition, but a synthetic one. 
Thus the proposition self=self converts the proposition A=A into a synthetic one. 3 
In the above sense intellectual intuition stands for the creative dimension that permeates the 
self s production and accounts for the diverse qualitative leaps throughout its activity. The 
different forms of consciousness in the STI seem to arise not as logical conclusions or 
determinate inversions of the previous states, but rather by way of an inexplicable leap, a 
sudden act which raises the self in a new qualitative stage, such as the rise of the self from 
original sensation to productive intuition or from reflection to artistic creation. These 
transitions, as already mentioned, do not appear as necessary consequences; they may occur 
but also they may not, as long as the creative potential of intellectual intuition does not get 
expressed. In any case, the transitions imply the potential or actual qualitative differentiation 
of intellectual intuition and, from this point of view, they stand at odds with their comparison 
with the smooth quantitative transitions that occur by means of delimitations of a uniform 
space, such as the transition from an oblong to a triangle by the simple drawing of a straight 
line. 
The tension presented above between the dynamic and geometric account of intellectual 
intuition not only permeates through the STI as a whole, but seems to follow Schelling's 
thought until it is resolved in favour of the geometric model in his System of Identity, to 
which we now turn in more detail. We will deal with the texts of the lectures delivered by 
Schelling during the winter 1803-1804, which were culled and published posthumously by his 
son, and are widely considered to be the most lucid and definite exposition of his Identity 
Philosophy. 
Op. Cit. p, 30. 
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Schelling expounds his thought following Spinoza's method, that is, in a rigid, axiomatic 
style. His introductory sections of the text focus on his attempt to refute "Fichte's 
subjectivization", as well as dualistic or representational accounts of knowledge. 
Accordingly, knowledge does not consist in the correspondence between subject and object, 
nor in the arbitrary Fichtean appropriation of the object by the self-positing ego; instead 
"there exists neither a subject as subject nor an object as object; but that what knows and 
what is known are one and the same, and consequently no more subjective than objective ýO . 
This One is called supreme knowledge, insofar as it is the eternal self-identity that recognises 
itself This knowledge is called Reason and thereby Schelling claims the defeat of all 
subjectivization of rational knowledge. In fact, Schelling by rejecting subjectivization also 
refutes objectivization, insofar as he denies the concept of object as standing opposed to 
subject. Both terms are characterised as fictional, one-sided representations of a primordial 
unity to which they both belong as dissolved. The previous account of knowledge derives 
from the fundamental law of Identity that dissolves the very distinction between epistemology 
and ontology, and thereby depicts simultaneously the state of immediate knowledge, namely 
Reason or Intellectual Intuition, and the state of cosmos, which is Reason recognising itself. 
We will focus our inquiry on the investigation of this concept of absolute Identity with regard 
to the controversial issue of the derivation of determinations from its infinite and 
undifferentiated status, since this constituted the area of severest criticism on Hegel's part. 
Schelling seems to follow Spinoza, not only with regard to his method, but also as far as the 
content of his central ideas. Hence, he expounds the concept of Identity or Absolute along 
similar lines to Spinoza's conception of Substance: 
4 System of Philosophy in General, (1804), in Idealism and the Endgame of Theory, p. 141. 
134 
The Absolute is that which is, by virtue of its idea (i. e. absolute self-affirmation), 
immediately is, or that whose ideal includes its Being and whose idea is thus the 
immediate affirmation of Being and not idea or Being in a discrete sense. 5 
The Absolute is defined as that whose essence is identical with its existence, since its essence 
is considered as causa sui, self-affirmed, which as such, immediately generates and thus 
coincides with its existence. Concomitantly Being, as existence, is defined in terms of 
absolute autonomy, sheer self-creation, while anything that is produced by another is defined 
as non-being. The concept of the Absolute embraces the whole universe and constitutes the 
very essence of each particular entity, which otherwise, as regards its particularity, is 
characterised as non-ens, non existent. 
We furthermore recognise the universal concept as that of a given particular only to 
the extent that this particular is being looked as the negation of the former, not as 
something in itself The concept of plant, for example, is possible only to the extent 
that the latter is not adequate to the concept, that is , to the extent that the affirmed is 
not the universe, as is the affirming. For if we posit the particular as being entirely 
identical with, and dissolved into its concept, then this concept is also immediately 
the concept of the universe, that is an infinite and eternal form. 
What is essential in the plant other than the eternal procreation and affirmation of 
itsep6 
The above abstract provides us with the crux of Schelling's thought. He conceives of the 
Absolute in Spinozian terms, namely as an infinite, eternal creativity, as self-creating agency, 
but in turn, he compresses and rigidifies this activity, rendering it into an homologous, 
uniform act that is assigned to every particular as the abstract concept of its permanent 
essence. In this sense the particular does not exist in itself, since what exists in it is only its 
self-generative dimension, which, however, does not pertain to its particularity but to the 
Absolute. In this way, Schelling misses the concrete conditions under which each particular 
Op. cit. p. 148. 
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entity forms and sustains itself and confines himself only to the extraction of the conceptual 
abstraction of the act of self-creation that inheres in it, which in turn is conceived as a 
monolithic, identical, absolute substance. This position could perfectly match with a dualistic 
conceptualisation of the Absolute as an external Creator, who imbues finite entities with his 
pneuma that shines through them; this is the direction of Bowie's reading of the Identity 
philosophy 7. However, Schelling insists on strongly demarcating himself from any version of 
dualism, aligning himself to the Spinozian thesis of immanence. The Absolute or God should 
be understood as the all-inclusive totality: 
For the true philosophy, God is not the supreme but the unconditionally One, not the 
endpoint or the last link in a sequence but the centre. There is no world outside him 
to which he relates in the manner of cause and effect; for otherwise God would be 
determined by a law other than that of identity; 
Nothing can emanate from God, for God is everything, and He is characterised by no 
other relation than that of the eternal and infinite affirmation of Himself. 8 
Hence, if the particulars are thus dissolved in God, as non-beings in themselves, whence do 
they derive their particular status? It is at this point where we can see the celebration of the 
geometrical method. According to the text, the particulars are derived by means of various 
delimitations of the homologous, uniform totality of the immediate self-created act, or in 
other words, by means of various subtractions, removals from the totality. This is why the 
particular is defined as non-being, non-ens, as a mere schema; for, its essence is what is 
always there, the infinite self-procreation of the universe, whilst its particularity is just the 
specific form, the circumscription of the removal in each case, similarly as different shapes 
6 Op. Cit., p. 172,173. 
7 See Appendix Il 
8 Op. cit. p. 150. 
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may be considered as being derived by various modes of delimiting - i. e. subtracting from - 
the totality of space. 
Accordingly, the critical question arises: By whom are the subtractions made? According to 
Schelling, it is our intellect or imagination that performs them: 
What do we generally understand when we speak of particularity? Even for a 
subordinate reflection, it is nothing in itself, not substance, but it is merely a form or 
an ideal determination. What makes the plant a plant is not a substance, for the plant 
shares substance with all other natural beings; conversely, the plant is neither real 
nor something in and for itself, but it is strictly a concept or a schematism of the 
imagination. 9 
The intellect or the imagination, however, is in itself a creative particular, but Schelling does 
not provide any explanation for the emergence of this specific particular that seems to be 
responsible for the derivation of the rest. Here then, we reach the internal limits of Schelling's 
account. In fact, Schelling attempts to address this problem by means of the sudden 
introduction, in the final pages of the text, of the mechanism of potencies; the latter, though, 
lie in blatant inconsistency with the whole spirit of the rest of the text, since by the 
preponderance of any of the arising potencies, he reintroduces what he precisely tries to 
abolish throughout all his previous enterprise, namely the subject-object division. In addition, 
he does not offer any explanation for the origin of the so called "reciprocal domination of one 
factor over the other"10, and the consequent loss of equilibrium between the two potencies 
that would create particularity. Hegel's critique draws on this aspect, highlighting the strictly 
quantitative character of the potencies. 
Hegel in the final Remark on the Quantity section in the Science of Logic, mentions that the 
understanding of Quantity as infinity through the concept of quantitative infinity misses the 
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qualitative moment that appears even in the sphere of Quantity. So, alluding to Schelling's 
three potencies of the Identity System, he remarks: 
The only further remark to be made here concerns the intrusion of quantitative forms 
into the pure qualitative forms of thought in philosophy. It is the relationship of 
powers in particular that has been applied recently to the determination of the 
Notion. The Notion in its immediacy was called the first power or potency; in its 
otherness or difference, in the determinate being of its moments, the second power; 
and in its return into itself or as totality, the third power. It is at once evident that 
power as used thus is a category which essentially belongs to quantum-these powers 
do not bear the meaning of the potentia, the 8wagiq of Aristotle. ' 1 
Schelling indeed, defines the potencies in quantitative terms; 
Where the state of being affirmed has relative dominance over the other that of 
affirmation, and where the latter affirms this very affirmation, we speak of A; where 
the affirmation dominates, and where it affirms the affirming factor of the first 
power itself, we have A2 (A to the second power); where both of these, the 
affirmation of the affirmed (A), and that which affirms this affirmation (A 2), 
penetrate and reduplicate one another, we speak of A3 or the power of indifference 
where the factors of A and B are reduced to a quantitative equilibrium. 12 
Schelling then, seems to try to save the particulars by means of the above pseudo-scientific 
proof, but he fails even to explain the sudden appearance of the originally balanced potencies 
in the axiomatically posited homologous and monolithic primal Identity. This objection 
sounds and is indeed a logical one, to which Schelling could perfectly riposte that the 
potential of its inexplicable and sudden self-division pertains precisely to the nature of this 
all-powerful Absolute. In this case, however, the claims about the Absolute's monolithic and 
immediate self-posited identity are self-cancelled and the only remaining meaning is but the 
postulation and the concomitant adherence tofaith in the idea of a total, omnipotent Being. 
9 Op. cit., p. 171. 
10 Op. cit., p. 171. 
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We can examine now in more detail Hegel's critique, which is expounded in the Preface of 
the Phenomenology of Spirit and more explicitly in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy. 
In the preface of the PS the Schellingian Absolute is dismissed as the idea that "sinks into 
mere edification and even insipidity", since "it lacks the seriousness, the suffering, the 
patience and the labour of the negative"13. The latter, namely the labour of the negative, is 
succinctly exposed by Hegel in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy as follows: 
What is lacking in Schelling's philosophy is thus the fact that the point of 
indifference of subjectivity and objectivity, or the Notion of Reason, is absolutely 
presupposed, without any attempt being made at showing that this is the truth. 
... The true proof that this identity of subjective and objective 
is the truth, could only 
be brought about by means of each of the two being investigated in its logical, i. e. 
essential determinations and in regard to them, it must then be shown that the 
subjective signifies the transformation of itself into the objective, and that the 
objective signifies its not remaining such, but making itself subjective. 14(MY 
emphasis) 
According to Hegel then, what is only postulated by Schelling in an abstract and static way, 
right from the beginning, should be proved by means of the movement of the Absolute itself. 
This consists in the reflection of the Absolute upon its own internal negativity, in fact a 
logical movement that would generate the essential determinations, inherent in the Absolute 
and being possibly recollectable, as a result of this movement. Hegel in turn, applying his 
method in the Science of Logic, shows that the abstract concept of Infinity - i. e. the way 
Schelling conceives of the Absolute in his Identity Philosophy - being deprived of internal 
finitedness is but a spurious conceptualisation of infinity. 
11 Hegel's Science of Logic, p. 3 24. 
12 System of Philosophy in General, p. 17 1. 
13 Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, §. 16 
14 Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy, p. 526, III Volume 
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Hegel by reflecting the abstract concept of infinity upon itself, reveals its internal, logical, i. e. 
essential determinations: 
The infinite is; in this immediacy it is at the same time the negation of an other, of 
the finite. As thus in the form of simple being and at the same time as the non-being 
of an other, it has fallen back into the category of something as a determinate being 
in general- more precisely, into the category of something with a limit, because the 
infinite is determinate being reflected into itself. 15 
Hence, Hegel using the power of logic - to be sure not of a formal logic, but one of the 
laborious recollecting of thought-experiences -, discovers the necessary determinateness of 
what is initially taken as indeterminate infinite. It is not surprising then, that he wonders why 
16 Spinoza who discovered "true" , i. e. determinate infinity did not move further than the 
indeterminate conception of Substance, a critical point that Hegel equally applies to 
Schelling, in the context of his discussion of Spinoza's philosophy: "This defect appears in 
Spinoza and Schelling in the fact that they see no necessity why the Notion, as the implicit 
negative of its unity, should make a separation of itself into different parts; so that out of the 
simple universal the real, the opposed, itself becomes known" 17 
Hegel praises Spinoza for his insight into the concept of determinate infinity by interpreting 
Spinoza's example of the notion of infinity, namely the case of the sum of the inequalities of 
distance between the circumferences of two non-concentric circles: the smaller one being 
inscribed into the other; the latter - infinite inequalities - though infinite, are yet delimited in 
the determinate space which is interposed between the two circumferences. Nevertheless, 
according to Hegel, Spinoza did not manage to properly develop his own speculative 
discoveries, similarly to Schelling's inelaborate 'truths'. It seems though bizarre why 
15 SL, p. 138. 
16 Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy, p. 263. 17 Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy, p 263,269. 
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Spinoza, who himself first introduced the idea of a determinate infinity and Schelling who 
18 
also developed the concept of infinite finitude in his Bruno essay (1802) jailed to proceed 
to the proper logical elaboration and retained the concept of an indeterminate absolute. Our 
suggestion is that the main critical issue with regard to Schelling's conception of the Absolute 
or Spinoza" s Substance, regarding their undifferentiated infinite status, cannot be exhausted at 
the logical level, as Hegel suggests, namely to the inadequate unfolding of the logic of infinity 
as such. Instead, in our view, their entrapment by the concept of absolute infinity should not 
be mainly traced to logical shortcomings but rather to their implicit embededness in the 
monotheistic tradition, despite their adherence to the concept of immanence. The latter, as 
such, does not necessarily imply the refutation of the compelling omnipresence of an all- 
powerful Being, so long as it does not move beyond the doctrinaire level. At this stage 
Schelling's re-enchantment of the world remains petrified, as long as the essence of the 
particular is derived from the law of identity. 
It is only when Schelling breaks with his monotheistic background, during his philosophical 
investigations from the Freedom essay up to the Deities of Samothrace, which will be 
discussed later, that the concept of inunanence recovers its dynamism. At present, we need to 
examine the specific connotations of the concept of Infinity of the period in question and thus 
to assess the limits of Hegel's critique as well. To begin with, Hegel ascribes to Spinoza's 
Substance a concept of infinity that Spinoza held for another case, namely, his fourth case of 
18 The notion of an infinite finitude is introduced in the Bruno essay which unfolds as a dialogue between Bruno, 
who stands for Schelling and Lucian, who represents Fichte. The topic of their dialogue is the Identity principle 
and quite soon the discussion focuses on the relation between Absolute and particulars. Lucian asks, 'How in the 
world can you reconcile this endless serial determination of things, which seem to pertain merely to existence 
within time, with the eternal being of things in their ideasT It is at this point that Schelling broaches the notion 
of infinite finitude, which attempts to grasp Identity as a union of opposites and thus 'incarnates the dialectical 
impulse' namely, the tendency to either posit the infinite within the finite, or the reverse, to set the finite within 
the infinite. This method then, for Schelling, quoting Plato, 'is a gift of the gods to mankind, akin to that purest heavenly fire that Prometheus brought to earth'. See F. W. Schelling, Bruno essay, p. 143. 
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infinity which refers to "the thing which is called infinite insofar as its parts, although 
included within a maximum and a minimum, cannot be expressed by any number" 19. 
Schelling stresses that in his exposition of the concept of the Absolute refers to Spinoza's 
first, fundamental case of the infinite, which is considered as altogether different from the 
other cases, and applies to a being which is infinite by virtue of its essence: 
The Absolute is unconditionally infinite. There are two forms of infinity: one that we 
ascribe to what we are capable of delimiting, e. g. space, time, etc. or what is infinite 
by its cause, such as the species in organic nature that are infinite by virtue of their 
cause. There exists another infinity, however, altogether different from the former 
two, that applies to a being by virtue of its definition, as Spinoza puts it, or by virtue 
of its idea. Such an infinity is that of God. For God is the absolute affirmation of 
Himself as infinite reality. 20 
Schelling here draws on Spinoza's elaboration of the concept of infinite, expounded in his 
Letter on Infinite (Letter X11, to Louis Meyer). In this letter Spinoza attempts to address, by 
means of distinguishing among various cases - actually six - of infinity, "the causes of errors 
,, 21 and confusions which have arisen of this question of the Infinite. 
The relevant issue for our discussion is try to gain a view into the qualitative difference of the 
first case of the infinite that applies to Schelling's notion of Absolute. According to the latter, 
a thing is infinite by virtue of its essence. Infinite in this sense should be understood as the 
coincidence of essence and existence that may apply to an all-inclusive causa sui. In other 
words, a being infinite by its essence signifies its uninhibited, immediate self-positing in the 
entire expansion and intensity of its potential. Infinite in this case is not the non finite, for this 
., Absolute positing has no relevance to any prior determination, and indeed that of a logical 
thought that would juxtapose it to finitude. A being that is considered as completely 
19 Spinoza's Letter on the Infinite, p. 189, in Spin=4 A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. by M. Grene, p. 1973. 20 System of Philosophy in General, p. 156. 21 Spinoza's Letter of Infinite, p. 183. 
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autonomous and self-created, simply exists as infinite, since it actualises by itself, 
immediately, all its potentialities. The law of Identity in this case stands for a claim on 
hierarchical priority of absolute power and indeed of one that can not be fully grasped by our 
reflective capacities. The very fact that it can be thought does not annul its infinite status, but 
only attests to its various forms of manifestations, in this case, as thought itself that is 
immanent to the absolute substance. In this sense, Spinoza's Substance could become 
intelligible only through two Attributes - extension and thought - whilst its infinite attributes 
are incomprehensible. To be sure, through Schelling's intellectual intuition, an immediate 
revelation of the Absolute could occur, but this still does not render it intelligible in terms of 
conceptual determinations. The latter rather depicts an overwhelming, usually terrifying and 
paralysing experience, as that described by the evangelists, transferring the feelings of 
perennial awe and hun-fflity. 
In Schelling's text, the Absolute stands for the eternal self-affirmation of God's existence. As 
such, it is not opposed to anything for it includes everything. It never starts or ceases to be. Its 
existence has no duration, not because it is infinite in terms of time, but because it bears no 
relation to time whatsoever. Eternity thus is not defined in terms of time, as infinite is not 
defined in terms of finitude, for the Absolute stands for an act of power and necessity and not 
for a concept of speculation. The Absolute, far from being an empty logical universal in the 
beginning of an inelaborate thought process, rather appears as the fullness of the actualisation 
of all potentialities. The postulation of the Absolute then carries more the weight of religious 
intensity rather than the scientific rigour of geometrical rigidity. The latter, though, seems to 
be indispensable for the validation of the former. In this sense, the notion of the infinite 
referring to the Absolute is qualitatively different from the other cases of the notion. The 
latter now fall within the area of conceptual understanding and, in Spinoza's context, are 
143 
related already to the sphere of the modifications of Substance. Accordingly, Spinoza's 
example, as far as the fourth case of the infinite is concerned, was not a claim for the notion 
of the determinate infinite, which, according to Hegel, could be applied to Substance and thus 
initiate its divisibility. Instead, Spinoza's example was intended precisely in order to prove 
the indivisibility of Substance. For the main point of Spinoza's case was to show that between 
a maximum and a minimum, there are infinite numbers or points, which attests to the infinite 
continuity of substance and therefore to its indivisibility. Moreover, for Spinoza, this case was 
also an example for the inability of our imagination to grasp the infinite that is always there, 
despite the limits that are formed by the schemata of imagination, anticipating the similarly 
inferior role that Schelling ascribes to imagination in the Identity System. 
In the Identity Philosophy the Absolute stands for the static fulfilment and infinite satiation of 
an homologous and powerful totality. Now, as already mentioned, Hegel's suggestion is the 
conceptualisation of the Absolute in terms of its self-reflective becoming. The identity of the 
opposites then would be proved by means of the discovery of their inversion and of their 
alternating status in the process of their movement. In fact, the movement itself derives from 
the development of the contradiction between the opposites themselves. It is in this line of 
thought that Schelling develops his self-critique, the period during 1809-1811, but in our 
view, in a much more interesting and richer way than Hegel's suggestion. For Schelling's 
movement does not develop in the safe means of thought-contradictions but in the 
provocative field of the contraries pertaining to God himself and thus to the surprising depths 
of the world and human soul. From this point of view, our final critical remark on Hegel is 
not only that he exhausted his critique of the Identity System to the logical level, but mainly 
that he reduced the complexity and differentiation of Schelling's philosophy to the short 
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Identity period, neglecting all the previous and later phases of a restless and imaginative 
philosophical development. In fact, Hegel not only neglected, but also dismissed Schelling's 
recurrent innovative changes throughout his long intellectual activity: "In the various 
presentations of his view Schelling on each occasion began from the beginning, because, as 
we may see, what went before did not satisfy him; he has ever pressed on to seek a new form, 
and thus he has tried various forms and terminologies in succession without ever setting forth 
one complete and consistent whole. ý922 However, what Hegel considers as a problem, seems 
to be, rather, Schelling's strength, especially as regards his radical ruptures with his own ideas 
and the elaboration of unexpectedly new thoughts. 
We will now turn to Schelling's rupture with the Identity System through the examination of 
his self-critique, which inaugurates a new phase in Schelling's philosophy, starting from the 
Of Human Freedom Treatise up to the Deities of Samothrace. 
In the Freedom Treatise, Schelling introduces his thoughts by demarcating himself from 
Spinoza's system. According to Schelling, the latter consists in a static pantheism, which 
although it conceives of things as immanent in God, in fact separates them and re-establishes 
mechanistic connections between them. This mode of thought was present in Schelling's 
Identity text, where he himself pointed out the distinction between natura naturata and 
natura naturans. 
However, a more complete differentiation of things and God can hardly be 
conceived than is made in the teaching of Spinoza which is said to be the classic 
instance of that identification. God is that which is in itself and is conceived solely 
through itself-, whereas the finite necessarily exists in another being and can only be 
conceived with reference to it. Manifestly, in consequence of this distinction, things 
are not different from God merely in degree or because of their limitations, as a 
22 Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy, volume III, p. 515. 
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superficial view of the doctrine of modes might indeed seem to reply, nor they differ 
from God toto genere, thus whatever their relation to God may be, they are 
absolutely differentiated from God through the fact that they can exist only in and 
dependent upon another being (namely himself), and that their concept is a 
derivative one which would not even be possible without the concept of God. 23 
According to Schelling, the main reason that leads Spinoza to this implicit dualism, is not his 
conception of immanence as such but his rigid distinction between the concept of Substance, 
as self-identical, and the concept of particular, considered exclusively in another. 
The error of his system is by no means due to the fact that he posits all things in 
God, but to the fact that they are things, to the abstract conception of the world and 
its creatures, indeed of eternal substance itself, which is also a thing for him . ...... Hence the lifelessness of his system, the harshness of its form, the bareness of its 
concept and expressions, the relentless austerity of its definitions; 24 
Spinozism in its rigidity then, is regarded like "Pygmalion's statue, needing of being given a 
soul through the warm breath of love. " But even this comparison is imperfect, as Spinoza's 
more closely resembles "a work of art which has been sketched only in its most general 
outlines and in which, if it were endowed with a soul, one would still notice how many 
features were lacking or incompleted. s, 25 
Schelling's concern is not only to animate the dead particulars and indeed by means of a self- 
reflective movement of the Absolute, as Hegel would suggest; but also to sketch a 
conceptualisation of God which would allow us to imagine the ineffable richness and paradox 
of the universe. God is no longer conceived as the all-perfect, omnipotent Being, as actus 
purissimus: "God is more of a reality than is a mere moral world-order, and he has in him 
23 Schelling, F. W. J., Philosophical Inquiries into the Nature of Human Freedom, p. 12. 24 OP Cit., p. 22. 
25 Op Cit., p. 23. 
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quite other and more vital activating powers than the barren subtlety of abstract idealists 
ascribe to him. , 
26 
Schelling, by expounding his new conceptualisation of God, in fact, presents the way he 
conceives the process of differentiation and individuation in the cosmic becoming. This is 
also depicted in terms of creation or God's self-revelation, which has usually been 
misinterpreted in strict theological terms. We will try to show that Schelling holds a more 
subtle and complicated meaning for the terms of creation and God himself, thereby opening 
new horizons in the problematic of the absolute and finitude. 
Schelling sets out a new conceptualisation of immanence, in terms of becoming. 
The concept of immanence is completely to be set aside insofar as it is meant to 
express a dead conceptual inclusion of things in God. We recognise, rather, that the 
concept of becoming is the only one adequate to the nature of things. But the process 
of their becoming cannot be in God, viewed absolutely, since they are distinct from 
him toto genere or - more accurately - in eternity. To be separate from God they 
would have to carry on this becoming on a basis different from him. But since there 
can be nothing outside God, this contradiction can only be solved by things having 
their basis in that within God which is not God himself, i. e., in that which is the basis 
of his existence. (In footnote) This is the only correct dualism, namely a dualism 
which at the same time admits a unity. 27 
Immanence then, now signifies a process, a becoming of things considered both in God and 
distinct from him. God is understood as a being diversified in himself, as a becoming which 
constitutes itself the process of determination and individuation of beings. We need to dwell 
on Schelling's account of becoming in order to take a view on the specific way he 
conceptualises the process of determination. 
If we wish to bring this Being nearer to us from a human standpoint, we may say: it 
is the longing which the eternal One feels to give birth to itself. This is not the One 
26 Op cit., p. 30. 
27 Op cit., p. 33. 
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itself, but is co-eternal with it. This longing seeks to give birth to God, i. e. their 
unfathomable unity, but to this extent it has not yet the unity in its own self. 
Therefore, regarded in itself it is also will: but a will in which there is no 
understanding, and thus not an independent and complete will, since understanding 
is actually the will in willing. Nevertheless it is a will of the understanding, namely 
the longing and desire thereof ........ But there is bom 
in God himself an inward, 
imaginative response corresponding to this longing, which is the first stirring of 
divine Being in its still dark depths. Through this response, God sees himself in his 
own image, since his imagination can have no other object than himself. This image 
is the first in which God, viewed absolutely, is realised, though only in himself-, it is 
in the beginning in God and is the God-begotten God himself. This image is at once 
and at the same time, reason - the logic of that longing, (in Schelling's footnote) in 
the sense in which onefinds a Logos in Logogriphs. (my emphasiS)28 
How are we to understand the above quotation? As a preliminary remark, Schelling's essay 
Of Human Freedom could be read in at least two possible ways. The first reading, viz., 
Heidegger's version, is in the light of the Identity System, which still leaves its traces in 
Schelling's present treatise. The second, which we will follow, is in terms of Schelling's 
immediately later works, namely the Ages of the World and The Deities of Samothrace. In 
fact, Schelling allows for both readings, since he both carries elements of his previous system 
and performs a spectacular break with his own previous systems and concomitant traditional 
accounts of teleology, necessity and identity. At present, we will examine Schelling's account 
of determination through the second reading, trying also to show Schelling's ambiguities, 
until we gain the more mature elaboration of his thought in the Ages of the World. According 
to the quotation cited above, Schelling conceives of the process of determination in terms of 
the interaction between longing or love, the so-called will-of-depths and will-to-love, or 
Ground and Existence. Movement occurs by means of the contrary interplay between two 
principles, these two wills, both pertaining to the nature of things. The first, that of longing, is 
the desire and will that strives to spread away from itself towards expansive expression. This 
refers to indeterminate passions, impulses and desires that urge away from themselves, 
28 Op cit., p. 35. 
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diffuse themselves and explode in a disoriented, mute mode. Schelling sees that in this 
longing itself there is born an 'inward imaginative response', the logic of this longing, the 
will-to-love. This second will, immanently born in longing itself yet not identical with it, is 
the stirring of love. The latter should be understood as the will, springing from longing itself, 
that wills to express, to actu ise onging. This will, that takes over longing and gives it 
creative form, renders it explicit and sound. The will-to-love wants to establish longing by 
connecting it, by relating it to other beings, by giving it shape and holding it distinct and 
distinguishable. Hence, the will-to-love transforms the diffused and indeterminate darkness of 
primal longing into the light of its creative formation. In this self-bending movement longing 
reflects upon itself and forms its image. But this image is produced by the elliptical 
movement of a living force, which, in its self-touching, reverberates itself, and thus becomes 
a speaking image. It is in this sense that the will-to-love utters the word: in the gathering of 
dispersion through the becoming aware of the need to express longing. Yet this word is the 
word of an image, the longing's image of itself, the word of the 'Logos one finds in the 
Logogriphs'. The logos of the Logogriphs, however, is the logos of an anagram, of a riddle: 
the word of the image is the unity of the elusive articulation that an image may recall. The 
word of this image is the unity of the ineffable vibration of longing, which unfolds its mute 
density into the rhythms of its imaginative expression. This unity cannot be the unity of a 
fully transparent utterance of a concept of the faculty of the understanding in the Kantian 
sense. Instead, it is a unity of a logogriph and therefore a unity that attempts to give a symbol 
for the indefinite complexity of longing. Longing translated into logos, longing seeing itself, 
can only give an allegorical and transitive unity. The logogriph, or the image, then, allows the 
variation of significance that can be grasped by whoever tries to decipher it, according to his 
own sense of longing and love. In this context, we can rethink the role of intellectual 
intuition, where the latter may now signify the self-image of longing, the enigmatic unity that 
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the logic of the logogriph recalls. The word, the utterance of longing, the will-to-love, does 
not exhaust or moreover annihilate longing. Rather, it takes it over, with love, in order to 
express it, as the poem treats one's desires. The will-to-love is nurtured by longing, which 
always remains as the mainspring of movement. 
In this context, Schelling gives a new meaning to the notion of Identity. Identity now stands 
for the becoming of creation out of the contrary intercourse between a will that strives for 
infinite expansion and the will that tries to form longing and to incorporate it in the nexus of 
beings. Identity also stands for the moment of formation of the longing, a moment of transient 
fulfilment. The copula 'is' then, signifies both the process of expression and the moment of 
actualisation. This double significance of Identity refers also to God's double meaning. 
Accordingly, God is conceived both as the becoming of the oppositional vital powers in him 
and as the moment of the celebration of love. 
The will-of-depths, that is unexpressed longing, stands for the material out of which the will- 
to-love creates its deeds. The richer the longing and the stronger the will-to-love, the deeper 
the process of determination and individuation. In this sense, the term determination does not 
signify a conceptual process of logical discriminations but the creative process of longing's 
self-formation. Now, the relation which is characterised by the prevalence of the will-to-love 
upon longing is called by Schelling, the Good. Instead, when longing does not retain the role 
of feeding love, resists its self-formation and denies its self-seeing, i. e. denies its movement 
according to its own contradiction, becomes blind, attempts to prevail upon love and is 
rendered Evil. These concepts, Good and Evil, need to be further explored, in order that we 
can gain some insight into Schelling's controversial concept of creation and thereby his 
account of determination. Schelling calls Good, the specific relation according to which the 
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will-to-love embraces, circumscribes and thus subordinates longing. This is also depicted by 
the image of the circle where the will-of-depths is in the centre, surrounded by the 
circumference, i. e. the will-to-love. Hence, Good, for Schelling, is called the System in the 
form of this specific relatedness between the will-of-depths and the will-to-love; a relatedness 
of structure and hierarchy. Heidegger calls it the jointure of Being, which for him, also, 
represents the 'immanent lawfulness' of beings. Consequently, Evil seems to be that which 
attempts to overturn and threaten the System. Here, the following critical questions arise. 
Does Evil, for Schelling, constitute an immanent act of creation itself, in fact a necessary one, 
so that becoming be sustained as such and love manifested at all? In other words, is Evil a 
relative concept with regard to the System of Good and as such, a condition for love and 
becoming? Or is Evil an act against creation, an activity to be discarded and expelled, as 
darkness should be sundered from light? The approach to this question depends on the way 
we conceive the relation between the two wills, ground and existence and thereby the concept 
of God. Schelling himself develops, in our view, contradictory thoughts throughout the 
Freedom essay, until he eventually, in the last section, elucidates, in a fruitful way, his 
concept of Identity and Indifference, preparing the way for the Ages of the World. 
Accordingly, if the relation between the two wills is conceived as one of primal identity, God 
is conceived as a primordial act of original self-revelation. In turn, the process of becoming of 
things in him is rendered a teleological movement towards the revelation of God, which is 
assumed as their hidden, inner, universal essence. Schelling allows for this reading, insofar as 
the One that longs to give birth to itself is understood as a uniform essence, immanent in the 
depths of things. Also, his attribution to the will-to-love the name of universal will, enhances 
this reading. However, Schelling explicitly stresses in the last pages of the treatise, the non- 
identity of the wills and yet the possibility of their becoming identical. This is to be 
understood in the context of Schelling's final remarks on Indifference. Here, he considers the 
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two wills as two equally eternal beginnings. Darkness and light, reality and ideality, good and 
evil, take meaning only so long as these two wills stand in a &relation. Only within a 
systematic unity can the above concepts acquire their meaning. Antitheses exist by virtue of 
this relation and in this way constitute and define unity, indeed a polar, oppositional and 
moving one. Becoming itself cannot take place except through the movement which exists by 
virtue of the relation between those contraries. Good takes its meaning with regard to Evil 
and light with regard to darkness, as none of these characterisations exist in themselves. 
Hence, Good is defined as the specific structure of the preponderance of the will-to-love over 
the will-of-depths. The latter, though, should not be understood as a static or ultimate one. 
Longing which sustains this structure is but the indispensable, disquieting energy which yet 
threatens this structure, maintaining thus becoming. This undermining potency is indeed 
disorganising and disruptive: it threatens the previous balance with chaos and disorder, so 
long as it challenges or even dissolves it. At this stage, longing is called Evil. However, 
Schelling keeps the concept of Evil, not for the disquieting, overturning longing, but only as 
long as the latter establishes itself upon the will-to-love and reverses the system. Evil then, is 
again System, insofar as it stands for a static structure, i. e. the reversal of the Good. We can 
therefore say that, as long as there is a continual domination of one will upon the other -a 
permanent hierarchy in the form either of order or chaos - then we implicitly have the notion 
of a systematic stagnation, pertaining either to static order or to entropy. In contrast, the 
concept of becoming assumes none of the previous fixation of roles of the wills, but 
presupposes the alternation and moreover the free activity of the wills in the process of their 
interaction. It is precisely the dimension offreedom that is implicated by the 
conceptualisation of the will in terms of two equally eternal beginnings. The polarities of 
Good and Evil, darkness and light, are interchangeable not only by virtue of their inter- 
relatedness, according to a logic of hetero-determination, or inversion, but also, according to 
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Schelling, by virtue of the moment of Indifference, inherent in their relationship. Indifference 
is characterised as the groundless, that which abstains from any relation, or predicate and thus 
from any antithesis. This dimension is what ascribes to each will a freedom of itself, a 
potential of an unprecedented power by means of which old structures dissolve and 
movement maintains itself, not only in the pattern of inversions, but possibly in new 
unpredictable paths. The groundless then, is not a stage of abysmal night before creation, as it 
has been interpreted 29 , but rather the dimension of freedom and unpredictability pertaining to 
every will, as eternal beginning, within the very nexus of relations with its other. 
Reality and Ideality, darkness and light, or however else we wish to designate the 
two principles, can never be predicated to the groundless as antitheses. But nothing 
prevents their being predicated as non-antithesis, that is, in disjunction and eachfor 
itself, wherein, however, this duality (the real twofoldness of the principles) is 30 
established. 
These two wills are considered to be of the same 'nature', namely that of will or potency, as 
we will see in the Ages of the World. This does not, however, imply their original identity, but 
only their ability to transmute or transfigure one into the other, whilst maintaining their 
difference and independent dynamics, exactly because they are considered as real potencies 
rather than as mere concepts. 
Heidegger's interpretation of Schelling's treatise develops from the standpoint of the Identity 
System. Heidegger's first application of his thinking in terms of identity lies in the 
identification of longing with the will-to-love. The latter is but the very essence of longing 
itself, except that it remains hidden in its depths: "the ground as longing seeks precisely what 
29 Viz. Heidegger's reading of the Freedom essay, which will be discussed later. 
30 Freedom Essay, p. 88. 
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the understanding seeS"3 1. Accordingly, for Heidegger, the process of becoming consists in 
the striving of longing to discover the inner unity which hides in its depths. This is also the 
deeper essence of every entity, which is considered as God's Being. God is still conceived as 
becoming - since Schelling does not allow any ambiguity on this issue - but now understood 
in terms of the movement towards the revelation of this hidden unity, through the clearing 
and separation of light from darkness. This fits with Heidegger's interpretation of God - also 
called Existence in the text - as an act of primordial revelation and original unity before any 
creation: "Existence is the primordial and essential self-revelation of God in himself before 
the eternal act of creating things"32 . 
Creation then, is but the process of revelation of the inner essence of things, that was 
originally revealed in God's Being, but then seems to have been buried in the dark depths of 
beings. In this case though, Heidegger should provide us with an account of Fallenness from 
the presumed original unity, which would also raise his inconsistency with his account of 
longing as both, fundamentally identical with understanding and yet something to be cleared 
off. However, Heidegger does not engage with the inconsistencies of his interpretation, since 
his main concern seems to be the elucidation of the relation between the Absolute and things, 
which presumably demonstrates Schelling's, adherence to the concept of the Absolute. 
The thinghood of things consists in revealing the nature of God. To be a thing means 
to present God's Being, which is an eternal becoming, itself a becoming .... This interpretation of thinghood, however, is also a presupposition for correctly 
understanding what Schelling is trying to say in the statement that the being of things 
is a becoming. He does not mean that platitude that all things are continuously 
changing. Nor does he mean that external ascertainment that there is nowhere at all 
in the world a state of rest and things do not have being. Rather, the statement means 
that things, of course, are, but that the nature of their being consists in actually 
33 presenting a stage and a way in which the Absolute is anchored and presented . 
31 Heidegger M., Schelling's Treatise On The Essence of Human Freedom, p. 12 1. 32 OP. Cit. ' p. 132. 33 Op. cit., p. 123. 
154 
Therefore, the Absolute in Heidegger's reading stands first as a primordial, pre-temporal act 
of God's self-revelation and then, consequently, as a telos, which is reflected through the 
becoming of things towards their primordial essence. The "Absolute is anchored" means that 
the ultimate goal always shines through the striving of things to reveal their essence and thus 
God's Being. Accordingly, creation is reduced to the unity which the understanding, the logos 
of the longing, brings about. The utterance of the word is but the revelation of the inner 
lawfulness, the so-called jointure of Being, which lies hidden even in that which appears as 
unruly. 
This word co-responds to the ground in the ground. Ground and existence in their 
unity, the jointure of Being is uttered. Into what? Into the other, what God is not as 
he Himself is, into the ground, the unruly and what is yet ordered in a hidden way, 
what is still present without gathering ....... Ground and Existence are each in their 
way the totality of the Absolute, and as such they belong together and are 
inseparable. What longing insisting upon itself wills is the same as what the word of 
the understanding wills and raises to the clearing of representing 34 . 
In Heidegger's reading, creation is conceived as the teleological movement towards the 
revelation of the inner lawfulness of beings, which seems to necessitate the separation of 
darkness from light, the clearing of order from chaos, logic from longing. Having thus 
reconstructed Schelling's account of creation, Heidegger criticises Schelling for excluding the 
opposition between ground and understanding from the realm of beings as a whole, and 
thereby for his alignment with the tradition of Western thought, the tradition of separation of 
logos and Being and the sequential forgetfulness of the latter. 
But when the system is only in the understanding, the ground and the whole 
opposition of ground and understanding are excluded from system as its other and 
system is no longer system with regard to beings as a whole. That is the difficulty 
34 Op. cit., p. 128,129. 
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which emerges more and more clearly in Schelling's later efforts with the whole of 
philosophy, the difficulty which proves to be an impasse. And this impasse is 
evident since the factors of the jointure of Being, ground and existence and their 
unity not only becomes less and less compatible, but even driven so far apart that 
Schelling falls back into the rigidified tradition of Western thought without 
creatively transforming it. 35 
Hence, according to Heidegger, Schelling's elusive account of cosmic becoming is reduced to 
the teleological movement of beings towards the revelation of their hidden essence, and the 
thereby revelation of God; this reconstruction allows Heidegger to classify Schelling in the 
traditional rank of the German Idealist thinkers whose thought develops from the standpoint 
of the Absolute rather than finitude. 
Schelling's account of system and creation, however, is at odds with Heidegger's 
interpretation of it, which narrows the process of creation to the systems of the understanding 
and the expulsion of the unruly. Ground, as the-will-of depths, is neither a foundation of the 
will-to-love, which as such should be wholly appropriated by it 36 , nor its "corrupting 
principle"37 , to be discarded for the revelation of the inner essence of things. Ground and 
Existence neither signify nor separate ontological phases, and moreover, their relation is not 
conceived in hierarchical terms, so that Ground should either become Existent or it should be 
cleared. Instead, as we have seen, these terms stand for the mutually interacting and relatively 
independent wills in the cosmic movement, which both feed each other, and do not exclude, 
neither exhaust each other. The latter account derives only from Heidegger's initial 
assumption of the identification of the understanding with the 'inner law' of longing. This, 
though, is to be found not in Schelling's essay but in Heidegger's own conception of the 
35 op. cit., p. 16 1. 
36 op. cit., p. 78,107,110. " Ground always means for Schelling foundation, substratum, "basis", thus not 
"ground" in the sense of ratio,.... T'he ground in God is that in God which God himself "is" not truly himself, but 
is rather his ground for his selfhood". 
37 See Slavoj Zizek, The Abyss of Freedom, p. 6, whose interpretation of the relation between Ground and 
Existence develops in Heidegger's line of thought; " the enigma resides in the fact that Ground is ontologically 
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primordial identity between Being and logos, expounded in his lectures, An Introduction to 
Metaphysics. Here, Heidegger claims the essential sameness of Parmenides' and Heraclitus' 
thought, as long as both - implicitly or explicitly - announce the primordial identity of logos 
and being. The latter is founded on the common conception of logos and being in terms of 
emerging, self-gathering power. In the same way, Heidegger identifies understanding and 
longing, since what essentially longing seeks is to find its essence through its self- 
gatheredness. This, however, hardly fits with Schelling's far more complicated account of the 
two inseparable and yet irreducible wills. Moreover, Schelling does not ascribe any ultimate 
inner lawfulness or inscribed order to the movement of things, as we will see in the Ages of 
the World. In this context, ground and existence are but the conceptual tenns that describe the 
rather unpredictable movement of various potencies in cosmic becoming, inhering 
simultaneously in every entity, in a process of mutual transformation, conflict and free play. 
Schelling eloquently emphasises the inevitable inability to discover an ultimate order in the 
"irreducible remainder", the enigmatic unruly that lies in the depths of beings. This, however, 
is not to be 'cleared' by the understanding and thereby excluded from beings as a whole; 
rather the opposite is the case: for Schelling the unruly constitutes the fruitful soil out of 
which the will-to-love originates and, as such, is the 'sublime mother' of the understanding: 
All birth is a birth out of darkness into light: the seed must be buried in the earth and 
die in the darkness in order for the lovelier creature of light should rise and unfold 
itself in the rays of the sun. Man is formed in his mother womb; and only out of the 
darkness of unreason (out of feeling, out of longing, the sublime mother of 38 understanding) grow clear thoughts. 
non accomplished, "less" than Existence, but it is precisely as such that it corrodes from within the consistency 
of the ontological edifice of Existence". 
38 Schelling F. W. J., Freedom, essay, p. 35. 
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Finally, Heidegger's reduction of creation to the systems of understanding, is but the 
preparation which enables him to apply to Schelling his general pattern of criticism on 
German Idealism, namely, the shrinking back from a position that potentially betrays human 
finitude - presumably the notion of ground in this text - to the infinity of the understanding - 
the notion of Existence - as the allegedly ultimate revelation of God. Heidegger's fixation on 
this idea precludes his seeing the subtlety of Schelling's account of the Absolute and 
Indifference. Hence, he only sees - in a very Hegelian way indeed - in Schelling's concept of 
Absolute the lack of predicates, whose impressive significance is that it renders the Absolute 
a nugatory notion, allowing thus the celebration of the concept of finitude: 
The highest unity is that of the Absolute.... In such a unity no duality can be 
discernible yet. Thus the unity is 'absolute indifference". The only predicate that can 
be attributed to it is its lack of predicates. Absolute indifference is nothingness in 
the sense that every statement about Being is nothing with regard to it, but not in the 
sense that the Absolute is nugatory and merely of no use. Here, too, Schelling does 
not see the necessity of an essential step. If Being in truth cannot be predicated of the 
Absolute, that means that the essence of all Being is finitude and only what exists 
finitely has the privile e and the pain of standing in Being as such and experiencing 
what is true as beings. 
19 
As long as the Absolute is declared nugatory, Heidegger deprives finitude of its infinite 
dimension, fixing it as radically opposed to infinity and thereby performing himself that 
which he ascribes to Schelling and to the whole of the western tradition. Instead, Schelling's 
account of Indifference, as we will see in more detail in the Ages of the World, can give new 
insight and dynamism to the notions of absolute and finitude, dismissing the prejudice with or 
the obsessive adherence to any of both concepts. 
39 Heidegger, M. , Schelling's Treatise On the Essence of Human Freedom, p. 161,162. 
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Chapter 5 
Schelling's dynamic account of the Absolute and finitude 
Despite Hegel's and Heidegger's monochromatic interpretations of Schelling's thought, the 
latter's conception of identity is diffused throughout his various works and in many 
different versions, as if the concept itself undergoes multiple transmutations. Indeed, 
Schelling develops his philosophy in a surprisingly versatile way - now characterised as 
kaleidoscopic, now as inconsistent - which is exceptionally interesting and diversified with 
regard both to form and terminology. In the previous chapter, we examined Schelling's 
monolithic account of the Absolute, during his Identity System phase. It is the aridity of 
this period that justified Hegel's overwhelming critique and also Heidegger's simplified 
interpretation of Schelling's Of Human Freedom, along with the consequent classification 
of Schelling under the category of the defenders of the notion of the Absolute. In this 
chapter, we will try to get a purchase on Schelling's dynamic and original account of the 
concept of the absolute and finitude as the latter have been elaborately expounded in the 
second draft of the Ages of the World. 
We start our investigation by following up the main line of Schelling's critics with regard 
to his concept of the Absolute. First, we will look briefly at his intellectual wanderings 
before the solidification of his thought into the Identity System - which we previously 
discussed - where we can already discern the potential of his dynamic and elusive thought, 
which reaches its richest expression and ongoing transformation throughout his middle 
works, the Of Human Freedom (1809), Ages of the World (1811-15) and The Deities of 
Samothace (1815). 
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in his early work, Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature (1797,1802), Schelling conceives the 
Absolute as an ongoing becoming of continuous self-division and differentiations which 
produce the infinite particularities. The act of eternal self-division is called subjectivity, or 
"the unknowable infinitude hidden therein", terms intended to refer to the mystery of 
productivity itself, to the initiations of infinite differentiations, to the battle of forces. 
This [the birth of things] does not take place through the intervention of stuff or matter, 
but through the eternal self-division of the absolute into subject and object, whereby its 
subjectivity, and the unknowable infinitude hidden therein, is made known in 
objectivity and finitude and turned into something. ' 
Matter, for example, is conceived as a dynamic and fragile equilibrium of forces, which 
may be broken at any moment, by the very forces that produce it, as the various chemical 
and physical phenomena attest to. Combustion, or magnetism, for example, are only 
manifestations of those dramatic breakdowns of equilibrium and the victorious 
predominance of the strong forces of cohesion or attraction respectively. This conflict of 
free forces, which above was named subjectivity, is also called contingency and constitutes 
the very process of nature's activity. 2 
For when once the first step has been taken, from the necessary to the contingent, it is 
certain that Nature does not remain on any lower level if she can advance to a higher 
one. But for this it is sufficient that she simply permits a free play of the forces in 
matter, it is also not impossible that some third thing (whatever it may be) should make 
this conflict of free forces permanent, and that matter (now a work of nature) should 
thereby find this continuance in this very conflict itself. 3 
1 Shelling F. W. J., Ideasfor a Philosophy of Nature, P. 150. 2 Schelling mentions in his Ideasfor a Philosophy of Nature, with regard to the phenomenon of combustion: 
"If the secret of nature consists in the fact that she maintains opposed forces in equilibrium, or in 
lasting, forever undecided, strife, then the same forces, as soon as one of them acquires a lasting 
predominance, must destroy what they were maintaining in the previous state. " Ideasfor a Philosophy 
of Nature, Book 1, p. 57. 
3 Ibid., p. 149. 
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Accordingly, "the whole material Universe branches out from the highest unities into 
particular universes, because every possible unity again breaks up into other unities, of 
,A 
which each can appear as the particular one only through continued differentiations. 
A great deal of controversy surrounds the 'beginning' of the process of division, a 
controversy which remains so long as the Absolute is considered as an original state of 
indifference. 5 The above question - namely, how does differentiation begin - assumes a 
misapprehension of Schelling's subtle concept of indifference. Moreover, it separates the 
Absolute from its activity, whilst it is precisely this very activity that Schelling calls 
'Absolute'. 
For through this very act in which the Absolute makes known its unity in diversity, 
every unity formed in the particular has the necessary endeavour to be in itself, and to 
make knowable the essence in the particularity or nature of its identity as such. 6 
Although Schelling has already introduced the meaning of indifference in his Ideas for a 
Philosophy of Nature, it is only from the Of Human Freedom essay and the Ages of the 
World that we can gain a deeper understanding of this controversial term. In the Ideasfor a 
Philosophy of Nature, we have the concept of the Absolute as the becoming of diversified 
forms by means of its self-division, mixed with the peculiar clothing of its essence in form, 
which sounds indeed suspicious, recalling a prima materia, a primordial substance, or a 
neo-Platonic form that takes on different shapes. However, the term essence seems to hint 
4 We quoted these two abstracts from the first and second Edition (1797,1801) of Schelling's Ideas for a 
Philosophy of Nature, as indicative of Schelling's concept of the Absolute as a process of eternal self- 
division. Many commentators, among them Robert Stern - who wrote an introduction for the above book - see 
a substantial difference between the first and the second edition. The first is considered to be based on the 
assumption of the polarity of nature which is "purely dialectical - as the transition of one moment into its 
opposite or other - [while] in the second edition this polarity is conceived as the unfolding into difference of 
an original unity. " (see Robert Stern's Introduction to Ideasfor a Philosophy of Nature p. xxi. ). 
The above distinction is grounded on the interpretation of the Absolute as primordial, original, 
undifferentiated unity, and is derived from a misconception concerning the process of self-division itself. 5 See Alan White, Absolute knowledge: Hegel and the Problem of Metaphysics 6. Schelling F. G. J., Ideasfor a Philosophy of Nature, p. 145. 
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at a much more dynamic and rather elusive idea, viz., that of the world-body. The latter 
attempts to grasp the unbegun and unendable, namely the eternal history of each particular 
finitude; a history woven by its invisible, unimaginable and unpredictable transfigurations 
and relations. The term 'world-body' or 'Idea' signifies the infinity of the potentialities that 
are latent in any manifest, concrete individuality. From this point of view, such concrete 
individuality is named a relative identity, in the sense of actualising - at a specific time -a 
concrete potentiality, realising thus, relatively, its potential. Hence, the world-body 
encloses the pulses of the world, recalls the ultimate interdependence 7 among ostensibly 
unconnected things. 
... but insofar as the whole is likewise reflected as 
form in this relative identity, so that 
even in appearance they are still Ideas, they are bodies that are simultaneously worlds, 
that is, world-bodies. 8 
In this context, indifference does not signify lack of distinction; rather, it includes all the 
differences in their infinite potentialities. But if this is so, how does the concrete actuality 
come about, or how - out of the infinite potentialities that are assumed to remain indifferent 
to one another - does a concrete different form emerge? Schelling's exploration of these 
problematics is to be found in the Ages of the World and the Of Human Freedom essay. 
To begin with, Schelling does not assume any original state of indifference which starts 
suddenly to differentiate itself. If the latter were the case, then he would assume a 
dichotomous approach between the existence of things and its origin. As we have seen in 
the previous chapter, in the Of Human Freedom essay, he discusses the issue in terms of 
the 'old distinction'9 between 'Being in so far as it exists and Being in so far as it is the 
7 We can discern here the anticipation of modern theories of Chaos. 8 See Ideasfor a Philosophy of Nature p. 150,15 1. 9 Of Human Freedom p. 3 1. 
162 
mere basis of existence"O. Here, Schelling starts to elucidate his dynamic account of the 
Absolute and its relation to finitude. God is not the Highest Being, the omnipotent causal 
power of any finite being. Nor is he identical with things, as a simplistic version of 
pantheism would suggest. Nor, yet, do finite things differ from God in the manner of 
Spinoza's lifeless system. Schelling clearly demarcates himself from a concept of 
immanence "insofar as it is meant to express a dead conceptual inclusion of things in 
God. "11 He recognises, rather, that the "concept of becoming is the only one adequate to 
12 
the nature of things" , where things are both in god and distinct from him, and where God 
is both the becoming of things and distinct from them. "This is the only correct dualism, 
namely a dualism which at the same time admits a unity. " 13 
Differentiation then, never started at a definite beginning of the history of time, nor was 
there ever a primordial cause of finite things. 
In the cycle whence all things come, it is no contradiction to say that that which gives 
birth to the one, is, in its turn, produced by it. There is here no first and no last, since 
everything mutually implies everything else, nothing being the 'other' and yet no being 
without the other. God contains himself in an inner basis of his existence, which, to 
this extent, precede him as to his existence, but similarly God is prior to the basis, as 
this basis, as such, could not be if God did not exist in actuality. 14 
In his later work, the Ages of the World, Schelling clearly states the unthinkability of any 
original beginning of the cosmos. 
If, however, the true ground and beginning is also a knowledge or science of the past, 
where is there a stopping point? For even when it arrives at the last visible thing, spirit 
still finds a presupposition that indicates a time when there was nothing but the one 
inscrutable, self-sustaining essence, from whose depths all has come forth. 
Furthermore, if this is considered in the proper spirit [rech im Geiste], new abysses 
would be discovered in it as well. It would not be without a certain kind of horror that 
spirit would finally recognise that even in the primordial essence itself, something had 
10 Ibid., p. 3 1. 
11 Ibid., p. 33. 
12 op. cit. p. 33. 
13 Op. cit. p. 33. 
14 op. cit. p. 33. 
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to be posited as a past before the present time became possible, and that is precisely this 
past that is borne by the present creation, and that still remains fundamentally 
concealed. 15 
The abyss, rather than being an undifferentiated One, is the crucible of the most different 
fermentations, a moment of an infinite becoming, remote and unrecognisable by our 
conceptual categories. Moreover, by the tenn abyss, Schelling brings about a rupture of the 
concept of foundation, either in the form of the Cartesian cogito, or in the form of the 
empirical ground of beings. Both versions of ground - which are indeed supplementary - 
constitute a dualistic account of the relation between man and world which sustains and 
regenerates itself in a rigidified categorial. system, usually named as representational 
attitude. 
The introduction of the notion of the abyss attempts to challenge this attitude. The concept 
of abyss refers to an indeterminable variable - at least in terms of fixed and clear concepts - 
and aspires to describe the experience of the Fall from the realm of our established 
subjective categories. However, this fall leads neither to empty space, nor to the ground of 
our sensible impression of the world. The abyss, in the context of Schelling, is an elusive 
claim for the groundless, self-sustaining mutuality between man and world, as well as the 
experience of this mutuality. It can be the experience both of panic and relief, of loss and 
finding, of disorder and new certainty, which we might get through the awareness of this 
inextricable mutual conditioning between man and world. The abyss is both paralysing and 
liberating insofar as it mocks the severe claims of Reason for certainty and autonomy. 
It is then, a notion that attempts to categorise the indefinability of our conditioning, the 
remoteness of primordial and present determinations. It is also the confession of the 
inability of the human intellect to torment itself with its perplexity in thinking immemorial, 
infinite time and the consequent solution to the perplexity with its fixation under a new 
15 Schelling F. W. J., Ages of the World, p. 122. 
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concept. The irony, though, is that it is now the concept of the abyss itself that seeks to 
become the new foundation. It is in this - usually neo-Platonic - context of thinking where 
concepts such as abyss or eternity lose their fluidity and elusiveness and become rigid 
frames, which accommodate the notion of Schellingian indifference. Accordingly, 
'indifference' itself becomes the 'ground' anew and not surprisingly meets - after a short 
traversal through the history of Philosophy - the principle of identity in its Cartesian or 
Fichtean version proper. 
It seems though, that it is the fate of some intriguing concepts to acquire such an autonomy 
- by virtue of their indeterminacy - so that they can raise themselves against the text and 
move alone in shadowy paths. The concept of the abyss definitely belongs here. 
Dealing with Schelling implies the inevitability of following these paths. To read Schelling 
is to embark on an intellectual and even emotional venture, especially with regard to his 
later philosophical investigations in which he retrieves the language of ancient myths, 
oracles and symbols. The Ages of the World can be read as a modem Creation myth, except 
that creation in this work never starts or finishes, but begins and dies at any moment and 
etemally. 
However, if this work is but a story, a new myth, then why should we take it seriously at 
all? It is here that we need to consider Schelling's implicit suggestion for the abolition of 
the barriers between faith and knowledge. In this work, Schelling simply thinks about the 
unconditioned. His suggestion seems to be that, when we think of the unconditioned, we do 
not necessarily reach impenetrable dead-ends; instead, we can create stories, myths and 
sunnises (EtKmrEs jUt)jqOt)S) 
16, 
which are certainly full of antinornies and paradoxes, but 
16 This term is found in Plato's Timeus, where Timeus explains to Socrates why he chooses to expound his ideas in the form of myth, here understood as an elliptic form of expression of truth by dint of the partial 
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nonetheless, endlessly so. We can do this, for man himself is part of the 'unconditioned' 
and because the unconditioned becomes itself conditioned by man's re-enactment of the 
moment of creation, in the special experiences where man comes in contact with the 
paradox of life and death that permeates his own mode of being. Man's "nexus of living 
forces", imagination, reason, creativity are but moments in the paradoxical unity of the 
history of becoming; 
Man must be granted an essence outside and above the world; for how could he alone, 
of all creatures, retrace the long path of developments from the present back into the 
deepest night of the past, how could he alone rise up to the beginning of things unless 
there were in him an essence from the beginning of times? Drawn from the source of 
things and akin to it, what is essential of the soul has a co-science/con-sciousness (Mitt- 
Wissenschaft) of creation ...... Man often sees himself transposed into such wonderful 
relations and inner connections through precisely this innermost essence, such as when 
he encounters a moment in the present as one long past, or a distant event as if he 
himself were witness to it! 17 
Man can think and even play with the 'unconditioned' for, in a way, he witnesses the 
moment of 'Creation', since he eternally recreates himself-, he himself is a form of self- 
generation. This is the case, in different forms and degrees, for any finitude, but above all 
in man, where we meet the most advanced manifestation of the so-far-known self- 
generative abilities of spiritual life. 
We now turn to a closer discussion of the text Ages of the World, for in the latter we find 
Schelling's most fruitful and illuminating exposition of his account of the concept of the 
Absolute, but also of finitude. This will be explored through the ages of the world, namely, 
the history of time. 
abilities of human reason: "Don't therefore be surprised, Socrates, if on many matters concerning gods and 
the whole world of change we are unable in every respect and on every occasion to render consistent and 
accurate account. You must be satisfied if our account is as likely as any, remembering that both I and you 
who are sitting in judgement on it are merely human and should not look for anything more than a cliccaroc 
g, uOo (likely myth) in such matters. " Plato, Timeus 29c-d 
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From the early pages of the essay, Schelling attempts to clarify his position as far as the 
relation between the Absolute and finite entities. Here, he seems to have taken into account 
his critics, insofar as the inexplicable derivation of finite entities from the supposed state of 
undifferentiated restfulness is concerned. 
Now the great riddle of all times originates precisely here, the riddle of how anything 
could have come from what is neither externally active nor is anything in itself. And yet 
life did not remain in that state of immobility, and time is just as certain as eternity. 
Indeed, to the casual glance, the latter even seems driven out by the former; a world full 
of movement, full of conflict and strain of all forces seems to have taken over the place 
where the highest indifference, eternal rest, and universal satiation once divert. 
There have always been those who claimed that this riddle was easy to solve. The 
unconditioned, they say, is at first purely in itself, devoid of externalisation and hidden; 
but now it steps out, externalises itself, and sublates its eternal indifference by itself. 
But these are words without sense. It is a founding and principle rule of science (though 
few know it) that what is posited once is posited forever and cannot be sublated again, 
since otherwise it might just as well not have been posited at all. If one does not remain 
steadfastly by what one has once posited, then everything will become fluid as it 
progresses, and everything will wear away again, so that in the end nothing really was 
posited. True progress, which is equivalent to an elevation, takes place only when 
something is posited permanently and immutably and becomes the ground of elevation 
and progression. Thus, either the highest is not a restful will (such as we have 
assumed), or it is one. If it is one, then it must also eternally remain as such from itself. 
For it is entirely incomprehensible how the highest could cross over from rest into 
motion. Thus it can neither emerge from itself, nor can it separate off or exist as 
something from itself, nor can it produce anything outside of itself. 18 
So Zeno's abolition of the concept of motion and change is perfectly consistent with his 
teacher's, i. e. Parmenides, assumption of the undifferentiated One, only that the latter is 
rather in blatant contrast to Schelling's Absolute. The latter now is expounded in its most 
mature form. Schelling no longer uses the terminology of forces. These may recall - even 
though Schelling never used them in this sense -a mechanistic reification of the deeper, 
inward drive of activity. Schelling here introduces the term of the will. The Absolute 
initially is conceived in terms of a will that produces itself and this is precisely the way 
time acquires its definition; namely as organic process. It is worth remarking that 
17 Ibid. P. 114. 
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Schelling, in order to expound his account of the notion of the Absolute, or the 
Unconditioned, first introduces the manner in which he perceives the movement of finite 
entities. The Absolute, in turn, will be conceived precisely through the paradoxical 
movement of the finite, in its multiplicity and transformative productivity. 
Schelling distinguishes in every entity, the two principles which characterise time. One 
principle is that which negates expression and formation and stands for the selfless, 
objective dimension and Schelling calls this being. The other principle, which is called 
what-is, is that which affinns the entity's expression and fulfilment and stands for its 
subjective dimension. Both though, are pure categories that never operate as such. In fact, 
the above principles simultaneously govern any entity's development or decay and it is by 
virtue of their enduring contradiction that motion exists at all. Time is defined precisely in 
terms of these contradictory principles. 
Whoever takes time only as it presents itself feels a conflict of two principles in it; one 
strives forward, driving toward development, and one holds back, inhibiting (hemmend) 
and striving against development. If this other principle were to provide no resistance, 
then there would be no time, because development would occur in an uninterrupted 
flash rather than successively; yet if the other principle were not constantly overcome 
by the first, there would be absolute rest, death, standstill and hence there would again 
be no time. 
... the principles we perceive in time and the authentic inner principles of all life, and 
contradiction is not only possible but in fact necessary. 19 
In fact, these two principles are but configurations of the will, for both are considered as 
principles of action, negative or positive, but in either case, determinations pertaining to 
activity. Time exists by virtue of change, which derives from the oppositional, polar 
principles under discussion. Here, change and movement do not assume any formal 
uniformity and universality, which, correspondingly, would imply a mechanistic 
18 Schelling F. W. J., Ages of the World, p. 135,136 (my emphasis). 
168 
construction of the concept of time. Instead, Schelling brings forward the organic nature of 
time. Although he does not further elaborate this idea, we can see from the text the way in 
which Schelling ascribes the term organic to the concept of time. At first glance we could 
ascribe to Schelling - as is usually the case -a naIve reduction of the cosmos to the activity 
of an organism, whose rhythm accordingly would define the concept of time. However, this 
vitalistic concept of time, associated with the homogeneity and uniformity of the biological 
cycle, would not make any substantial difference to the mechanistic model. What is needed 
is an interpretation of the term organic which accords with its derivation from the term 
organon. The latter term has a double meaning: it means, first, instrument, signifying 
passivity, objectivity; it also means vpjVV , i. e. product, production, that which pertains to 
activity and subjectivity. Both meanings are derived from the past participle, copya, of the 
verb rpyo), which means to work, to produce. The past perfect tense in ancient Greek has 
indeed a double, paradoxical sense of both passivity and activity that is transferred to the 
double meaning of its derivative word, opy(xvov. We do not know if Schelling was aware 
of the double operation of this term, but it seems to correspond precisely to the double 
dimension of the plastic will operating in life, that both posits and is posited, stands for 
both what-is and being and thus allows for the organic nature of time. These principles, as 
wills, as organic forces, operate in every entity but in indefinite configurations; this 
multiple differentiation of the same principles allows for both the subjective (individual) 
and objective (cosmic) dimension of time, as well as, for its diversified conceptualisation 
and historicity. 
If in every finite entity the contradiction between these two principles is actual and active, 
in the Absolute it is taken as implicit and non-active. The Absolute, the Unconditioned, the 
Highest - according to Schelling's different terms - is considered as the concept of 
19 Ibid. p. 123,124. 
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expressing of the infinite potentialities, or, as the latter are clarified in two categories, of 
the being and of the what-is . 
According to the concept of the unconditioned we have put forward, we must say that 
is what-is, and yet is being as well. But this proposition itself still requires explanation. 
To begin with, what is this It (Es) that is both being as well what-is? Clearly, a 
twofold examination of it is possible. We can examine it to the extent that is both what- 
is, as well as being; however, we must examine it to the extent that it is merely It - in 
other words -simply that which is both being and what-is. But as that which is both 
being and what-is, it is necessarily neither the one or the other. For as that which is 
both, it is the expressing ( das Aussprechende) of both and can therefore be neither one 
of them in particular nor both at the same time; it is above both. 20 
The Absolute stands for the concept which corresponds to a non-restful, dynamic phase, 
out of which anything could come up, as a result of the potential activity of the polar wills. 
The latter seem to be indifferent to each other, nevertheless, they are in a state of mutual, 
unconscious longing and yearning for each other. "Being is for its part, perfectly indifferent 
to what-is. But the more this composure is profoundly deep and intrinsically full of bliss, 
, 21 the sooner must a quiet longing produce itself in eternity. 
Hence, the notion of the Absolute so far, attempts to depict a dynamic state full of immense 
922 23 implicit forces, similarly to a "surging, billowing sea' , "pregnant with a future". It is a 
process of becoming out of the endless productivity and self-producing of the will. The 
latter produces itself unconsciously, out of presentiment and inexpressible longing, yet 
necessarily so. 'We understand eternity to mean the whole: what-eternally-is and being, as 
well as the (still concealed) expressing of both; as such, eternity is not conscious of 
itself. 924 It is the process of an unconscious production of the will which, nevertheless, is 
n 'k able to recognise its products as distinct from it, namely, as essential, as what-is. In other 
20 Ibid. p. 126. 
21 Ibid. p. 136. 
22 Schelling's expression, referring to the primal longing in the Freedom treatise, p. 35. 23 Nietzsche's expression in the Genealogy of Morals 24 Ages of the World, p. 136. 
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words, as expressed and fuýfllled productions, as opposed to the producing will, which is 
still unexpressed, yearning, longing, striving for its externalisation. 
We need though, to further consider the above process. We can start from the investigation 
of the story of any finite entity, for, according to Schelling, to investigate means to retrace 
the history of the entity under research, so long as the history of any being leads us to the 
unfolding of its multiple relations with the cosmos, to the history of the cosmos itself. 
Therefore, in order to investigate the mysteries of the cosmos, the philosopher could start 
from any event, or entity, under the condition that he himself would be predisposed to treat 
it not as an alien object but as something in which he could discover the thread of his own 
connections to it as well. We would hazard that this is the meaning of the continuous 
transformations of subject and object in the process of their interaction in the System of 
Transcendental Idealism (1800). 
In the above work, this process culminates in the production of the work of art, in which 
both subject and object are in a dynamic relation of mutual liberation and subordination, 
fulfilment and exhaustion. The producer (artist, worker ... ) discovers his own self, liberates 
his internal forces through the struggle with the material, inside and outside of himself. 
Accordingly, the object both guides the subject and is transformed by it. 
Nature speaks to man and man speaks to her; the previously mute and dead material now 
unleashes its latent forces, which man can see and feel only if he wants to, and tries to, 
through his work. Man and nature now speak a new language, one mediated through work, 
desire, struggle and violence. 
It is this sort of language, as artist, as violent transgressor of the privacy of the mysteries of 
the world, that Schelling speaks in the Ages of the World. He invites us to decode the inner 
oracle of the order of things and thus of ourselves. The inner oracle, anyway difficult to 
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describe, stands for the 'essence' of things, the what-is of things. It is mute and unable to 
express that which is enclosed within it. It is mute because the 'what-is' of things is not a 
static permanent substance that underlies things or reveals itself. In fact, it is only in its 
relation to the other that it actualises itselL 
... this essence is in itself mute and cannot express what 
is enclosed within it. Indeed it 
would never open unless it were escorted by an other, itself in the process of 
becoming ... This (inner oracle), however, feels no less drawn to the other. Buried 
within it is the memory of all things, their original condition, their becoming, their 
meaning. But this archetypal image of things slumbers within it - not, indeed as an 
extinguished and forgotten image, but rather as an image growing with its own essence 
that it cannot take out of itself and call upon. This image would certainly never awake 
again, if a presentiment of and longing for knowledge did not lie in that unknowing 
itself. 
But incessantly called by this (other) to its ennoblement, the higher essence notices 
that the lower is assigned to it, not to be held in idleness, but rather that it might have 
an instrument in which it could behold itself, express itself, and become intelligible to 
itself. For everything lies within it at the same time and without distinctions, as one; 
but in the other, it can distinguish and separate out what is (distinguishable) in itself. 25 
Schelling clarifies the above process by means of his new terms of potencies. These are 
rather analytic determinations of what previously was introduced by the less rigid notion of 
the will, which now divides itself into three potencies. According to this line of thought, 
every finite thing is characterised by a network of multiple potentialities. This is what 
Schelling calls the first potency, namely the potency of being, and relates to the entity's 
objective dimension. The entity as such, is not an object only for us, but also for itself, in 
the sense that it has not expressed itself, it has not released its inner latent powers, and is 
also completely unaware of this. This aspect is called, analytically, being or object, but in a 
completely different way from what the reflective/representational classification would 
name as object. In fact, it is a being full of life, insofar as it is specified as a stage of 
longing, hunger, desire, presentiment, and thus stands for the dynamic state of an 
exceptional energic density. This is why Schelling uses the terms 'posits itself', even when 
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he refers to the objective dimension of an entity, or rather even more so, since 'positing' 
here does not signify the spontaneity of the intellect but cosmic spontaneity. For here, we 
deal with wills that Posit themselves, even though unconsciously, as spontaneous 
springiness of energy, as manifestation of the active and self-generative character of every 
finite entity in the cosmic becoming. 
For considered purely as such, being is selfless and completely immersed in itself. But 
on precisely this account, being draws its opposite into itself, and is a constant thirst for 
essence, a yearning to attract what-is, or to attract a subject, so that by means of this 
subject it might step forth from a state of mere potentiality into activity. But when being 
is considered as already active (wirkendes), as a being that is also again by itself, then it 
is necessarily already accompanied by a thing- that-is (ein Seyendes); and this conflicts 
with the being, with what is based entirely in itself. 26 
This longing, 'regarded in itself, (it) is also a will.... not a conscious but a persistent 
Willi, 27, we already find in the Of Human Freedom Treatise. There, it is called the will- of- 
depths, or the self-will of creatures 'by means of which alone all life achieved 
differentiation and distinctiveness to the last degree. 28 This longing, the potency of what- 
is-not, constitutes the impulse and strength of all life. It is the principle of individuation 
that makes the cosmos rich, for the longing for self-expression is the dividing power that 
gives uniqueness and unity, that creates in-dividuality. It stands for the process of in- 
dividuation, understood as a process of acquiring uniqueness by means of continuous 
divisions and differentiations. But what does differentiation mean and how does it come 
about? It would appear to consist in an act of both sheer spontaneity and inner necessity, an 
act of a new kind of freedom that raises new, tighter bonds. It is, for example, the 
experience of a new thought, the discovery of a discrimination that reveals new 
connections with things, or the spontaneity of the duplication of a cell that thus becomes 
25 Ibid. p 114,115. 26 Ibid. p. 123. 
27 Of Human Freedom, P. 34,359. 
173 
doubly related to the living tissue. From this point of view, the deeper a process is 
differentiated, the deeper it discovers itself to be interrelated with the rest of the universe, 
since the process of division simply discovers the new, already there, so far untraced 
threads of relations. We are used to ascribing the task of division to reflection. The 
interesting point about Schelling here, is that he claims that longing, the unconscious will 
for self-expression, is what brings about differentiations in life. For this longing is the 
desire, the hunger - immanent in things - to express their inner potential. This is the 
condition of thingg themselves in nature, in man, in the cosmos. "If the eternal will - that 
original force of negating - could ever stop working, everything would turn into nothing 
,, 29 
and it would again be nothing as it once has been. 
This longing is also called the inexorable drive of everything to become master of its inner 
essence, and yet an original force of negating formation, that is, of resisting the stagnation 
of any delimited form. Schelling uses the terms desire, hunger, presentiment, longing, 
possibly in order to make even more explicit his contrast to the mechanistic terminology of 
his age. These terms also echo the poetic imagination of creation myths of ancient 
mythologies and the philosophies of Gnostic sects which stand as a remote background to 
his works. 30 Longing also recalls - though more distantly - Aristotle's concept of 5-uv(xgtq, 
the moving principle of things and anticipates Nietzsche's will-to-power. 
Hence, we see that the terminology of forces is transformed into an emotional one. The 
latter not only encapsulates the dynamic nature of cosmic processes, but also emphasises 
28 Ibid. p. 52,376. 
29 Ages of the World, p. 144. 
30 As an example, we can notice the interesting similarity of Schelling's philosophy (in the Ages of the World 
and the Freedom Essay at least) with the cosmogony of Simon Magus, the founder of the Gnostic sect. In the 
cosmogony of Simon Magus there is the idea of an eternal, unbegun power that subdivides itself, increases 
itself, finds itself, is its own father and mother, its own son, one, the root of all things, and is itself Desire. It is 
a pre-conscious totality which contains ego and the unconscious; through desire, it creates all things. This 
desire to create, comes from fire and is also the origin of consciousness, of Logos. Intense terms such as 
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their creative, generative dimension, since creation proper is actually the product of e- 
motion according to the original meaning of the word emotio, as that which moves one out 
of something, which makes one move. Emotion is thereby different from feeling or 
sentiment, which is associated rather with passivity or even stagnation. Schelling's 
language becomes emotional in this sense: emotions, moods, presentiments become 
extrovert and creative, working hard to release the potential from its lethargic state. 
One would expect Schelling to complete his account of becoming through the above 
problematic. However, he introduces two other potencies: a) the potency of what-is or 
subjectivity, the affinning principle that pertains to an entity that posits itself as essence, as 
that which renders it as having expressed its potential and b) the potency of unity, or spirit, 
as the common affirming of both previous potencies. We need to examine the difference 
between the first and second potencies. If the first potency is mostly the driving will that 
longs for self-expression, then what is the distinction between it and the second potency? It 
has been suggested that the second potency consists in the realisation of the lack and the 
formulation of a goal, a plan posited by the entity. 31 
The above suggestion, though, misses the main point that the potencies (as terms) refer to 
processes, to activities rather than to static products or fixed and external determinations, 
such as a specific plan indicates. We suggest that the second potency attempts to account 
for the process of internal discipline, concentration and determination that is needed in 
order for an entity to express itself in a formative way. It refers to the process of longing's 
self-bending, which unfolds its primal density, and sees in its image its internal colourful 
diversity. However, this self-bending occurs against longing's resistance, in a battle with 
hunger are also met in old Hindu texts of ancient creation myths. (cf. Marie-Luise Von Franz, Creation Myth, 
Spring Publications, 1972. ) 
175 
itself, and from this point of view, is a struggle for its intense, conscious concentration, 
intense recollection of energy; a type of energy that gives shape and style, form and 
meaning, light and warmth. This is what mythologically has been depicted by the motif of 
the original egg, or the golden genn, the appearance of Phanes, the shining God, who 
procreates himself exactly as consciousness enlarges itself, suddenly, after a creative and 
intense concentration upon itselL Then consciousness becomes transparent, at once 
diffused and concentrated, like the energy of the light, illuminating and warming, the 
unifying strength of love. The second potency is the power that strives to give form to the 
drive of self-expression, not according to a self-imposed duty or external goal, but, 
according to Schelling, out of a new type of substantial religiosity, and an inner unity of 
knowledge and action. In the Of Human Freedom essay, referring to what he has named 
will-of-love, he qualifies it as that type of religiosity that is in contrast to 'idle brooding, 
pietistic intimations, or will-to-feel divinity. ' 32 He demarcates himself from a concept of 
love and duty that could be associated with formal moralising. 
I admit willingly and gladly to all who wish to assert, that morality is excluded from my 
system of philosophy in this sense, as a virtue which an individual can acquire for 
himself. 
It is a miserable undertaking to seek to derive God from morality, and not only because 
so many find the assumption of a God useful as a means toward morality. Such people 
have a utilitarian viewpoint. God is for them a household remedy which one can use to 
strengthen himself. 33 
Instead he links this concept of will- to- love with a new understanding of religiosity. 
We understand religiosity in the original, practical meaning of the world..... it is the 
expression of the highest unity of knowledge and action which makes it impossible for 
one's act to contradict one's will..... Even in its origin, religiosity means action being 
bound, in no wise and a choice between opposites as is assumed when the freedom of 
31 Beach E. A., The Potencies of Gods, p. 113. 
32 Of Human Freedom, p. 7 1. 
33 Ibid., footnote on *3 89, p. I 11. 
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the will is an equilibrium arbitrit, as it is called, but the highest commitment to the 
right, without choice. 34 
The potency of what is, then, seems to relate to the will-to-love that actualises, expresses 
and fulfils itself by virtue of expressing its inner need. It is the freedom that comes from 
the highest commitment, since the latter internally coincides with the former. 
In this respect, the will-to-love is also the actualisation of the overcoming of one's blind 
selfishness - the self-will of the first potency -, and thus stands for the communion with the 
whole. It is the experience of self-transparency and awareness of the universal, and thus it 
is like an inner birth, a gradual and painful or sudden rise of a state of fulfilment and 
clarity, as if the wholeness of the previous abyss has now been filled with light. 
It is, then, the inversion of the previous potency, the transmutation of hatred into love: from 
ongoing sharp divisions to diffusing unification, from brutality to religiosity, from 
inexorable hubris to mild humility, from lack to fulfilment, from hunger to satiation. 
Both potencies are categorical tools that attempt to grasp two polar, illusory states: the first, 
the illusion of blind individuation, the second, the illusion of transparent universality: the 
first, the illusion of a disconnected individualist self-will; the second, the illusion of a 
complete connection with ourselves and the world, insofar as we project - in a Fichtean 
way - our illuminated consciousness to the world itself and thus assume harmony with it. 
The third potency is the unity of the previous ones. Or, it is rather the only one process 
occurring, already there, that we split into its analytical components. As potency, it 
describes again both the process of producing in its movement and its distinctive moments. 
As term though, it is again a new category that anew fixes this movement. The advantage 
of this category is that it attempts to grasp the movement in a richer and more contradictory 
34 Ibid. footnote on *392, p. I 11. 
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way than the previous ones, which caught only the extremes. This category, therefore, 
assumes less rigidity; more of a moving image than a mere snapshot. It refers to the whole 
process of expression, to its paradoxes, culminations and decays, to its different moments 
and, in particular, to the moment of actualisation. It is both a creative and destructive 
potency, where creation can be destructive and destruction can be creative. 
In particular, Schelling refers in detail to the moment of the attainment of expression, 
which he calls spirit and which stands for the unity of the principles. "This is the first pure 
joy of mutual finding and being found. "35 
This unity is the moment in which the unexpressed is expressed, actualised, formed, 
uttered. But its utterance comes more from the sounds of the free play between the 
interacting forces rather than from the logical articulation of the attained unity that may 
lead to the domination of one will over the other. Schelling prefers to depict this free unity 
through the allusive meanings that the image of youth may evoke. 
Now this would be the most excellent and perfect unity, since the conflicting elements 
are free and yet at the same time one, and free movement neither cancels unity nor does 
unity cancel free movement. Even when this type of unity presents itself on perhaps a 
lower level, it still deserves to be kept in mind and indeed comprehended. If we want to 
give something similar, the most fitting comparison would probably be with the unity 
of forces of which one becomes aware in the innocence of youth. There, all forces are 
indeed present and in mutual interaction amongst themselves, excited by gentle 
interplay; but no character, no I-hood, no one has stepped forth to dominate and control 
them. 36 
This vibrant and thriving unity is a creation out of love and hatred, out of longing and 
discipline: as a child of both strife and love, it is fragile. In fact, it is not a final product at 
all, but just a new configuration in the process of transmutations. It is described as a state 
of bliss or ceaseless excitement, which exists only because there was a will that longed for 
35 Ages of the World p. 145. 
36 Ibid. p. 146. 
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For only a deep disquieting wave of longing and insatiable desire can give rise to 
moments of inexhaustible pleasure and pure joy. Deep satisfaction arises only as a response 
to an equally deep desire. But the deeper the fulfilment, the stronger its disquieting 
becomes. 
But after this force achieves totality and recognises itself in the unity of spirit, this one- 
sided relation cancels itself again. For the affirming essence eternally calls for the 
negating will, in order that it might eternally be generated from this will and rise up 
over it as the essence. 37 
The unity attained by the moment of actualisation calls again for disruption. 
For unity or for spirit, however, the opposition serves as an eternal pleasure [lust], since 
spirit only becomes sensible to itself in the opposition; and far from sublating this 
opposition, spirit seeks instead to constantly posit and confirm it. 38 
For it is a unity of living, creative powers and indeed of theirfree interplay, which implies 
that each one of the polar forces holds its full vitality and strength. The distinctive feature, 
then, of the moment of expression, consists in this type of dynamic unity that allows and 
even strengthens the freedom of the interacting powers that constitutes this unity. It is a 
moment of unique co-ordination of different forces, the mutual finding of mutually seeking 
forces, rare and exceptional, and thus, fragile. It is a moment where longing enjoys its free 
expression, "rejoices in the soothing of its harshness and severity, in the quieted hunger of 
its attracting desire t'39 This moment of dynamic concord is called totality, but it is exactly 
its fragility and transitoriness that attests to its openness, or rather, its non-closedness in 
contrast to what the term totality usually implies. Here, Schelling encapsulates the third 
37 Ibid. p. 1.44 
38 Ibid. p. 145. 
39 Ibid. p. 145. 
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illusory moment, which is however, much more dynamic and vanishing, in so far as "far 
from sublating the opposition, spirit seeks instead to constantly posit and confirm it. 9940 
But in what does this opposition consist? So far, according to Schelling's own distinctions, 
we have dealt with the opposition between being and what- is, objectivity and subjectivity, 
potentiality and actuality. But if in the moment of spirit, there is a mutual finding, as 
Schelling claims, how does the opposition maintain or even develop itself? It is here that 
the idea of potencies, as wills, as self-generative powers, proves its importance and makes 
even more explicit the dynamism and resourcefulness of Schelling's thought. Our 
suggestion is that it is precisely the event of mutually finding that transforms the polar wills 
and not only maintains the opposition, but also transforms it into a new one, according to 
the new qualitative circumstances created thereby. In this way, we could also avoid a crude 
teleological determination of the notion of opposition and consequently, of movement 
itself. In any case, the opposition is much more immanent and internal than that depicted 
between the two, allegedly completely distinct wills. Thus far, Schelling uses a pictorial 
language that externalises and even substantiates the concept of opposition. 41 
We suggest that we should think of opposition - and thereby of the source of movement 
itself - as an internal and generative process within the complex that we analytically 
distinguish between the expressible and the expressed. Schelling clearly states: 
40 Ibid., p. 145. 
41 See for example: "the forces become perceptible to each other (my emphasis), but without fighting each 
other. This is the first pure joy of mutual finding and being found. Essence should, by right, be in-itself, and it 
not without bliss that it senses its first and purest reality; the negating power, for its part rejoices (my 
emphasis) in the soothing of its harshness and severity, in the quieted hunger of its attracting desire. For unity 
or for spirit, however, the opposition serves as an external pleasure [lust]. " Ages of the World p. 145. 
Or, "Now because the opposites are not bound to each other, or to unity by a necessary link, but rather 
only by the inexhaustible pleasure of having and feeling the presence of each other, this is the freest life, 
the life that plays with itself, as it were, filled with ceaseless excitement and bursting with its own renewed 
vitality. " Op. cit. p. 145 
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What-is-not and what-is are not two different essences in it but are rather only one 
essence regarded from different sides. That by virtue of which it is not, is the very 
thing by virtue of which it is. 
For it is not due to a lack of light and essence that it is not, but rather as a dynamic 
hiding-away, an active striving backward into the depths, into concealment, and 
therefore as an active force that likewise is- and hence is comprehensible..... But it [i. e., 
the will] negates itself only in order to reach essence. 42 (my emphasis) 
Is this a claim for teleology? To begin with, there is definitely a demand that the 
expressible must be expressed. This demand is always there - since the will, as a whole, is 
self-generative - either as hunger and severity, or as silent disquieting and imperceptible 
stirring. Hence, the opposition moves and is transformed, in an ongoing movement of 
recurrent moments of despair and bliss, hunger and satiation, evacuation and fulfilment, 
births and deaths. "No entity to this day can be created without the repeated production of 
its archetype. Indeed we will hazard the assertion that every act of generation occurring in 
nature marks a return to a moment of the past, a moment that is allowed for an instant to 
enter the present time as an alienated (re)appearance". 43 It is this type of movement that 
allows for the creation of archetypal images, as a mode of apprehending the world and its 
history, especially as a mode of visualising the future and re-experiencing the past. Now 
our suggestion is that it is the concept of archetype that can accommodate the notion of 
telos that is implied by the above abstract. The concept of archetype apparently brings us to 
a new field of investigation. In order to understand it, we would need a separate field of 
inquiry. At present, we will focus only on the connotations that are derived exclusively 
from Schelling's text and are relevant to our discussion. 
42 Ages of the World p. 143. 
43 Ibid. p. 162. 
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Schelling expounds his ideas on archetypes in a scattered way during the last pages of his 
text. In fact, these are the most opaque and challenging part of the book and consequently 
we are aware of its possible impoverishment through our reading. Schelling mentions that 
the doctrine of the archetypes is lost in deepest antiquity; the Greeks already regarded it 
as a sacred legacy. This certainly fosters the suspicion that the doctrine had lost 
something of its original meaning by then, since even Plato was only a reporter and 
interpreter of this ancient teaching. 44 
Schelling's approach to archetypes comes from his more general conceptualisation of the 
organic nature of time. In fact, the archetype is but a possibility that can be rendered actual 
exactly by virtue of the organic conceptualisation of time. 
The archetype, as condensed psychic and cosmic energy, allows the experience of a 
spectacular reversal of time, in which the future, in a way, becomes experienced before its 
advent, as vision, as a momentary fleeting sensation, and the most remote past can be re- 
enacted and relived through the living experience of an archetypal image, in which 
66nothing was enduring, nothing was solid, but everything was in unceasing formation. 945 
The archetypes are considered as images of future things, as visions of the future or 
evocation of a distant past, far beyond the limited span of our individual life time, as if we 
receive them from the hand of the cosmic memory. 
The production of such archetypes or visions of future things is a necessary moment in 
the overall development of life, and even if these archetypal images cannot be 
understood as physical natures in precisely the normal sense, they certainly cannot be 
thought apart their physicality. They are neither merely universal concepts of the 
understanding, nor fixed models; for they are Ideas precisely because they are eternally 
full of life, in ceaseless motion and production. 46 
44 Ibid. p. 161. 
45 Ibid. p. 154. 
46 Ibid. p. 161. 
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But how do they come about? How are they connected with the organic nature of time? 
In order to approach the above questions we need to connect our previous discussion on 
time with Schelling's remarks on mesmeric sleep, normal sleep, animal magnetism and 
oriental mythology, all of them scattered in the last pages of the text. 
Schelling suggests that man - as a network of living forces 
47 
_, seems at least partly subject 
to an outer potency that cancels the free relations of forces within him and transforms the 
relation into a necessary one. " Further, 
Internally, a waking man and a sleeping man are entirely the same. None of the inner 
forces that are active in the waking state are lost in sleep. From this it is already evident 
that the difference between these states, as well as their alteration, is not determined 
from within the organism; rather, it is the effect of a potency external to the organism, 
now attracting, now releasing. All forces of a man in the waking state are apparently 
governed by a unity that holds them together, like a common exponent (or expressing), 
as it were. In sleep, by contrast, each force and each instrument seems to work for itself, 
and a freely willed sympathy takes the place of an externally determined unity. And 
while the whole looks as though it were dead and ineffective on the outside, the freest 
play and intercommunication of forces seems to unfold on the inside. 
In the normal course of life, the effect of that outer force of attraction appears as 
sometimes waning, sometimes disruptive, in regular alternation. When this happens, an 
unusual suspension of weakening of this force seems possible, according to the familiar 
phenomena of the so-called animal magnetism. 
Indeed, the power seems actually given to one man to transcend that outer potency and 
return another man to the free inner relations of life, so that he appears dead externally, 
while internally a steady and free connections of all forces emerges from the lowest up 
to the highest. 48 
He describes mesmeric sleep and dreams that originate out of the mutual independence of 
the inner forces, as states that are characterised by those "free inner relations of life", 
liberated from external unifying potencies. Here, "there is a disruption of forces, a 
relaxation of all links, and being is posited-outside-itself. )9949 (my emphasis 
Generation and Death are similar phenomena from this point of view. In generation the 
relaxation of all links enables the bursting forth of a new entity, which, in its actualisation, 
47 This suggestion is also made in the 0 Human Freedom essay 48 Ages of the World, p. 15 8. 
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repeats the ever-recurrent act of creation, recalls the archetype of eternal birth; in death, the 
relaxation of the entity's links enables its sinking back to the eternity of its non-actualised 
potentialities. Every death then recalls a birth and a future rebirth. They are phenomena 
which, by virtue of this liberation of forces, encapsulate a moment of eternity, in the sense 
of encapsulating the infinite possibilities of being. This is the sense - in our view - where 
being is understood as being-posited-outside of itself, namely being that recalls and 
projects its infinite potentialities by virtue of the unprecedented liberation of its inner 
forces. The latter seem to be able to acquire their full potential; to be tuned to the latent 
forces of the cosmos. The idea that Schelling seems to be suggesting is that when man 
liberates himself from a potency that keeps him in control and external unity, and hence 
becomes posited outside himself, then his inner forces - wills - operate in a much more free 
and multidimensional level. In such states, man's sensitivity and imagination are expanded, 
insofar as the spectre of his possibilities appears now magnified, promising and terrifying 
at the same time. Here, longing becomes intensified and the expressible's inexorable drive 
to be expressed, ruthlessly grasps images from the past and future, or plays the blissful 
game of imagination's free variations. Time then becomes confused, loses its proper order 
and succession, moves backwards and forwards in this state of infinite joy and infinite 
teffor. 
Schelling clearly states that man can achieve higher things when able to posit-himself- 
outside of himself. 
Why do all great doctrines so unanimously call upon man to divide himself from 
himself, and give him to understand that he would be able to do anything and could 
effect all things if he only knew to free his higher self from his subordinate self? 
It is a hindrance for man to be posited-in-himself-, he is capable of higher things only to 
the extent that he can become posited-outside-himself [auber-sich-gesetal, how an 
49 Ibid. p. 162. 
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even higher, free, inner contact takes place according to the different gradations of 
spiritual productions, and how the same thing is required everywhere. 50 
Archetypes, accordingly, are the visions of the future or of the past that can come about in 
the above state of ecstasis These visions are new possibilities, new potentialities, that 
having been liberated get caught by the imagination, or get tuned with the dormant and 
imperceptible pulses of inner life, at that moment when man has become-posited-outside- 
himself. They are produced during "that inner state of pure contemplation in which [the 
eternal] perceives, as if in a vision, the miracles of time [and etemity]. "51 They express the 
innermost longing of the expressible, "eternally full of life", "in ceaseless motion and 
production", and thereby, could constitute a telos for man's activity. But this telos is not an 
externally posited model, a duty or social obligation, nor a static end to be achieved. It is a 
goal, that even if attained, will be destabilised anew by the new forces generated or 
annihilated by dint of its expression, which in turn create new contradictions, new visions. 
It would appear that at least one critical question remains: how could this ecstasis ever 
occur? Is it an exclusively personal issue related only to mesmeric sleep and inner 
withdrawness? The approach that we can adopt with regard to this issue - related to 
Heidegger's concepts of authenticity and temporality - critically depends on the 
interpretation of the meaning of this "outer potency that cancels the free relation of forces" 
within man. Schelling offers no further clarification on the matter. However, he definitely 
attempts to describe a state, a potency which restricts the individual in a field of confined 
potentialities, acts, roles, thoughts. In this sense, we could associate this potency with the 
function of a self-controlling force that integrates man within the context of predictability 
and conceptual rigidity, social conformity and regularity. The state of mesmerism and sleep 
50 Ibid. p. 163. 
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do not constitute alternative suggestions for the attainment of an ecstatic state. They are 
only examples that could facilitate the understanding of visionary moments in a relaxation 
of all links. Schelling, apparently, does not provide us with alternative solutions, nor does 
he articulate a political philosophy. He wants, at this stage, to emphasise the need for a 
state that can expand the horizon of potentialities and accentuate the need for expressibility 
according to one's innermost inclinations and desires, as opposed to externally imposed 
models. For example, in Schelling's beloved ancient ages, it was Dionysus, with his 
shocking Epiphany and even more shattering disappearance that effected the dissolution of 
all familiarities, social rules and order, thereby provoking states of mass-ecstasis and social 
mania. This ecstatic moment does not reveal the tragedy of the original finitude of man in 
his confrontation with the infinite whole. Instead, it weds man with infinity, precisely by 
virtue of his finitude, in the paradoxical linkage between life and death, in his active 
immersion in the cosmic enigma, of which man himself partakes. 
Dionysus, though, has been expelled from Olympus and ever since then from any social or 
divine Institution, for the ecstases he instigated were massive and social and not isolated 
moments of a desperate internal journey for 'authenticity'. Is Schelling's own vision, then, 
the return of Dionysus? 
We are not sure if Schelling wanted Dionysus back, but he certainly suggested that the 
experiences related to Dionysus were conditions for the expansion of man's personality. 
However, the experiences of dionysian ecstasis do not constitute the final stage either. 
They are only moments towards man's expressibility, creativity, actualisation. For the 
visions one has seen, namely the experience of liberation of his inner forces and its 
consequent feelings - cheek or contempt for social rules, loss of individual identity, panic 
51 Ibid. p. 161. 
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and delight for life - are necessary experiences in order for him to come-to-himself, to work 
according to his potential and give shape and form to it. 
We can easily observe that it is not sufficient for a man's complete actuality that he 
merely be something or implicitly have something. In addition, he needs to become 
aware of what he is and what he has. He is a thing-that-is, and he has a being by 
nature without any effort, even as a child. But both this thing-that-he-is and this 
being [that he has] are ineffective until a force is found that is independent of both, 
that becomes aware of them both and activates them. It is not enough that forces (or 
abilities) be present in man; he must recognise them as his own, and only then is it 
possible for him to grasp on to them and put them to work and into effect ......... this 
moment, the moment when it becomes aware of what it is, is the moment of 
awakening, of coming-to-itself in the true sense ...... This was the highest goal. 
52 
Does this visionary quality pertain to nature as well? Schelling remarks: "Nature still 
appears visionary although, in a certain sense, it acts blindly, ". 
Schelling dismisses both any account of external intelligence that guides and organises 
Nature's patterns, as well as the blind mechanism explication. 
How, then, could we understand this dimension of visionary quality along with a certain 
kind of blind action in nature? Is it a version of the Kantian claim about purposiveness 
without purpose? It seems that Schelling again suggests a rather original approach which 
transcends not only mechanism and teleology, but also the distinction between 
purposiveness and purpose. We have already seen the latter as far as man's activity is 
concerned. The main point was based on the idea of the liberation of man's living forces so 
that the latter could reveal and posit in man as his own purpose, of the expression of his 
inner potential in its most creative and imaginative dimension. The visionary quality of 
nature's activity is also related to a spiritual dimension in nature itself, a spirituality that 
transpires from the sensual, since "nature for its part becomes ever more the visible imprint 
of the highest concepts, [and] it is, in truth, only the ignorant who still looks with scom 
52 Ibid. p. 167. 
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upon the physical. 9953 Nature's elusive spirituality is connected with every entity9s 
inexorable drive to become master of its inner essence. It refers to the power that 
alchemists sought, namely, to "what makes gold into gold"54 and to that "something else in 
, 55 
and around corporeal things [that] grants them the full sparkle and shine of life' . It is the 
indefinable power that holds the magnetic poles together, that makes gold shine, that 
replenishes the green in plants, that emanates as grace in the highest transfiguration of 
human corporeality. 56 It is a force that holds opposites together as opposites, that gives life 
and individuality to the different entities. We still need to dwell on the question as to what 
the paradoxical activity of nature - blind and visionary - consists in. The 'blind' dimension 
is connected to the power of longing as discussed above: the uncontrollable drive of self- 
expansion that spreads, diffuses itself, dashes against and collides with infinite other 
forces. However, there is a returning force which is not the outcome of the blind collisions, 
or a reactionary force to the expansive one, but immanent in matter itself and only 
analytically distinguished from the supposedly pure expansive force. This dual character of 
matter in its infinite divisibility allows for the multiplicity and richness of forms in nature, 
in life. It seems that the visual dimension in nature is precisely this 'ability' to maintain 
unities of tensions and thereby to restore dynamic balances of forces that constitute the 
different determinate individualities at different moments. The above approach accords 
with Schelling's anti-dualism, i. e., that the structures we perceive in nature are a dynamic 
and finite intersection of our forces (cognitive, perceptive, emotional) and nature's forces, 
and not just a subjective and completely arbitrary classification of chaos according to our 
convenience. Or, to put it another way, even our convenience is conditioned by our 
53 Ibid. p. 119. 
54 Ibid. p. 152. "Matter's spirituality seems to be liberated again with the waning or transforming of that outer 
potency that restricts the freedom of its inner life: this time the outer potency is more clearly specified as the 
coagulating potency". 55 Ibid. p. 15 1. 
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immersion in the cosmic forces which we call chaos. Order and chaos represent two 
categories, but also two archetypes insofar as both have been experienced in man's history. 
In this sense, the assumption of nature's purposiveness is rendered meaningless, since this 
concept presupposes the fundamental separation of man from nature, according to which 
nature is assumed to organise itself in patterns comprehensible by man's intellect. Nature's 
visionary dimension then, can be interpreted as nature's self-seeing tendency - nature's 
imagination - the latter understood as its formative power. Hence, nature's visionary aspect 
seems to coincide with its tendency for self-differentiation, and it is here again where telos 
and spontaneity, necessity and freedom meet, and where mechanism and teleology are 
suspended. Does this augur the most perfect possible world, as the coincidence of necessity 
and freedom, as the compulsive suggestion of the 'inner necessity of the agent' in the Of 
Human Freedom essay implies? 
It is at this point that we need to recover the deeper meaning of the concept of indifference. 
Our suggestion is that indifference, contra its various misinterpretations, is the concept, in 
Schelling, that attempts to encapsulate the possibility of contingency (or, if we really want 
an ontological image for that concept, it is the trap of the infinite contingencies). 
In our previous discussion of the Absolute, we reached a point where the state of 
Indifference had been conceived as the dynamic, non-restful state of latent operative wills, 
of infinite possibilities. "According to the concept of the unconditioned we have put 
forward, we must say that it is what-is and yet it is being as well. But this proposition itself 
,, 57 still requires explanation. To begin with.... It is above both . Attention must now be 
focused on this 'above', or the 'before', as Schelling also calls it. Here, Schelling attempts 
56 Ibid. p. 152,151,150. 
, 57 Ibid. p. 126. 
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to grasp an even more elusive possibility than the multiple potentialities of the expressing; 
namely, the possibility of a complete non-expressibility. 
"The unconditioned can express itself as what-is and as being, and it can refrain from 
expressing itself as both. In other words, it can be both, or it can let both alone. Free 
will is just this ability to be something along with the ability to not-be-it. ', 58 
Here then, we have the possibility of the absorption of time, a moment of eternity, a 
moment before the self-positing of any possibility, mute and lost. At the same time, it is an 
instance of explosion, of bursting out, of expression; a transmutation, a moment of 
contingency. Indifference then, means the absence of any determinate relation, a lack of 
commitment to any relation, and is thus contingency, surprise. Indifference can be seen as 
the 'mood' of transmutation and the inversion of teleology: in the former (i. e., 
contingency), time sinks in a moment, while in the latter (teleology) time unfolds according 
to its telos. It is as if time stops at the moment of the attainment of expression, as it also 
stops before the discovery of any potentiality. It halts in a moment of free will, of sheer 
contingency, where every determination seems to be inadequate. Indifference is the 
moment of sheer surprise and ineffable shock where 'all plausible connections collapse'. 
Hegel would possibly riposte that this is already a determination, but this is so only after 
the understanding has managed to recover and reorganise its unity through the recollection 
of its shock. To be sure, the shock does not occur in an absolute void. However, the 
determinations of the shock can be found - partially - only after its occurrence, when, by its 
very happening, it illuminates its conditions. The contingent can become determinate only 
when, by means of its advent, it betrays its tracks, thereby indicating that our understanding 
was blind, or unprepared. The moment of contingency inheres in every being, as an 
uncontrollable, unclassiflable dimension and also as its possible, interesting 
58 Ibid. p. 127. 
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unpredictability. This is why the abyss is always present, as the discrete or violent 
compulsion for the continuous liquidation of our intellectual and intuitive categories. 
This moment is defined as free, pure, unmitigated will. It lacks any predicates because it 
stands indifferent to any specific expression, since it is free to express or not express any 
potentiality, and as such is also called the will that wills nothing. From this point of view, 
the lack of predicates indicates not its nugatory status, but the sheer unpredictablity of its 
activity. This is precisely the meaning ascribed to the concept of the Absolute by Schelling, 
namely the dimension of free expression in any direction, the moment of contingency 
lurking in every finite entity in the enigmatic movement of cosmic becoming. The Absolute 
is not a hypostasised higher Being, nor an ultimate telos in the movement of things, but the 
will that " always penetrates the greatest turmoils of life and the most violent movement of 
all forces"59 
In this way Schelling brings eternity back to time, the sacred to the profane. This can be 
further seen through a brief recapitulation of his notion of time in the Ages of the World 
and in the Bruno essay. In the Ages of the World, time is the conflict of two oppositional 
principles and is thereby the mediation between the expressible and the expressed. 
Accordingly, when the expressible is suddenly expressed (as in a moment of magic, or 
transmutation), or remains buried in muteness, we have the concept of eternity. Similar 
ideas are expressed in the Bruno essay. "Things in the universe are more or less perfect, the 
more or less they embody time. But all the things of the pre-eminent sort incorporate 
time. 9v60 Time here is conceived in terms of self-limitation, as the process of establishing 
one's particularity. Time is an act which, as self- limitation, differentiates the specific entity 
from the rest of the universe and creates the conditions of succession and intensity, quality 
59 Ibid. p. 134. 
60 Schelling F. W. J., Bruno, or on the Natural and the Divine Principle of Things, P. 173. 
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and difference. Time as an act of self-limitation pertains to every entity: the more a finite 
being returns to itself, the more it establishes its own time, its own rhythm and style, and 
from this point of view, the process of self-limitation is parallel to that of self-expression, 
both of them manifestation and creation of time. 
Every culture, therefore, considered as a particular finitude in the history of the cosmos, 
creates its own conception of time, and vice versa: from the different conceptions of time 
we can infer certain typical features of different cultural and historical epochs. The 
conceptualisation of time in the Ages of the World elucidates the remarks extant in Bruno, 
concerning the strange phenomena of the inner sense of time which some entities 
surprisingly possess (as migratory birdS)61, insofar as time is conceived in terms of 
conflictual forces operative in every entity and in the cosmos. Accordingly man, as the 
finite entity that aspires to self-expression xar' E4qXijv establishes his own time, which is 
conceived as 'the expression of self-consciousness'. 62 
Time then, is the manifestation both of finitude and infinitude. It is the outcome of 
limitation, for otherwise the expressible would be already expressed, the infinite 
possibilities would be infinitely accessible or actualised and succession or differentiation 
would be redundant, since everything would be perceived immediately and simultaneously. 
The a priori character of time is the already given fact of our finitude (and of any other 
entity's finitude insofar as it becomes aware of time). But time is also the outcome of non- 
limitation in so far as it is an act of self-limitation, attesting to the actualisation of 
potentiality, to the establishing of one's identity. It is in this context that we locate the 
61 Ibid. p. 182 'The succession of seasons is not alien to things that actively contain time, things such as 
migratory birds that steer their flight toward another climate and thus act as an indicator of time. " 62 Bruno essay p. 175. 
"But any individual thing is more self-identical the more perfectly it incorporates time..... unifying 
difference through the identity of the concept and of the line, which is the expression of self- 
consciousness. " 
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concept of the Fall. Fall, for Schelling, is precisely the act of self-limitation, the act of time 
and self-expression. and it seems that the more one 'falls', the freer one becomes. 
In the above conceptualisation of time, as indicating both finitude and infinitude, we meet 
again Schelling's account of eternity. Eternity inheres in the history of the cosmos, now 
obscure and mute, now shiny and uttered, but always present and recurring. "For since time 
commences absolutely in each living thing, and since at the beginning of each time is 
connected to eternity anew, then an eternity must immediately precede each life. "63 
in the Ages of the World we encounter the unexpected breakthrough of the absolute in the 
history of cosmos and simultaneously the violation of its sacred precincts by the re- 
enchanted profane. The world appears as both transparent and opaque as never before. The 
aporias of Reason can no longer be settled in its Architectonic structure. For the ages of the 
world have no architectonic. Instead, they transpose us to 'the greatest turmoils of life' and 
the 'most violent movement of all forces'. It is in this field that now logic and human 
subjectivity have to readdress their aporias and reconsider their own movement. 
Or, "Just as the thing constitutes its time by containing an actuality whose possibility lies outside of it or a 
possibility whose actuality lies beyond it, so too does the concept insofar as it is simply finite. " Bruno p. 180 63 Ages of the World, p. 162. 
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Chapter 6 
Schelling's conception of the self 
In the previous two chapters we examined Schelling's differing approaches as regards the 
notions of the absolute and finitude. In this chapter we will discuss the implications of these 
accounts for his conception of the self, in particular, with regard to the notions of judgement, 
reflection and freedom. These issues will be explored respectively, through his early work, 
the System of Transcendental Idealism (1800), and the Ages of the World (1811). 
Schelling mainly provided his conception of the self in his major work, System of 
Transcendental Idealism (1800), which was written just a year before he formulated his first 
articulation of the System of Identity, and as such mostly moves within the 'spirit' of this 
philosophical phase, though, there are already in it the interesting elements of Schelling's 
later thought. These, however, do not unfold their dynamic potential since they are enclosed 
within the requirements of the identity principle. Hence, we will not deal with a thorough 
examination of the STI, in order to proceed to his conception of the self, as the latter can be 
drawn from the Ages of the World, which radicalises the break with the Identity System that 
started from the Freedom treatise. So, after a brief discussion of the STI, we will endeavour to 
reconstruct Schelling's possible account of the self, according to the ideas expounded in the 
Ages of the World. 
Schelling's STI originates in the Kantian problematic, as far as the possibility of objective 
cognitive judgements is concerned. As a whole, the work attempts to provide philosophy with 
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the principle that can raise the main dualisms between reason and sensuality, nature and 
freedom, and would constitute the Supreme Principle of Knowledge. 
How both the objective world accommodates to presentations in us, and presentations in 
us to the objective world, is unintelligible unless between the two worlds, the ideal and 
the real, there exists a pre-determined harmony. But this latter is itself unthinkable unless 
the activity, whereby the objective world is produced, is at bottom identical with that 
which expresses itself in volition, and vice versa. 
Now it is certainly a productive activity thatfinds expression in willing. ( my emphasis)' 
It seems that according to Schelling the pre-determined harmony is not postulated by the 
positing of human reason, but comes about through the identity of the activity that pertains to 
both cognitive representations and nature. This statement constitutes the strength but also the 
weakness of Schelling's thought at this stage, as long as the interesting idea of productivity is 
rendered to the status of a transcendental and absolute principle for the totality of all possible 
experience. Schelling states the above principle in Fichtean terms, i. e., as the identical act of 
self-consciousness, which consists in the absolute freedom of the self-positing of the subject- 
object Identity, called Intellectual Intuition or Original Self-Consciousness. The latter, 
however, does not refer to the individual ego but to a universal, all-inclusive totality, which 
posits in its identical and absolute act the infinity of the cosmos, Spinoza's natura naturans 
as subject-object at once, or what Schelling called in his Identity System, Absolute or Reason. 
The eternal, timeless act of self-consciousness which we call self, is that which gives all 
things existence, and so itself needs no other being to support it; bearing and supporting 
itself, rather, it appears objectively as eternal becoming, and subjectively as a producing 
without limit. 2 
We will not pursue in detail the examination of the relation between this principle and its 
development in the Identity System, but we will only focus on the issues relevant to the topic 
1 Schelling F. W. J., System of Transcendental Idealism, p. 11. 
2 Ibid. p. 32. 
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of this chapter. From this point of view, an interesting difference to be remarked, is that the 
act of absolute or original self-consciousness in the STI, is not conceived as an immediate act 
of primordial identity, but as an infinite becoming condensed in an absolute synthesis of the 
primordial conflict between opposing activities. Self-consciousness results as the outcome of 
two infinite, mutually contrasted activities; one expansive, which is a pure producing out 
toward infinity and is called real, and a second contractive, which infinitely limits the first 
activity, by turning its products into objects of its intuition and is called ideal. The reverting, 
intuitant activity is conceived as an act of absolute freedom, which in its continuous 
limitations of the producing activity, builds the infinity of limitations and differentiations in 
the whole of reality. 
Both activities, the real and the ideal, mutually presuppose each other. The real, originally 
striving into infinity, but to be limited for the sake of self-consciousness, is nothing 
without the ideal, for which in its limitation, it is infinite. Conversely, the ideal activity is 
nothing without the to-be-intuited, the limitable, and on that very account, the real. 3 
..... It can already be concluded from the foregoing that the identity expressed in self- 
consciousness is not an original identity but a created and mediated one. What is original 
4 is the conflict of opposing directions in the self; the identity is the resultant of this. 
For Schelling, the original conflict must be resolved by an absolute identical synthesis, and 
this is the point where the dynamism of the insight into the conflictual productivity reaches its 
limits. This will be seen later, as far the implications of his conception of individual self- 
consciousness and its freedom is concerned. 
By means of the infinite condensing of the original act of the Absolute self-consciousness, 
Schelling states - in a Spinozian line of thought - the immanent necessity of the infinite 
configurations of the cosmos, as a result of the very nature of the Absolute itself, which 
through its unconditionally free act, infinitely limits itself, self-objectifies itself. Intellectual 
3 Ibid. p. 41. 
4 Ibid. p. 45. 
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Intuition is precisely this simultaneous act of necessity and freedom, in which self- 
consciousness intuits its own products. Intellectual intuition therefore, stands for a free, self- 
reverting productivity, by means of which self-consciousness attains full transparency of its 
own productivity. 
The action that is cause of all limitation, and can no longer be explained by any other, 
must be absolutely free. But absolute freedom is identical with absolute necessity. If we 
could imagine an action in God, for example, it would have to be absolutely free, but this 
absolute freedom would simultaneously be absolute necessity, since in God we can think 
of no law or action that does not spring from the inner necessity of His nature. Such an act 
is the original act of self-consciousness; absolutely free, since it is determined by nothing 
outside the self; absolutely necessary, since it proceeds from the inner necessity of the 
nature of the selL5 
Through this idea Schelling introduces multiplicity and internal differentiation or limitation in 
the absolute but does not annul the totality of the absolute. It is in the Freedom essay, where 
he dismisses the notion of an all-perfect, and all-powerful, supreme Being, that multiplicity - 
still duality in the Of Human Freedom - is not appropriated by an encompassing act, as that of 
Intellectual Intuition, but acquires its independent dimension. Here, finitude is not just a 
manifestation of the absolute but a manifestation of this dynamic multiplicity. This is 
probably the reason why Schelling transforms, from the Freedom essay onwards, the 
terminology of forces to that of wills and potencies. However, Intellectual Intuition is 
conceived in terms of productivity, and indeed between conflictual forces, and it is this aspect 
that allows Schelling's original approach to the notion of the self. In fact, Schelling, in the 
STI, elaborates the most fruitful dimension of Fichte's thought, i. e., the self as productivity, 
which, as we saw in chapter Three, for Fichte remained undeveloped in favour of his 
deductive enterprise. 6 
5 Ibid. p. 47. 
6 As we discussed in the third chapter, Fichte simply postulated the productive character of the self-positing ego 
but he did not further develop the productive process of self-consciousness. Productivity was rather exhausted by 
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Since the productivity of the original self-consciousness includes the infinity of all 
manifestations of reality, it can be understood as a genetic concept, out of which the notion of 
the self can also be generated. The understanding of the self's production as part of this 
original act is the difficult task of the philosopher. However, the latter can never fully grasp 
the infinity of actions contained in the absolute act. He can only grasp some distinctive 
actions which constitute "epochs" in the "history of self-consciousness". From this point of 
view, Schelling, already from the beginning of his work, presents the STI as the 
demonstration of thefundamental impossibility of the self's attainment of its complete self- 
transparency or comprehension of the cosmos, and thus of the impossibility of intellectual 
intuition itselL 
Since, therefore, there is an infinite conflict in self-consciousness, the one absolute act 
we start from contains - united and condensed - an infinity of actions whose total 
enumeration forms the content of an infinite task; (if it were ever to be completely 
accomplished, the whole structure of the objective world, and every determination of 
nature down to the infinitely small, would have to be revealed to us. ) So, philosophy can 
enumerate only those actions which constitute epochs, as it were, in the history of self- 
consciousness, and establish them in their relations with one another. 7 
If, however, intellectual intuition can not occur as an all-inclusive comprehension of the 
infinity of the actions of the absolute, nonetheless, it can irrupt as a moment in the self, since 
the latter is part of the absolute and partakes of its forces. This is the moment when the self by 
its own spontaneity attempts to come to itself, and thereby imitates, momentarily, the original 
act, precisely because it is part of it. As such, intellectual intuition constitutes the mainspring 
of the self's perennial productivity as its infinite, creative dimension. "Hence it is that at 
the ego's striving to deduce all the determinations of experience from its original act. The latter was carried 
through the introduction of external 'synthesising' concepts, rather than through the immanent dynamism of the 
productive process itself. Moreover, in Fichte's system the only active force is the self, while the not-self 
remains passive. Schelling, in this work, also seeks to deduce the whole of experience from the original act of 
absolute self-consciousness - and here is the point where the limits of the STI are to be found. However, this 
deduction is carried through the elaboration of the productivity of the two conflictual, active forces, Pertaining to 
both self and nature, allowing thus a more dynamic conceptualisation of the process of the self 
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every moment I can come to be for myself, exactly as I come originally to be for myself. "8 
However, during the exposition of the different "epochs" of the self's productivity, the term 
that accounts for the various phases of the productive process is not intellectual intuition, but 
productive intuition. We need to dwell for a while on this interesting distinction, which attests 
to Schelling's subtle account, in the STI, for the relation between the finitude of the self and 
yet its final ability to attain the absolute. The self is conceived in the same oppositional terms 
as the original act of self-consciousness, namely, in terms of the real and ideal activity. 
Productive intuition attempts to describe the unifying aspect of the double-natured activity, 
when the latter pertains to a finite self-consciousness. Productive intuition, as opposed to 
intellectual intuition - which is immediate transparency of one's own products and therefore 
would only apply to an absolutely self-born being - attempts to describe the various stages in 
the process of the constitution of the self by its own activity, which both produces and reverts 
upon itself and the world, thereby creating a developing field of fusion between the self and 
the world. Here, the boundaries between world and self dissolve and the roles of subject and 
object interchange and alternate: "I posit a region of consciousness where this separation does 
not exist and where inner and outer worlds are conceived as interfused". ' As such, productive 
intuition attempts to account for both the self s infinite dimension in its self-producing 
activity, and its finitude, so long as the self finds itself limited by external forces. The 
interaction between these forces creates the field of interfusion between the self and the 
world. The different 'epochs' of the self, in turn, are defined according to the relation of the 
self with this field. At this point, we would like to remark that although Schelling introduces 
the concept of productive intuition in the end of the first epoch, i. e. sensation, as the rise of 
intelligence, we consider it to be the term that describes the productive process of the self as a 
7 System of Transcendental Idealism, p. 50. 
8 Ibid. p. 48. 
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whole, and whose various configurations constitute the different modes of the self's 
constitution. Productive intuition is the ever-transforming process of both producing and self- 
intuiting that pertains to the self's productivity and characterises the self in all its activities. 
The notion of productive intuition stands for the spontaneity of the self's ongoing 
productivity. Hence, spontaneity is primordially associated with intuition andfeeling, which 
genetically creates, as will be seen later, the specific spontaneity of reflection, as an act of 
abstraction from the field of fusion. As far as the relation between productive intuition and 
intellectual intuition is concerned, we suggest that we interpret productive intuition as 
intellectual intuition in its imitation, by the philosopher or any finite subject that attempts to 
re-enact the original act of absolute freedom. By this we mean that the attempt of the re- 
enactment of any supposed act of absolute freedom, by any finite being, such as the human 
subject, will inevitably take the form of a finite act, which, however, as productive and 
spontaneously regenerated, has an infinite dimension. Schelling does not discuss this issue. 
He definitely suggests though, as we already saw, the partial or momentary character of the 
imitation of the original act, indicating the finite character of human subjectivity. This is more 
evident in Schelling's discussion of the various epochs of the self, that emerge precisely as 
different phases of the process of productive intuition. 
The various forms of the self's relatedness with the world and itself - which by Kant are 
mostly conceived as faculties of the subject, and by Fichte as being posited by the ego - are 
now presented as different modes or moments in the self's process of self-constitution, arising 
as dynamic balances out of the continuous conflict among the oppositional forces operating 
inside and outside the self. Accordingly, Sensation is a phase of the self's constitution in 
which the self, at this stage, feels affected and is unaware of its own activity. Here, the self 
Ibid. p. 74. 
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intuits the field of fusion as entirely objective or external, excluding its own activity. 
Sensation only arises when the self does not intuit its own productivity and considers itself to 
be entirely passive. The latter is, according to Schelling, the empiricist dead-end approach - 
which even Kant did not avoid -, because it fails to account for the self's ability to be 
affected at all. Schelling suggests that sensibility is also an active process, except that the self 
remains unaware of it. On this point, Schelling introduces his interesting concept of 
productive intuition, which stands for the generative potency of the self uniting both forces. in 
the stage of sensation though, the self is not aware of this fusion. The conflict between inner 
and outer forces is conceived as static " Since it is the outcome of opposing infinite 
activities, it will necessarily be finite. It is not the conflict of these activities conceived of as 
in motion; it is a static conflict. " 10. This is the case where the self isolates itself from its 
internal forces and its activity and in turn, conceives it as reified and alien to it. This 
polarisation between the self and the object gives rise to the emergence of the stage of 
reflection, in which productive intuition takes on the form of a Fichtean appropriation of the 
4common region of interfusion' back to the self, which is no longer simply self but seems to 
elevate itself to the level of self-consciousness. Reflection, for Schelling, arises when the self 
feels strongly restricted by external forces, or by those forces that it itself renders thus 
restraining. The self, being absorbed by its fixation to an object - which cannot be recalled 
from its own activity - feels, as Schelling puts it, "trapped in a present". 11 
The state of the self at the present juncture is thus briefly as follows. It feels itself driven 
back to a stage of consciousness to which it cannot, in fact, return. The common boundary 
of the self and the object, the ground of the second limitation, forms the boundary 
between the present stage and the past one. The feeling of being thus driven back to a 
stage that it cannot in reality return to is the feeling of the present. Thus at the first stage 
of its consciousness the self already finds itself trapped in a present. For it cannot oppose 
the object to itself without feeling itself restricted and committed, as it were, to a single 
10 Ibid. p. 5 1. 
" Ibid. p. 103. 
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point. This feeling is no other than that which we describe as self-awareness. All 
12 consciousness begins with it, and by it the self first posits itself over against the object. 
The self, experiencing the object as a constraining, threatening force, reacts through a radical 
release of its internal forces that seek to liberate it from the restraining trap and the enslaving 
present. Reflection then, springs forth as the outcome of an unbearably constraining 
experience, against which the self discovers its inner liberating forces. Reflection is another 
product of the conflictual interaction of forces, where the conflict becomes even more static 
and polarised. However, reflection is still a configuration of productive intuition. From this 
point of view, judgement power itself is a form of the self's productivity and its 
determinations with regard to the world are possible by virtue of the interaction between the 
common forces pertaining to the world and the self, no matter how polarised they are at this 
stage. Such polarisation may be the reason for Schelling's characterisation of the concepts as 
mere shadows of reality; yet these shadows are 'real', by dint of the assumption of the 
common productivity that pertains both to reality and to the human ability to represent its 
shadows and acts as an internal, primordial force springing from within the self and nature. 
The necessity of productive intuition, here systematically deduced from the entire 
system of the self, has got to be derived, as a general condition of knowing as such, 
directly from the concept thereof-, for if all knowing borrows its reality from an immediate 
cognition, it this alone that is to be met in intuition; whereas concepts, in fact, are merely 
shadows of reality, projected through a reproductive power, the understanding, which 
itself presupposes a higher power, having no original outside itself, and which produces 
13 from within itself by a primordial force. 
Will and self-determination in turn, are moments of further polarisation of the above conflict. 
Reflection, will and self-determination are conceived as static configurations of productive 
intuition, where the self experiences its self-reverting productivity in an exceptionally exalted 
12 Ibid. p. 103. 
13 Ibid. p. 73. 
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a dual activity of antithetical forces, and it is precisely the recognition of this immanent 
dualism that allows the possibility of a non-dichotomous separation or possessive 
identification between the self and its other. Thinking arises as a moment of this dual 
operation, as a specific mode of productive intuition and as such does not necessarily coincide 
with the awareness of the self's identity or with reflection in the sense the term had during the 
17 th century philosophical debate. If this is so, then who is the agent of thinking? It is 
Schelling's notion of personality, which is not exhausted by the concept of subject and yet is 
considered as active, that allows a fruitful engagement with the above question. This notion 
presupposes a different approach to the concept of the unconscious than that which we have 
so far come across in the STI, that is, an understanding that enriches its function beyond the 
level of the natural and concomitantly reconsiders the concept of nature itself, 
In the STI the unconscious seems to be restricted to the function of drives, impulses, instincts, 
i. e., to the role of an 'other' that works in opposition to the self's will and determination. 
Here, Schelling, despite his original conception of the unconscious, develops his conception 
of personality from the standpoint of a clear-cut separation between conscious and 
unconscious activities. The self is conceived as entirely absorbed by the unconscious, during 
the first epoch, whilst being entirely cut off from it in the second and third one, i. e. as 
reflection and will, until eventually the two activities find each other in the last epoch of 
artistic productivity. 
The intuition we have postulated is to bring together that which exists in separation in the 
appearance of freedom and in the intuition of the natural product; namely the identity of 
the conscious and the unconscious in the self, and this the consciousness of this identity. 
The product of this intuition will therefore merge on the one side upon the product of 
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nature, and on the other upon the product of freedom, and must unite in itself the 
characteristics of both 14 
By means of this idea, Schelling introduces the core element of his new conceptualisation of 
the notion of personality, namely, in terms of the conscious unification of unconscious and 
conscious activity pertaining to the self. Accordingly, freedom now is conceived as being 
attainable only through the self's conscious determination to welcome its 'other' and express 
creatively its desires, through the labour and discipline required by the work of art. Schelling 
will retain this insight in his later works but, as we shall see, he develops it in a dynamic way, 
leaving aside the simplified dichotomies or identities of this stage. For as we saw, Schelling 
keeps completely separate the unconscious and conscious aspect of the self until he discovers 
their absolute identity in the sphere of artistic creativity. In this way, Schelling assigns to the 
unconscious, almost exclusively, a natural and alien quality, whilst he deprives reflection of 
any creative dimension, rendering it barren and sterile. Accordingly, he ascribes to art an 
ideal, redemptive role, restricting artistic productivity - whose character is more paradoxical 
than the sheerly liberating one which is assumed in the STI - to the sphere of aesthetic 
production. Aesthetic production appears as the ultimate stage of productive intuition, in 
which the complete identity between the self and nature is attained. In this way, movement 
seems to halt in the work of art and aesthetic production is exalted as an act of absolute 
freedom. This position derives from Schelling's initial standpoint of the necessity and indeed 
the pre-existence of an absolute synthesis, which in the act of limitation manifests itself in the 
form of the work of art. 
The intelligence will therefore end with a complete recognition of the identity expressed 
in the product as an identity whose principle lies in the intelligence itself-, it will end, that 
is, in a complete intuiting of itself; ........ The intelligence will feel itself astonished and 
14 Ibid. p. 219. 
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blessed by this union, will regard it, that is in the light of a bounty freely granted by a 
higher nature, by whose aid the impossible has made possible. 
This unknown, however, whereby the objective and the conscious activities are here 
brought into unexpected harmony, is none other than that absolute which contains the 
common ground of the pre-established harmony between the conscious and the 
unconscious. 15 
The unconscious, or the unknown, eventually gets trapped by the work of art, which as such 
seems to reveal the mysteries of nature. Is this product, however, thus transparent? According 
to Schelling, the attainment of the absolute does not refer to a logical transparency but rather 
to the emotional state in which the self has a feeling of infinite harmony - with itself and the 
world - and thereby attains the deep emotion of absolute freedom. 
In this way we consider that the principle of identity radically restricts the dynamism of the 
process of the self's constitution, which completes its movement in the alleged attainment of 
absolute freedom of the work of art and the perfect harmony with nature. The research into 
the internal contradictions of the aesthetic productivity falls beyond the scope of the thesis; 
the former's strength - i. e. aesthetic productivity -, in our view, lies in its dynamic to reveal 
and sharpen the producer's contradictions and the paradoxes of the word, rather than 
resolving them. 
Moreover, if in the last epoch Schelling discovers the absolute identity between conscious 
and unconscious activities, in the previous epochs, these are conceived in a dichotomous 
mode. 
Hence, Schelling, in this work as a whole, seems to be describing the process of individuation 
for the modem self, - through the suppression of the unconscious and the celebration of pure 
logic, or the inversion of this through the deification of pure art - the consolidation of 
disciplinary specialisation and the dissociation of science from art, morality from pleasure, 
work from love. However, despite the partial validity of this approach, we still find that great 
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scientific conceptions have been nurtured by inspired and visionary messages from the 
unconscious, or that great works of art have been the product of long-lasting and arduous 
expression of the "logic of the longing", attesting to the inevitable interaction between 
conscious and unconscious activities, despite the demands of methodical and predictable 
organisation of the self's actions as a whole. 
We need then to turn our attention to the Freedom treatise and the Ages of the World, from 
which we can draw the more dynamic and flexible approach of Schelling's conception of 
personality and freedom. In these works, as we saw earlier, Schelling is freed from the 
necessity of the absolute synthesis of the conflictual. activities that permeate the cosmic 
becoming. In the Ages of the World, he shifts the emphasis to the exploration of the 
paradoxical movement of finite entities. As we saw, he conceives every entity as a nexus of 
interacting potencies that strive, in their different way, to express the entity's inner potential. 
We will not repeat the dynamic, non-teleological process that takes place towards the entity's 
struggle for self-expression. We focus now on these particular aspects of this process that 
allow us to draw the dynamic insights of Schelling's conceptualisation of personality, mainly 
through his reconsideration of the relation between the unconscious and the conscious, though 
now the terms are not mentioned with regard to man but with regard to the potencies of the 
cosmos. Hence, the following account for the notion of the self is not as such articulated by 
Schelling, but constitutes our reconstruction, according to our reading of the text in the 
previous chapter. The conclusions we drew from the concept of indifference will again be 
proved exceptionally fruitful for our research. 
15 Ibid. p. 221. 
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The forces pertaining to the self are now conceived in terms of wills or potencies, anticipating 
their relatively autonomous dimension. The first potency, the so-called being that stands for 
unconscious productivity, lies in active interaction with the second one, the so-called what-is, 
that stands for the self-reverting, self-recollecting, conscious activity. The contradictory and 
antagonising operation of these wills, as we saw, results in the various creative stages of 
expression, but also in the recurrent disquieting of the moments of fulfilment which never 
assumes a final or absolute status. This process, which also defines the constitution of one's 
personality, consists in a becoming of findings and losses, bliss and despair, satisfaction and 
anxiety, possessing and dispossessing. 
We need to look closer at the above process, especially with regard to Schelling's concept of 
indifference. The latter provided insight into the dimension of autonomy, of the self-moving, 
uncontrollable and unpredictable character of each will, which accordingly allows an 
understanding not only of mutual dependence but also of autonomy between the unconscious 
and the conscious activities, and yet the latter were apprehended in a non-dualistic way. A 
dualistic account of this conflict, as we saw, results either in a separation of the self from its 
products - in the stages of sensation, reflection and will - or to a complete identification of 
them in the aesthetic production. In contrast, we will try to develop an account of the 
conflictual interaction between the conscious and unconscious that allows both the self's 
surrender and distance from its productions, and more importantly, the acknowledgement of 
the anisotropic and a-symmetrical character of these activities. These may feed each other, but 
do not assume a supplementary role in the perspective of the attainment of complete harmony 
between themselves and thereby in the self and its relation to the world. 
In the context of this new approach, the products of the unconscious are not reduced simply to 
the natural level, i. e. instincts, drives and impulses, which, even in their conscious and 
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creative transformation by means of artistic activity, still assume a restrictive understanding 
of the role of the unconscious. This approach leads to the new illusory freedom attained by 
means of the alleged complete identity between the conscious and unconscious in the realm of 
artistic productivity, as Schelling suggests in the STI, absolutising thus the role of art, 
substituting the moral law with an equivalent aesthetic norm and reintroducing the delusion 
of appropriating the 'other', albeit through its projection to a 'third', namely the work of art. 
This approach then, does not lead us far beyond a Fichtean aestheticism. However, the 
unconscious, despite the constant efforts of the conscious, will always remain unconscious, 
i. e. unknown, enigmatic and unconquerable, an "irreducible remainder" in any form of 
expression. 
Yet this unknown would prove to be our best, our most loyal friend; for it will always remain 
free, our constant nourishing 'mother' and at the same time our most challenging, mocking, 
and cruel adversary. It will unwelcomely intrude into our fixed conceptions, it might attack 
with intolerable and incredible fantasies and dreams but it will also feed us with beautiful, 
liberating and pleasurable images and emotions. It may connect us with the immemorial past 
of the prehistory of the cosmos, it may bring us the voices of our forgotten ancestors, or it 
may reveal to us scenes of the future, moments of our undiscoverable potential life. It may 
disclose the most forbidden and shameful aspects of our self-constructed persona, but it may 
also reveal hidden beauties and gifts dwelling in our inscrutable self. Schelling explicitly 
states the relative autonomy of the two wills inside us. 
The conflicting wills are certainly not bound to each other. If in the expressible, the 
relation between the opposites is characterised by an inner necessity compelling them to 
be one (because both are equally necessary to the whole) then, in the expressing, the 
relation between the forces is characterised by an inner freedom not to be one, but rather 
for each to be for itself. Each of the wills is individual and self-sufficient, and each has the 
complete freedom to posit itself and to negate the other. But precisely because they are 
equally unconditioned, neither will can negate the other without being negated by it in 
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turn; and similarly the other way around: neither can posit itself without positing the 
other 16 . (my emphasis) 
Accordingly, the ego does not have the identity of itself before its eyes. What rather 
accompanies all our representations is our unconscious aspect. The two wills acting and 
constituting the self lie in a relation of both collaboration and autonomy, and this also seems 
to be the way they can be, if personality is conceived as a dynamic process. Conscious activity 
always has the right to try to give meaning, unity and order to its various perceptive, mental 
or emotional messages. Otherwise the self would be absorbed and surrendered, not only to its 
unconscious aspect, but moreover to the predominant social patterns of propriety and to 
concomitant moral and cultural norms. The unconscious, for its part, has its own life, since it 
does not only consist of forgotten, repressed or marginalised conscious contents. Instead, its 
life manifests an extraordinary richness and complexity which rarely reaches the threshold of 
consciousness - as the inexplicability of unexpected moods and unplanned desires attests to - 
in which case it rather takes the form of a riddle, of an oracle. 
Everything that is something without being it must by nature seek itself; but this is not to 
say that it will find itself, and still less that a movement or going out from itself takes 
place. This is a seeking that remains silent and completely unconscious, in which the 
essence remains alone within itself, and is all the more profound, deep, and unconscious, 
the greater the fullness it contains in itself. 17 
The unconscious operates in a much more disorderly and erratic way than does 
consciousness, incessantly producing contents that even when they do not reach 
consciousness, inform it , providing its concepts with tones, colours, hues and shades that 
enrich or destabilise their assumed fixed meaning. The unconscious surrounds and sustains 
the conscious, nurturing it with its rich material upon which consciousness may creatively 
16 Schel ling F. W. J., Ages of the World, p. 172. 
17 Ibid. p. 137. 
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work, cultivating and embellishing, challenging and subverting its - usually rigid - contents, 
unsettling the comfortableness of its laziness and inertia. But "neither will can negate the 
other without being negating it in tUM.,, 18 In other words, neither the unconscious nor the 
conscious can try to acquire full domination upon one's personality. For, if the conscious 
dismisses, neglects, suppresses and tries to dominate the unconscious, this, in turn, will 
negate it. It will return, shattering one's artificial identity, ridiculing and disclosing the empty 
and delusory freedom proclaimed by it. In this case, consciousness may seek shelter by further 
consolidation of this identity through the vain pursuit of social status, power, and the fearful 
locking-up of its 'threatening' other. Accordingly, consciousness can not be entirely 
surrendered to the unconscious. For in this way, individuality and uniqueness is dissolved into 
an undifferentiated permanent state, which, so long as the self is unable to detach itself from 
it and realise its uniqueness, can also take the form of an external collective consciousness, 
such as blind commitment to religious or political doctrines or uncritical conformity to social 
and cultural norms and fashionable 'ideologies'. The process of personality and individuation 
seems to follow the difficult and challenging path of the interactive struggle between the 
conscious and the unconscious and indeed through the self s conscious willingness to take 
and to allow itself to take this path. Consciousness should allow its loss in the unknown 
depths of the self. In this unexplored area it may discover, with surprise and horror but also 
with unprecedented delight and relief, not only forbidden desires and suppressed instincts but 
also ideas, thoughts, stories and myths, images and sounds that can effect a fascinating 
expansion of its horizons, its knowledge, its new wisdom, its taste and its judgement. For the 
unconscious does not only consist of chaotic and unruly contents, as appears from the 
standpoint of modem identity. The unconscious has its own judgement and memory, as long 
18 Here, the term negation has not the Hegelian meaning of determination, but rather the literal sense of the word, 
namely, denial, rejection or, since it refers to potencies, to the power to annul or annihilate another power. 
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as it also discriminates, selects, remembers and judges, and it performs these with a surprising 
wisdom. For it seems that it lives more intensely in the rhythm of the cosmic becoming, and 
lies connected with immemorial times. It is the unconscious that witnessed and remembers 
the experiences of our ancestors and the mysteries of life in its perennial births, deaths and 
rebirths; being woven by the unique thread of our own unrepeatable individuality blended 
with the history and pre-history of the cosmos, recounting thus the ages of the world. 
Man must be granted an essence outside and above the world; for how could he 
alone, of all creatures, retrace the long path of developments from the present back into 
the deepest night of the past, how could he alone rise up to the beginning of things unless 
there were in him an essence from the beginning of all times? Drawn from the sources of 
things and akin to it, what is essential of the soul has a co-science/ con-sciousness (Mitt- 
Wissenschaft) of creation ....... Because this essence holds time enveloped, it serves as a 
link that enables man to make an immediate connection with the most ancient past as well 
with the most distant future. Man often sees himself transposed into such wonderful 
relations and inner connections through precisely this innermost essence, such as when he 
encounters a moment in the present as one long past, or a distant event as if he himself 
were witness to it! Accordingly, the unfathomable, prehistoric age rests in this 
essence; ... But this archetypal image of things slumbers within 
it - not, indeed, as an 
extinguished and forgotten image, but rather as an image growing with its own essence 
that it cannot take out of itself and call upon. This image would certainly never awake 
again, if a presentiment (Ahndung) of and longing for knowledge did not lie in that 
unknowing itself. 19 
The unconscious is mostly conceived as the immanent longing, rising from the depths of the 
self for the expression of the latter's inner life, providing the self with an incomparable 
strength and a different type of security. This is not the fragile security of the constant 
identity, but that which the self discovers through the liberation of its unacknowledged 
potential, the welcoming of its 'other', the recognition of its genuine autonomy and the relief 
because of this, the courage to face it and interact with it. Schelling then invites us to an open 
confrontation with our 'other', and yet he reminds us that this is not mostly 'ours', as long as 
we tend to consider the products of our consciousness and will as our properties. Human soul 
19 Ages of the World, p. 114. 
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, as a part of the world, participates 
in its enigma, and thereby not only the individual, but also 
a historical consciousness, could never assimilate it by means of its transparent recollection. 
Hegel also suggested - mainly in his major work the Phenomenology of Spirit (1807) - the 
conceptualisation of the self in terms of its self-constitution, of its Bildung, by means of its 
successive formative experiences. However, in Hegel the experience always takes the form of 
frustration, apparently not because Hegel was unaware of other emotions, but because the self 
always assumes an initial self-positing self-certainty. To be sure, Hegel mainly attempts to 
provide a phenomenology of the formation of modern identity, which is thus characterised by 
the inevitable, continuous collapses of the roles that it assumes at every stage, as well as by 
the illusory certainty that it can appropriate the 'other' and make the circumstances conform 
to its own positings. However, Hegel expounds his project from the standpoint of self- 
consciousness, and, moreover, a self-consciousness that proves able to gradually educate 
itself through its continuous struggle for recognition. This seems to be the highest form - as 
the most spiritual manifestation - of desire. The battle takes place mostly among conflictual 
self-consciousnesses, whose contradictions necessitate the overcoming of the narrow, 
individual level and the restoration of the social and historical arena, as the proper field for 
the unfolding of the recurrent contradictions. In this way, Hegel presents self-consciousness 
only from the perspective of its perennial intention to assimilate the 'other', to establish its - 
indubitably sophisticated and highly cultivated - identity, in a context where historical 
retrospective self-consciousness could successfully recollect its experiences and write the 
history of the world. 
Instead, for Schelling, the field of the contradictions consists in the unsolvable paradoxes 
permeating man and the world, coming from the 'prehistoric ages' and heralding a coming 
future. Schelling suggests a dual, conflictual positing, i. e. conscious and unconscious wills, 
and moreover, the recognition of their free and relatively autonomous activity. Accordingly, 
213 
the confrontation with the 'other', inside and outside the self, may lead not only to frustration, 
since the self s standpoint was not exclusively the confirmation of its initial identity, but also 
to fascination, pleasure and hope, precisely by virtue of discovering something beyond, 
different from itself that reveals the richness of the world. Thus, the world and its history 
appear not only in the language of our conceptual reconstructions and classifications, but also 
in the oracular language of the unconscious, as it presents itself in nebulous dreams, elusive 
fantasies, morbid symptoms, unheard voices, speaking images, puzzling symbols, 
incomprehensible and yet full of meaning logogriphs, in the ineffable movements of our 
bodies and the betraying colours of our emotions. All these languages seem to express a new 
type of Bildung, as manifestation of the enigmatic wisdom infusing the cosmic becoming. 
This wisdom transpires from chaos and order, darkness and light, destruction and creation, 
cruelty and love, sense and spirit, words and silence. It occupies a unique place in all ancient 
mythologies and religions, represented in the most versatile and contradictory divine female 
figures, the most ancient goddess Sophia, mother and mistress of Logos, now sensuous and 
seductive, now spiritual and protective, shiny, warniing, transparent, veiled, blackened or 
reddened, inaccessible, tender and cruel, virgin and muse, receptive and giving, destructive 
and creative. 
Reason reflecting on its origin, can arise in an enriched form. No longer drained and rigid, but 
imbued with the moisture of wisdom, it may acquire new plasticity and an imaginative 
dimension. Logos accepts that is not the exclusive creator of the world, since inside it, before 
it uttered the word, Sophia was dwelling silently and meaningfully. 
Schelling is the only philosopher of the modem era, who mentions this interesting relation 
between Logos and Sophia, bringing back to philosophy the expelled goddess, mainly 
associated with unknown, dark, pre-cosmic forces, but also with generative, colourful, 
illuminating ones, mother and lover of Logos. 
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The peoples of the Orient have clearly recognised a playful pleasure at the beginning of 
the life of God, which they have eloquently termed Wisdom; it is an unblemished mirror 
of divine force and (due to passive qualities) an image of his benevolence. With 
astonishing precision, they everywhere ascribed of a passive than active nature to this 
essence. For this reason, they did not call it, ( as we have been doing, the ) spirit; nor did 
they call it ( the ) Word (or the Logos), although wisdom was often ( incorrectly ) 
confused with this term. Rather they ascribed a feminine name to it to suggest that this 
essence is only passive and receptive, in contrast to the higher essence. 
Language in a book that is rightly considered divine drifts over us like a fresh morning 
breeze from the holy dawn of the world, language that introduces Wisdom in speech. "The 
Lord possessed me in the beginning of his way, before he did anything. I was set up from 
eternity, from the beginning, or ever the earth was. When there were no depths, I was 
brought forth; when there were no fountains abounding water. Before the mountains were 
settled, before the hills am I brought forth. When he prepared the heavens above, I was 
there: when he set a compass upon the face of the depth; when he appointed the 
foundations (Grund) of the earth, then I was by him, ( as one brought up with him): and I 
was daily his pleasure, playing always (by) him. " 
With these words, Wisdom is sharply distinguished from the Lord. The Lord possessed 
Wisdom, but she was not herself the Lord. She was with him before the beginning, before 
he did anything ...... 
Wisdom was by the Lord. But who is the Lord? Indisputably he is that will which rests 
within being and what-is, the will through which alone being can actually be being and 
what-is can actually be what-is .... he is the expressing of all essence. 
20 
Here, Schelling has discovered the imaginatively creative Logos, but not yet the active 
Sophia, even though, from the Freedom essay, he emphasised the will-of-depths as the 
"sublime mother of the understanding". It is in the Deities of Samothace that he will fully 
appreciate the discoveries of his own thought, discovering also the proper gods who can 
accommodate them. 
But did Schelling, at this stage, want Dionysus back? 
Dionysus is always present and yet absent. This is his nature. He suddenly appears with 
tumult and terror, shaking all present regularity, but disappears even more unexpectedly, 
perhaps, precisely when we need him the most, and sinks into his original place, the moist 
20 Ibid. p. 163,164 . 
215 
element, the Styx Lake 21 , or to the deep of the flowing rivers and the springing fountains, 
where fairies, elves and sorcerers dwell. This is the location where our dreams, desires, 
longings, our images of past and future and our dances in the festivity of time lie. Dionysus 
does not compel us, does not force us. He only sets his chorus, his thiasos to play the aulos, 
the forbidden musical instrument from Plato's Republic, and Aristotle's Politics, and he 
offers us his tastes, his smells and his rhythms. Thus he seduces us to his manic dance, in the 
moist element, in his magic liquid that paradoxically, though water-like, rekindles fire, and he 
drives us back to our dark and unknown self, only to strengthen us in order to make us able to 
face it, to experience it, through his weapons: myrth, wine, ivy and aulos. For, the 
confrontation with our unconscious, the liquidation of our artificial persona, the dissolution 
of rigid conceptual schemata is not a conceptual enterprise that only requires the strenuous 
effort of a highly activated intelligence, but can rather be attained through the transformation 
of our thymos. This is the main gift of Dionysus; the provision of a liberating courage , the 
imagination of the soul and thymos, which apart from character also means anger. 
Hence, if the biblical God, with his "let there be lighf', inaugurates the decisive separation of 
darkness and light, of unconscious and conscious, Dionysus overthrows this regime, smashes 
the new order, and blurs the boundaries, intermingling the two worlds. This is where 
Schelling, in his own philosophical way, attempts to transpose us. Thus he induces us to 
discover our gods, inside and outside us. 
But do we ever return from the manic dance? Does Schelling want us back from Dionysus? 
From what we have seen so far, it seems that the crucial issue, if personality is to be a 
dynamic process, is the maintaining of the conflict between the conscious and unconscious, 
21 Styx is the name for a river-lake and goddess of Greek mythology, that nine times encircles and confines the 
Underworld. It is by the same lake that Persephone was playing with Okeanides - nymphs of the deep sea - and 
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the enduring interfusion of the two worlds. In fact, out of this conflict a 'third' always arises. 
The conscious always attempt to appropriate this 'third', to normalise it, to round it. This is 
the deeper meaning of the identity of the self - indeed a duty to identity - in Kant, of the 
'synthesis' of the original ego in Fichte. The unconscious, for its part, will also try to engulf it 
in its depths. However, the 'third' is much more intractable and elusive: child of the 
conscious and the unconscious, by virtue of its double nature, it stands untameable and 
contradictory, in the midst of its contenders: Logic, Will, Nature, Morality, God, Society, 
History, Abyss 
What is the fate of this 'third'? What is going to express it? Who is going to possess it? 
Schelling seems to be reluctant to give it away to any of its beloved claimants. He rather 
suggests that we externalise and transform the conflict into creative deeds, which rather than 
resolving the conflict, enable its creative and challenging development. Our participation in 
the Dionysian dance is precisely the preparation we need for the intensification of our creative 
dimension. During this experience we are taught the art of surrender and resistance, we 
experience the liberation from all old bonds, we discover, to our surprise, immense hidden 
energy being locked by our inert soul and body. For the Dionysian mania transmits a new 
type of sophrosyne - Sophia's daughter? - to those who welcome it, whilst a ferocious 
punishment for those who refuse it. 
22 
Being thus transformed, we do not remain for ever surrendered to the manic dissolution, but 
we feel the inexorable need to channel our new energy into action and creative deeds. This is 
the expanded meaning of artistic productivity, which does not pertain only to a genius or to a 
gifted artist, but to whoever allows himself to discover and express his creative dimension 
through his various activities. This is, in turn, the sphere where freedom lies, namely in the 
suddenly was abducted and carried off by Hades, once she caught the radiant flower narcissus. 22 This was, for example the fate of Pentheas, see. Ovid's Metamorphoses, book III 
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process of creative, extrovert expression of the perennial conflict inside our soul, which lets 
itself be exposed to, listens to, and is fascinated by the paradoxes of the world. In this process 
we discover our limitations and the limits of these limitations themselves. We experience our 
violence and selfishness, harmony and generosity, the freedom to effect good and evil. The 
latter seems to be the inevitable manifestations of each entity's activation of its various 
potencies in the struggle for its self-expression, the conditions of its very movement. Good 
and evil are but the transient fonns of the relation between the self and its other, in its 
movement, now in tune, now clashing, now in mutual support, now in ruthless destruction. 
Good and evil are the moral connotations for the inevitable configurations recurring in the 
dynamic interaction among entities, since the latter are finite and none of them can assume an 
absolute status - which would imply that becoming itself would be arrested by its, i. e. the 
absolute entity's, utter predominance. In this context Schelling announces freedom as 
essentially consisting in our ability to do both good and evil, that is, to incessantly activate 
our contradictory potencies, as opposed to a static clinging to an abstract rule of action. From 
this point of view, man can never - and indeed should not - be beyond good and evil. It seems 
that it is again the freedom of creative productivity that can disentangle the self from the 
stifling web of moral labels and duties. For, this kind of freedom - to be sure contradictory, 
but for this reason substantial - does not prioritise the need for, and thus decreasing the 
dependence from, social recognition, since satisfaction or frustration springs mainly from the 
product itself. The latter though, rather than effecting the feeling of complete harmony in the 
producer, has demanding criteria of judgement, so long as it condenses the outcomes of a 
deeper conflict and carries with it the history of many battles, confrontations, hopes and 
anxieties. It crystallises, in a unique and more critical way, the producer's complex 
connections with society, nature, religions, cultures and indeed in their historical dimension. 
From this point of view, it constitutes a much more challenging and respectful judge than that 
218 
of current social and cultural norms. It therefore demands a critical distance of the producer, a 
temporal withdrawal from the buzz of current critics and admirers, in order to achieve 
stronger and deeper bonds with the world itself and its history. Solitude seems to be 
necessary, in order for the creator to be able to rethink and rediscover old and new forms of 
social bonds, which in turn will again prove to be both liberating and constraining, setting the 
scene for new ruptures, breaks and transformations. 
The 'third' then, the child of the conscious-unconscious battle, seems to transitively dwell in 
the products of desire (maast), thought (mysti) and memory (maadijan), namely in the evasive 
process of myth-making, as the previous semantic elements are but the Sanskrit roots of the 
word ptýoq, myth. This is where Schelling eventually invites us, and this is the way he finds 
more adequate for accommodating the paradoxes of the world and his elusive thought. 
Schelling already stressed the significance of mythology in the STI, as the medium which 
brought all the individual streams of knowledge into the "universal ocean of poetry", before 
the radical breach between science and poetry, philosophy and art. The need of the restoration 
of this breach inaugurates the possibility for the rise of a new mythology: a task, though, 
which belongs to a future historical era. 
Philosophy was born and nourished by poetry in the infancy of knowledge, and with it 
all those sciences it has guided toward perfection; we may thus expect them, on 
completion, to flow back like so many individual streams into the universal ocean of 
poetry from which they took their source. Nor is it in general difficult to say that the 
medium for this return of science to poetry will be; for in mythology such a medium 
existed, before the occurrence of a breach now seemingly beyond repair. But how a new 
mythology is itself to arise, which shall be the creation, not of some individual author, but 
of a new race personifying, as it were, one single poet- that is a problem whose solution 
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can be looked for only in the future destinies of the world, and in the course of history to 
come. 23 
Although Schelling did not further develop this insightful idea, we can extract some of the 
features of his conception of a new mythology from the last sections of the STI. We suggest 
that Schelling's generic and elementary forethoughts on the notion of a new mythology inhere 
in his brief account on the character of the work of art and the relation between art and 
philosophy. As we saw, Schelling introduced the insightful notion of productive intuition, 
through which conscious and unconscious activity, producing and thinking are considered as 
parts of the same unifying productivity. However, in the STI, productive intuition appears as a 
split activity in the stages of sensation, reflection and will, whilst it recovers its unity only in 
the aesthetic production. In the latter, according to Schelling, for the first time the unity of 
conscious and unconscious activities is manifested. Art, as opposed to philosophy, realises 
the expression of the unconscious in acting and producing. 
... it is self-evident that art is at once the only true and eternal organ and document of 
philosophy, which ever and again continues to speak to us of what philosophy cannot 
depict in external form, namely the unconscious element in acting and producing, and its 
original identity with the conscious. 24 
Despite our objections regarding the exclusivity ascribed to art - as the only sphere of 
expressing the unconscious and moreover, as that in which the absolute identity between the 
conscious and unconscious is attainable -, the first feature that can be drawn from this 
position with regard to the conception of the new mythology, is that this indicates a form of 
expression that allows the unconscious to 'speak' - in its own language - through action and 
creative production. But why is this identity - effected by the work of art in the STI -, so 
important? 
23 System of Transcendental Idealism, p. 232,233. 
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Art is paramount to the philosopher, precisely because it opens to him, as it were, the holy 
of the holies, where bums in eternal and original unity, as if in a single flame, that which in 
nature and history is rent asunder, and in life and action, no less than in thought, must 25 forever fly apart 
Art's unique significance derives from its power to reveal the sacred in the world, and from 
this point of view, art itself is a form of mythology. In turn, the new mythology seems to 
emerge from the various forms of the sacred revealed by artistic production. The sacred, 
though, in the STI is the all-inclusive, absolute act of original self-consciousness, the 'holy of 
the holies', in whose revelation all movement stops. 
If this point in production is reached, the production must absolutely stop, and it must be 
impossible for the producer to go on producing; for the condition of all producing is 
precisely the opposition between conscious and unconscious activity; but here they have 
absolutely to coincide, and thus within the intelligence all conflict has to be eliminated, all 
contradiction reconciled. 26 
The revelation of the absolute in the work of art restores the absolute identity between man 
and the world, and therefore renders the riddle of the cosmos transparent. 
what we speak of as nature is a poem lying pent in a mysterious and wonderful script. 
Yet the riddle could reveal itself, were we to recognise in it the odyssey of the spirit, 
which, marvellously deluded, seeks itself, and in seeking flies from itself, for through the 
world of the sense there glimmers, as if through words the meaning, as if through 
dissolving mists the land of fantasy, of which we are in search. Each splendid painting 
owes, as it were, its genesis to a removal of the invisible barrier dividing the real from the 
ideal world, and is no more than the gateway, through which come forth completely the 
shapes and scenes of that world of fantasy which gleams but imperfectly through the 27 
real . 
The announcement of the new mythology, just a year before the Identity System, could not 
possibly have other features than the promise of the ultimate revelation of the absolute. 
24 Ibid. p23 1. 
25 Ibid. p23 1. 
26 Ibid. p221. 
27 Ibid. p232. 
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However, even in this fonn, Schelling broaches the powerful idea of the possibility of the 
rediscovery of the "holy" in this world through our creative productivity. This insight acquires 
its dynamism only when Schelling dismisses the concept of "the holy of the holies" and 
instead discovers the sacred as multiple, transmutable, disclosable and elusive, shiny and 
obscure, eternal and mortal, emerging and vanishing from all forms of life and becoming. 
This shift started from the Freedom treatise and signalled a new phase in Schelling's thought, 
which develops through its ongoing transformation in the Ages of the World up to the Deities 
of Samothrace. It is this last work that, in our view, may better accommodate Schelling's 
radical vision of the possibility of the rise of a new mythology. 
The Deities of Samothrace is never mentioned as an important philosophical work in 
Schelling's intellectual history. At most, it is presented as a supplement to the Ages of the 
World, reducing its ideas to the former' S28. Instead, we find in it Schelling's most fascinating 
philosophical messages, which provide his previous philosophical investigations with new 
dimensions and perspective. In the Freedom treatise, Schelling discovered the evil in God and 
the intractable longing - the unruly of the depths - which nurtures all life, becoming and 
28 See Robert Brown's philosophical interpretation of the Deities of Samothrace, (Schelling's Treatise on The 
Dieties of Samothrace, Scholar Press, 1977). In this commentary, Brown analyses the significance of the deities 
of Samothrace by reducing them analytically to the corresponding potencies which are expounded in the Ages of 
the World. In this way, Brown misses the multi-dimensioned significance of each deity, since each potency in the 
AW, describes in an abstract and conceptual level the various moments of the cosmic movement. Brown, though, 
states that in the DS there is a shift from mere "structures of thought' 'to the actuality of beings, ascribing to 
Schelling a shift from the realm of pure thought to the realm of ontology. This is argued on the basis of 
Schelling's transposition from the "highest reality of thoughf' to that of the will, which started already midway in 
the AW. However, as we saw, Schelling even from the STI never conceived the "highest reality" in terms of 
mere thought, but in terms of the absolute productivity, which anticipates his later concept of will. The shift, that 
we also argue for, from the potencies to gods, does not mean that Schelling now values more reality in its 
ontological independence from thought, but that this reality cannot be revealed and exhausted precisely by 
human productivity - viz. his early Fichtean aestheticism - since its theurgic movement exceeds man's productive 
powers and can be only partially experienced by them. Brown, by exhausting the deities of Samothrace as the 
three potencies of the AW, essentially annuls the shift that he states. As will be seen in the following chapter, our 
interpretation of the DS attempts to show that the transformation of potencies into gods does not consist in the 
transformation of concepts into wills, for the potencies were already conceived as wills. The shift brings about 
the logogrific apprehension of gods as wills, which thus does not present the structural pattern of the three 
potencies. The latter, no matter how dynamic and transmutable is, still conceives every entity as being 
characterised by the same potencies; instead, in the context of the cosmic theurgy, there is no structural 
correspondence between human and divine potencies, nor definite enumeration of them; 
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creativity. In the Ages of the World, he discovered the silent and plastic Sophia, dwelling in 
this dark longing, endowing it with order and chaos, harshness and mildness, indifference and 
commitment. The Deities of Samothrace, would appear to be generated, as if Schelling 
himself reflects - with love - upon his own longing to savour the paradoxes of the cosmos and 
articulates in a logogrific form his new discoveries. 
As logogrific, this form does not attempt to posit its own absolute, even in the cunning form 
of the declaration of the absolute's death. It does not proclaim that it is the highest medium 
that explains the world. This form rather, prefers to mock any claims on absolute transparency 
and provides us with old and new riddles, showing thus the paths that reconnect the various 
streams of knowledge. 
in this phase of Schelling's intellectual development, cosmic becoming is not condensed in 
the destiny of the self-enveloped, primordial, absolute synthesis, but appears as the 
multifarious and unpredictable movement of cosmic theurgy. The "odyssey of spirif 'has no 
return point, not because spirit cannot manage to break the barriers between the real and ideal 
world or never breaks through the mist of the senses. In this work, spirit appears and 
vanishes, multicoloured and obscure, liberating and compelling, all-present and invisible, in 
the very visible process of life itself, in the riddle of its self-procreation, destruction and 
regeneration. It is not bizarre then for Schelling to be attracted by the paradoxical deities of 
Samotharce - the enigmatic Cabeiri - whose mysteries were dedicated to the mystery of life, 
in its multiple transformations and the magic inherent in them. What Schelling has 
conceptually grasped as indifference in the Ages of the World, now becomes a real power; the 
power of procreation and life, which springs from the borderline of the subjective and the 
objective, as the moment of their indifference, which may reveal and express longing's inner 
contra ictions ut may also not express them. "The unconditioned can express itself as what- 
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is and as being, and it can refrain from expressing itself as both; in other words, it can be 
both, or it can let both alone. Free will is just this ability to be something along with the 
ability to not-be-ir'29 . But the life of the cosmos, as the movement of self-generative, 
procreative and destructive powers is elusively depicted as the life of known and unknown 
gods. This is why the deities of Samothrace, whose nature is still concealed in darkness, can 
accommodate Schelling's thought. For the image of the cosmos they evoke is not the 
transparent revelation of the mythology of Phanes, a mythology of original and ultimate 
order, but the image of a logogrif, which anticipates a mythology of both order and chaos. 
The unity of this image does not reveal an absolute, original, all-inclusive act, but the "magic 
of insoluble life", in its multiplicity, orderly and unruly movement, expressing man's direct 
encounter not only with the forces of order but also with the forces of chaos. The logogrific 
expression of this magic, in turn, cannot result merely from a profound thought process - as a 
more complex conceptual representation - but from a more holistic experience which 
stimulates all living forces in man's being and allows him not only to seize but also to be 
seized by the cosmic powers. Hence, logogrif becomes a form of life, an intense experience of 
battle or play with the riddles of the world, a real force in the field of fusion between man and 
the cosmos which provides new dimensions in the world, rendering it, as ever, accessible and 
inaccessible, familiar and enigmatic. 
We can now see Schelling's philosophical insights from his engagement with the messages of 
this "mysterious polytheisrW'. In the STI Schelling stated that in order to capture some 
distinctive 'epochs' of the history of self-consciousness, one - the philosopher - should 
perform an act of imitation of the original absolute synthesis. In fact, by this, Schelling makes 
a mythological claim, since the suggested imitation essentially constitutes an attempt at re- 
29 Ages of the, World, p. 13 1. 
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enacting the origins of the cosmos. The act of imitation is a modern ritual, to be performed by 
the philosopher. In the Deities of Samothrace, Schelling - in a way - imitates not the original, 
absolute synthesis, but the elusive drama of the Cabeiri, and thus his creative reconstruction 
offers us the new 'epochs'of his paradoxical cosmogony. 
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Chapter 7 
The Deities of Samothrace: Towards Schelling's Aoyoypt(ptKq 
Samothrace is the name for the visible part of a conic, shaky, volcanic mountain top, always 
being, mysteriously, surrounded by a cloud ring, that rises above the wavy and windy waters 
of the northern part of the Aegean Sea. 
The island as a whole consists in a continuous, inaccessibly forested mountain chain which 
gets abruptly broken by vertical cliffs, dark chasms- whose sight disappears into the depths of 
the subterranean volcanic rock-, powerful waterfalls and innumerable springs, namely an 
elusive continuity of sudden breaks, in such a way as if the island by its very compelling 
presence speaks out the disrupted unity among chthonic, earthly and heavenly realms, life, 
death and rebirth, in pace with the cyclical flow of waterfalls and springs, and the alternating 
rhythms of the volcanic convulsions and the restful breath of the cloud ring. It has been 
surmised by historians that the island has been populated in the first instance by people 
venturing out-to sea, far sailing foreigners- most probably Pelasgians or Phoenicians- who 
along with " incense, purple dye and ivory there also transplanted their gods and 
sanc uaries. 911 
Samothrace then, has had a reputation since antiquity for its Cabeiri mysteries, which are 
considered to be the most ancient and important mysteries of ancient times, as equally or even 
more honoured as the Eleusinian. This is why Samothrace is characterised as X(j)p(x ýOvj, 
namely sacred land, hostess of wondrous orgies of gods, unnameable to mortals, as the 
Orphic hymn informs us 
226 
Z(Xoq lagoopa", 
EVOCC Mt OPYLCC (PptKTCC OF, (J)V 
(xppil, r(x OpoTotcnv. ( Orphica Argonautica 468) 
This is the place and time-the indeterminate transitive period between magic and Greek 
Spirit, post-'barbarian' and pre-hellenic- that Schelling chooses as accommodation for his 
philosophical thought. The Ages of the World seem to be seized by this magnetic land and 
need to stop here, to listen and recount its story. 
The significance of the Cabeiri deities still lies in darkness and the beliefs, practices and 
events surrounding their cult are characterised by particular mystery and obscurity. Their 
names and numbers remain indeterminate, as does the meaning and the role of each 
individual deity. It seems though that this obscurity does not only derive from their 
remoteness in the night of time or the limits of historiological research, but mostly from their 
very nature, which appears as flexible, transmutable and mainly theurgic, namely creative and 
generative of new, higher or lower deities. It is mainly from the standpoint of their theurgic 
dimension that we hazard to explore the messages of this "mysterious polytheismý'. 
As far as the origins of the Cabeiri is concerned, there have been a plethora of surmises and 
suggestions from the various fields of mythology, history, philology and etymology, whose 
details are not our concern, since this very multiplicity of suggestions -indeed supplementary 
ones- only betrays their manifold nature. Hence we find them as Uranus' children- Titans' 
brothers-or ancient demons of the volcanoes of the Thracian Sea, giants or dwarfs, 
Koryvantes from Phrygia, as sons of Zeus and Electra or sons of Prometheus, almighty or 
lower deities. The most predominant surmise though, that Schelling also seems to prefer, is 
that the Cabeiri originate from Hephaestos, the divine smith whom Hera expelled from 
1 Schelling's Treatise on the Deities of Samothrace, p. 17. 
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Olympus due to his natural deficiency, who, though lame in both legs, is the only god who 
knows the secrets of motion, possibly because of his extraordinary knowledge of fire, the 
unique gift, on which even Zeus confesses to be dependent. The Cabeiri, as 
Hephaestos'offspring, children of fire and the art of fabrication, are also mentioned as 
icatovre;, namely burning and 7wpoTevaq, i. e. fire-generic, rising from the earth's bowels 
and transfusing their fire-like energy to their invokers; their sudden epiphany has also been 
registered as exceptionally paradoxical, more obscure than shiny, extremely helpful or 
ruthlessly paralysing, in any case effecting a spectacular transformation to anyone who 
discovered them. 
However, the most distinctive feature of the Cabeiri, as already mentioned, is their theurgic 
nature. Schelling repeatedly stresses this element: "One could say of them that they are not so 
much divine as they are god-producing, theurgic natures, and the whole chain presents itself 
,, 2 more and more as theurgic. 
How then could we understand the movement of the Cabeiri as theurgic but also as chain ? 
It seems that their movement transpires again the unity of cosmos, what has been 
philosophically and theologically registered as oneness, and yet the latter conceived not as an 
external supernatural and mystical divinity - as is the case with monotheistic or even 
polytheistic traditions, which cut off the divine from the natural and reduce it to a noble, 
universal substance - but as the miraculous unity which springs from every act of creation, 
life and birth, and infuses the cosmic becoming throughout. Creation then, does not refer to 
one original act performed once, in the beginning of time, by an external Demiurge and 
moreover not to the imposition of order on primordial chaos. Creation is the ever recurrent act 
in all processes of life, movement, birth, growth and procreation, and as such inextricably 
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linked to death, decay and degeneration. Creation comes as the outcome of the resolution of 
the highest contradiction and the living confirmation and expression of it. It comes as the 
externalisation of the highest conflict between the cosmic potencies, the will that negates 
expression and leads to contraction and the will that strives for fulfilment and expansion. 
Schelling already wrote in the Ages of the World 
One and the same will is activated as the will that wills nothing and is also activated as the 
will that wills something (life and actuality). Because the highest contradiction is 
necessarily also the highest movement of life, it can thus be seen here and from the outset 
that an absolute decision is demanded ....... How is a decision possible here? Perhaps 
someone might say that one of the wills is by nature subservient to the other, in which 
case it would necessarily be overcome by the other will, and this other be the victor. But 
this presupposition is false. 3 
This would be the case of the creation of order by a victorious benevolent creator, triumphing 
over nature. However, "both wills are by nature equally important, each has the same right to 
be active, and it is necessarily true that neither retreats before the other', 4 
How then is a decision possible here? According to Schelling, the decision comes through the 
simultaneous activity of both wills in full intensity, where contradiction reaches its peak and 
as such encapsulates the highest tension. Out of this moment of highest energy, creation 
bursts forth as an act of highest love. This is not an act of planned decision, nor the outcome 
of a wilful agent, but, simply and miraculously, it is the mystery of life itself, in its infinite 
manifestations. For, according to Schelling, the very existence of cosmic becoming is itself a 
perennial and recurrent act of love. 5 Love does not generate only the products of order, good 
or beauty, but is the very process of life and becoming, the magic of perennial creativity in 
the cosmos, in its paradoxical continuity, breaks, destructions and rebirths. It is this 
2 op. cit., p. 24. 
3 Ages of the World, p. 169. 
4 op. cit. p. 172,173. 
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procreative love and the magic involved in it that the notion of theurgy attempts to grasp. But 
the unity which this theurgy creates remains inexpressible, unutterable, 
6 and it can only 
possibly, partially and momentarily be encountered through the experience of the epiphany of 
gods. This is possibly the reason why the Cabeiri were mainly relived through their (pptK-T(x 
opywc, the famous Cabeirian mysteries, rather than taught through official institutions. This is 
also what is signified by the qualitative leap in Schelling's thought, from the Ages of the 
World to the Deities of Somothrace, namely, the move from what has been conceptually 
uttered in the Ages to what is now only a part of the life of gods, whose whole movement 
remains (xppilTn. 
The various potencies and wills, which we meet in the Ages of the World, now become gods, 
not because Schelling gets trapped into a naive personification or anthropomorphic approach, 
but because it is possibly the notion of gods that may better accommodate the elusiveness, 
dynamism, self-generative and mostly (xppilTq nature of the cosmic becoming, and as such 
both immanent and transcendent with regard to man. From this perspective, the divine does 
not assume a wholly separate, transcendent status, and moreover does not constitute a unique, 
static, self-contained, holy substance, and yet is not exhausted as man's inner forces, by his 
psychic and spiritual potencies, since man - as finite part of the cosmos - being himself a 
specific complex of potencies, lies in the midst of cosmic forces, lower and higher, similar 
and different to him, seizing them and being seized, controlling them and subject to them. He 
5 These are only the conclusions that we draw from Schelling's extensive engagement with this issue, see Ages of 
the World, p. 167-175. 
6 "We can therefore see that in the very moment when the Highest is supposed to express itself, it becomes the 
inexpressible. Let no one be mistaken about this, or waste time in debating against those who deny it. One must 
in fact insist on this very inexpressibility, because it is necessary for the highest life. If what wills to express 
itself in all life were not inexpressible by nature, how would there be any vital motion? How would there be an 
impulse toward expressibility, articulation or organic relation? ", See Op. cit., p170 
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may then be able to discover the gods inside him, but they may mostly appear to him through 
their unexpected and compelling epiphany. 
The Cabeiri in turn, considered as separate deities seem to express the various unities of 
tensions, depicting the various moments of cosmic becoming; each deity stands for a fragile 
and generative state, as a complex of contradicting potencies which produces new ones; each 
deity is then product of the other and yet indifferent to its other, since it is theurgic by itself, 
has a self-generative, free and independent dimension, its own uniqueness. 
In the Ages of the World, Schelling already stressed. 
This entire life, after all, originated in the first place out of the longing of eternity for 
itself. All merely germinal life is of itself full of longing; it increasingly demands to 
emerge form mute, ineffective unity and to be lifted instead into an active unity. In the 
same way we see the whole of nature to be equally full of longing; the earth sucks the 
force of heaven into itself through countless mouths; the seed strives toward light and air, 
in order to catch sight of an image, a spirit; the flower sways in the sun's rays in order to 
pull them into itself as colour. 7 
It is Ceres or Demeter, the Cabeiri deity Axieros, who now accommodates longing, this ever- 
infusing activity and ever-present mode of being. 
But according to the literal translation of the first name, Axieros, in the Phoenician dialect 
can not very well mean other than (in the first instance) "hunger", "poverty", and in 
consequence "yearning", "seeking"..... Another image of this first nature, whose whole 
essence is desire and passion, appears in the consuming fire which so to speak is in itself 
nothing, is in essence only a hunger drawing everything to itself. Hence the ancient 
precept: fire is the most inward, therefore also the oldest; through the subduing of fire 
everything first began to be a world. Thus it was that Hestia came to be revered as the 
oldest (first) of beings, and the concepts of Ceres and Proserpina, the most ancient deities, 
became intertwined with that of Hestia. The feminine character of this many-named being 
points to the concepts of longing and of yearning desire, as do all names of the first nature 
either obscurely or clearly; so especially the nature of Ceres, whom the ancient historian 
interpreted as the first Samothracian deity, arises wholy as yearning passion. 8 
7 Op. cit., p. 165. 
8 Schelling's Treatise on The Deities of Samothrace, p. 19. 
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Demeter appears as lack, as the night of nothingness, of non-being, and yet she is the 
creating goddess, "the moving power through whose ceaseless attraction everything, as if by 
magic, is brought from the primal indeterminateness to actuality or formation. "9 For her night, 
which appears as the realm of the invisible and inexpressible, the mute and the silent, is the 
night of the most intense contraction of all creative powers, as the blackness of the 
contraction of all colours, and as such, her night is at once light and colours, life and word. 
Demeter stands for the inextricable connection between fertility and death, the perennial 
creativity and destruction pertaining in the "universal magic and the theurgy ever abiding in 
the whole universe, through which the invisible, indeed the super-actual, incessantly is 
brought to revelation and actuality. " 10 
What the relation of this Demeter with the Homeric one is, we do not know. We learn though 
from the Homeric hymn that Demeter laid Demophoon - the son of the king of Eleusis - into 
the fire in order to give him her major gift, namely, immortality. What appeared, to the eyes 
of the ignorant mortals, as Demophoon's loss and destruction, was what would render him 
immortal, eternally young; this is why Demeter decided to teach humans the Eleusinians 
mysteries, that is, in order to show them the immanent link between creativity and 
destruction, fertility and death, loss and rebirth, and to infuse them with love and faith to the 
theurgy of insoluble life. This is also the message that the Cabeirian Demeter sends. Her fire 
melts and dissolves everything, and out of this burning and consuming fire everything springs 
out and regenerates itself. As such, Demeter carries the burning torches, the symbol of 
yearning passion and persistent flame, which keeps movement alive and regenerates life out 
of death. For Demeter is love herself, the love of longing and burning desire for Persephone, 
which is actuality, visibility, sensuality, expression, concrete life, rebirth, but mainly, for 
Op. cit. , p. 20. 
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Demeter's love is mostly anger and inexhaustible strength to get back what she lost. She is 
Demeter loving and nurturing but mostly Demeter Erinys, the powerful and threatening 
goddess who despises Zeus and forces him to retreat in the sight of her frightening fury. As 
such, Demeter carries the moon-shaped sickle, the symbol of linkage between fertility and 
death, now as an act of love and violence, reminding us, that every creative act is 
accompanied with an act of violence, as the com has to be cut in order to spread its seeds, as 
Aphrodite and Erinyes both sprung from the blood of the castrated Uranus. 
We find then Demeter- karpophoros, the bringer of fruits, and Demeter-Black, Demeter- 
Erinys and-Nemesis, Demeter-Mother, Despoina and Demeter-Mistress, young and aged, 
beautiful and impressive, repulsive and imperceptible, grievous and triumphant, vulnerable 
and powerful, longing in its multiple configurations. But "the flower sways in the sun's rays 
in order to pull them into itself as colour", and Demeter turns to Helios - the Sun god and the 
only witness, with Ecate, of her daughter's rape- and becomes Persephone, colourful and 
tangible, goddess of sensuality and careless games. The world of actuality though, is but an 
episode of the cosmic drama and every concrete entity carries within it all the dormant forces 
out of which it emerged and into which it will sink again, its invisible past and future. 
Persephone breathes Demeter and Demeter embodies Persephone, identical and different, as 
the "intelligible dyad", " together construct the cosmos through a twofold magic. "" 
Persephone teaches the immanent spirituality of the sensual and is the one who dares to 
experience Demeter's teaching, for Persephone allowed her loss in the Underworld in order to 
emerge again, reborn, wiser, and even more sensual; for it is in the Underworld that she 
experienced the taste of the pomegranate, symbol of fertility and yet she became Queen of the 
Dead. The paradox of the connection between fertility and death reaches its peak in this 
10 Op. cit., p. 29. 
11 Op. cit., p. 33, number 64,80 from Schelling's notes. 
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second Cabeiri god, Axiokersa or Persephone, goddess of sensuality and the pleasures of life 
and Queen of the Dead, both. But it seems that it is precisely by virtue of her sensuality that 
she is Queen of the Dead. For Persephone, as concrete sensuality is unique and unrepeatable, 
"the one who weaves the garment of mortality, "12 and thus stands for the uniqueness and 
unrepeatability of every actual episode in the cosmic becoming, as a unique manifestation of 
the fragile balance of the infinite forces concurring in its expression. Nevertheless, this 
uniqueness transpires its past and future metamorphoses, the invisible world, chthonic and 
heavenly, intangibly sensual and unintelligibly spiritual, where Persephone reigns. Hence, 
Persephone is Queen of the Dead in a double paradoxical sense, affirming both the transience 
and persistence of things, their uniqueness and recurrence, vanishing and yet present in the 
theurgic chain of insoluble life. Persephone, the seductive goddess with the slim ankles, with 
narcissus and pomegranates in her hands, careless Kore and Hades' wife, dwells in both 
worlds, visible and invisible, and calls us to accompany her in her adventures. 
Persephone is a sorceress, as the initial beginning of future bodily existence, as the one 
who weaves the garment of mortality and generates the deception of the senses, but most 
generally as the first link of that chain extending from the depths to the heights, binding 
together beginning and end. Persephone is even called "Maja", a name which reminds us 
more than a little of magic. 13 
Persephone reborn, though, is no longer the same, the careless Kore. It is not only the sudden 
abduction, the marriage through rape, the pomegranate, the surprise, the shock, the loss of 
herself and her mother, the grief , the discovery of a new world, that gave rise to her change; 
it is mostly that she herself now becomes mother of herself, giving birth to her new self, 
transforming herself into a new god, Dionysus, the fourth Cabeiri god. 
12 op. cit. p. 20. 
13 Op. Cit. p. 20. 
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if Persephone discovered new dimensions of sensuality in the realm of spirituality, for it is in 
the underworld that she tasted the pomegranate, Dionysus discovers new spirituality in the 
realm of the senses themselves. Dionysus, carrier of a wine vessel and ivy leafs, Lucius i. e. 
liberator, announces an unprecedented dimension of freedom through the expansion of 
sensual experience. It is the freedom of the involuntary movements of a body which responds 
to the Bacchic rhythms, perceives new colours, hears unheard sounds, discovers forbidden 
pleasures, and creates new bonds with the mind, which also expands its horizons and 
discovers new worlds, of visions and images, so far closed off by its restricting concepts. 
Mind then, feels itself to be seized by divine madness, this necessary Etcricptutq, what we 
now call in-spiration, which renders it productive, imaginative and creative. Body and Mind 
rediscover their unity in the marriage of sensuality and spirituality, in its most intense 
expression, in "the blessings of madness" 14 , in the miracle of life, in the act of procreation 
and perennial regeneration. For Dionysus is himself the miraculous child of an absurd 
marriage, namely that of the goddess of sensuality with the god of Death, and the conditions 
of his birth and recurrent rebirths are even more absurd. 
Dionysus has been bom and reborn many times, by different gods and mortals, by Persephone 
and Hades, by Zeus and Semele, by Demeter and Athena, as many as he has been persecuted, 
arrested, murdered, dismembered. He suffers and dies, but there is always, paradoxically, a 
goddess who saves him, now Athena-Pallas, who rescues his pallomeni, i. e. vibrating heart, 
now Demeter, who reconnects with fire his fragments. Dionysus carries the fire-like features 
of his mothers, but he is also mild and plastic. Rising out of the moist depths of the 
underworld, he hydrates, moderates and gives new plasticity and form to the harshness of the 
consuming fire of his primal mothers. Joyous, vital, sensual, he recalls the initial careless 
14 Socrates says in the Phaedrus " Our greatest blessings, come to us by way of madness .... provided the madness is given by divine gift", Phaedrus 244A. The above expresion is owed to E. R. Dodds, The Greeks and the 
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sensuality of Persephone and celebrates the freedom of an unsuspicious present. Yet this 
present holds the history of the cosmos in it, and heralds its future lives. Dionysus, the magic 
child, as generator of new forces, becomes harbinger of new forms of life and is transformed 
into Hermes or Kasmillos, the fourth Cabeirian god. 
Hermes is the traveller god, who transfers the messages between the two words, in which 
Dionysus unreflectively dwelled. Longing, which passed from burning desire to plastic 
sensuality, now seems to reflect upon itself, to announce itself, to discern its transformations, 
to foretell its future ones. Hermes, with his golden sandals, flies like the wind from one world 
to the other, sends messages from past to future, enlivens memories and dreams, but also 
organises plots and plans, and carries the magic wand, the golden rod which suddenly gives 
luck or misfortune, fulfils or destroys the plans that he inserted in mortals' minds; he is called 
the guide of dreams and the protector of travellers but he is also the patron of robbers and 
thieves and all who are expert in gaining advantage through trickery. Hermes is the first 
Cabeiri god who utters the word, by announcing his theurgy, as the forerunner of a future 
god. Through Hermes there is the premonition, the sense of awaiting, preparing for, even 
planning the creation of the future god, and thus he carries the sensation of time, the first 
seeds of order, which, yet, may suddenly spread away under a simple movement of his wand. 
Hermes though, the god of communication, seems to stand as servant of the god whom he 
heralds. This is Zeus, the Highest Derniurge, god of order and justice. "If then those preceding 
personalities are ( inner)-worldly deities, so the god to whom they are the leader and ladder, 
whom Kasmilos directly serves, is the transcendent god, the god who rules them and thus is 
the lord of the world, the demiurge, or in the highest sense, Zeus. "15 
Irrational, p. 64. 
15 Schelling's Treatise on The Deities of Samotrace, p. 24. 
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Zeus stands for the order which is depicted by the transient and dynamic balances of forces in 
the cosmic becoming, but as long as this order appears to govem and subordinate these 
forces, as long as order is uttered and proclaimed as permanent, then it becomes transcendent 
and subjugating. Zeus loses his touch with the world, ascends to the top of the Olympic 
Pantheon, and recreates the world, according to his own order, becoming thus the highest 
Demiurge. However, even Zeus is not a static figure, for he himself seems to violate his own 
rules. The god of justice and highest power becomes the initiator of deception and conspiracy, 
impotent in the face of Demeter's threats, dependent on Hephaestos' skills, vulnerable to his 
own desires. Now he sends thunderbolts and claims his gifts from the sacrifices of the 
mortals, but then becomes golden rain and descends to earth to get what he desires. Zeus 
returns to Dionysus and Dionysus to Zeus anew. " But Dionysus is also a derniurge and 
indeed, so to speak, the demiurge overcoming Hephaestos who releases the creation from the 
bonds of necessity and sets it forth in free multiplicity ......... Zeus is also again 
Dionysus..... That is, Zeus is again related to the first three potencies, as the second is related 
to the first ....... But moreover, 
Dionysus returns once again to the higher potency" 16 
The chain now seems to bend back on itself, to close itself and enter into the rhythm of a 
recurrent movement. We are left with the messages of five gods. However, these seem to 
stand only for some distinctive moments or potencies operative in the cosmic becoming. In 
16 op. cit. p. 35, Schelling's notes, number 80. 
In this note Schelling, attempts to explain the non- hierarchical relation of Zeus with the previous deities drawing 
on the Pythagorian doctrine of the generative monad. Although this mode of correlation may allude to a sort of 
emanationism approach - which Schelling otherwise rejects - the main issue arising from this note is that 
according to Schelling, Zeus does not constitute a highest, ultimate stage, but emerges out and sinks again to the 
other potencies. Also, we stress Schelling's interesting remark, that Zeus's number is always 4, the number of 
order and completion. Carl Jung also, in his writings on the archetypes of the collective unconsciousness and the 
notion of quartenity, associated fourfold symbols and systems with the archetype of order, totality, oneness, 
fulfilment. 
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fact we met an indeterminable multiplicity of potencies, since each of these gods is itself 
multi- natured and mainly theurgic, perennially producing new potencies. 
First of all it is clear that those initial deities are the very same powers through whose 
action and rule the whole world chiefly was constituted; thus it is clear that they are 
worldly, cosmic deities. Collectively they are called Hephaestos.... Hephaestos himself is 
not in the sequence of Cabeiri, as little as his name appears among those of the seven 
planets or in the circuit of the days of the week, (which is) the key to all systems of gods, 
as I hope to show someday. Taken all together these preceding deities, or as we also could 
say, these serving deities, are Hephaestos. The creation of Hephaestos is the world of 
necessity. He is that which holds the All in strict constraint. But he is also the artistic 
sculptor of the Whole. He is also that which forms the innerworldy seat of the gods, 
certainly of the ones higher than he himself..... But Dionysus is also a demiurge and 
indeed, so to speak, the derniurge overcoming Hephaestos, who releases creation from the 
bonds of necessity and sets forth in free multiplicity. 17( my emphasis ) 
Hephaestos does not stand as a separate deity. In the Cabeiri cosmogony there is no higher 
Deity - what the Greeks held as Moira or Fate - to bind and externally predestine the cosmic 
becoming. It is rather the very existence and movement of this becoming that is itself 
necessary. Hephaestos' world stands for the necessity of the interaction of cosmic forces and 
their arising orders. The potencies which weave the web of necessity are the very same ones 
which undo it, breaking and relinking the cosmic chain. Zeus and Dionysus play and struggle 
with each other, transform into each other, construct and deconstruct the cosmos and infuse it 
throughout. However, these deities do not exhaust life, but are considered as merely initial, 
constitutive and further productive of new deities, lower or higher, latent or manifest, which 
call for their discovery, hidden in the uniqueness of each culture, historical epoch and human 
soul. 
The Cabeiri and Schelling through them, utter their word more as a riddle, rather than as a 
revelatory doctrine. Hence, they speak the oracular language of logogriphs, not only with 
regard to what they say but mostly with regard to what they do not say, but only allude to. Yet 
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their language presents an extraordinary intensity and fullness, and even manages to effect a 
shaking influence upon one's personality, for what they do not say they let it be experienced. 
This is the meaning of the mystical which characterises their cult practices. The mystical does 
not refer to any supra-natural entity, nor to the allegedly closed and inaccessible character of 
their rituals, since the Cabeiri mysteries, precursors of the Dionysian ones, were a collective 
and open festivity. The mystical, instead, comes immediately from the natural element itself, 
which is not dead and fragmented, but transpires the miracle of life, the mystery of perennial 
creation; this is precisely the central meaning of the Cabeiri mysteries. These are said to be 
dedicated to the light of dawn, to the wondrous springing of life out of unknown cosmic 
forces. 18 In this context, the mystical element in the experience of the mysteries does not 
intend to hold a redemptive function, as would be the case if the mystical was associated to an 
absolute spirituality and the liberation from natural bonds and sins deriving thereby. Instead 
the notion of the mystical in the Cabeiri rituals attempts to describe the distinctive sensuality 
which emerges out of the particular atmosphere of the mysteries: the sensation of sinking in 
the darkness of an all-night festivity, the sudden flash of light in the midst of the darkness, the 
smells of burning torches and moist ivy leafs, the rhythms of vibrating cymbals, all these 
elements which bring Dionysus' vibrating heart close to mortals and render the divine 
imminent to man, too close and yet too far, immanent and transcendent, palpable and 
invisible, present and all-infusing but app7lrov. As such the mystical signifies the unique 
and exclusive mode through which each one experiences his participation in the mysteries. 
Yet this mystical experience could open new, unprecedented paths of communication, 
understanding and knowledge of the world and one's soul, since it mostly consists in an 
active engagement with the divine, in an extraordinary activation of one's inner physical, 
17 Op. cit. p. 24,35, footnote 80. 
18 C. Kerenyi, The Cabeiri Mysteries, in The Greek Mysteries. 
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psychic and mental forces, mediated through a series of symbolic deeds, the so-called 
8p(*cva, where 'truths' are communicated not only through their utterance but by means of 
their dramatisation. It is by means of one's SpWv(x that one discovers and creates his ever- 
changing self, and this is also, possibly, the meaning of Schelling's statement in the Freedom 
essay that "man's being is essentially his own deed' 19 . 
We may now recover the deeper meaning of the Cabeiri messages, which seems to be the 
experience of the imminence of the divine and the personal transformation or even 
transmutation emerging out of it. This experience in turn, seems to be expressible through a 
logogriphic or a mythic form. Here, myth is not intended to stand for another explanatory 
schema or moreover for a religious doctrine; for the Cabeiri are neither abstract and anaernic 
concepts, nor hypostasised ontological personalities. The Cabeiri deities stand for the living, 
non-hierarchical, transmutable, dynamic, unpredictable, unknown and manifest potencies 
which constitute the paradoxes of the world, the magic of insoluble life. Hence, their mythic 
representation is both an allegory and a tautegory, since it attempts to name the (xppilrov of a 
real becoming, since this form allows the inexhaustible engagement of man with the paradox 
of the world, as being an active part of it. It seems also that this mythic form requires the 
eclipse of the absolute, since the appearance of the latter either engulfs and occupies all 
becoming - which appears as but a manifestation of its own homogeneous substance -, or 
20 becomes transcendent and renders becoming disenchanted . 
However, it is not the Cabeiri myths and their cult that intend to accommodate Schelling's 
vision for the creation of a new mythology. Schelling does not suggest that we should adopt 
19 Of Human Freedom, p. 63. 
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their beliefs and rehearse their rituals, as the Romans did, even printing them on their coins; 
21 
for only an age devoid of creative spirit lies in need of borrowing the spirit of its ancestors, 
only to ossify it in objects of exchange. Schelling discovers the Cabeiri spirit only in order to 
call us to discover our own gods, to create our own 8p(*cvcc and myths, according to our 
own , different and sin-fflar, experiences. 
The re-enchantment of this world is not going to 
come through the excavation of old temples and the dogmatic adoption of old religions. A 
new theurgy seems to be awaited and recalled and Schelling seems to be suggesting that it 
already lurks in this very disenchanted world. As far as the fate of the Cabeiri is concerned 
"To us the finest employment of the name would be granted in that moment when it also 
recalls that Cabeiri-like alliance, through which the power of a truly Typhonian realm was 
first broken, and at last its final convulsions stifled, one which threatened to end in general 
demoralisation. , 
22 
20 Schelling devotes extensive critical comments on scholars who reduce the Cabeiri polytheism to monotheistic 
dogmas or emanation systems, see Schelling's Treatise on The Deities of Samothrace , p. 22,23,24,25. 21&t In the later period of the Roman empire the once holy name of the Cabeiri was profaned through flattery; on 
coins not only the bust of the pious Antoninus or of Marcus Aurelious appeared, but even the head of a Domitian 
along with the inscription of the Cabeiri deities. ", Schelling 's Treatise on the The Deities of Samothrace , p. 30. 22 Op. Cit. p. 30. 
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Section III 
Conclusion: Helmet and pomegranate 
The twenty-eight line Homeric Hymn attempts to present the true identity of the 
goddess Athena and her astonishing epiphany among the other Olympian gods: 
I begin to sing of Pallas Athena, the glorious goddess, owl-eyed, inventive, unbending 
of heart, pure virgin, saviour of cities, courageous, Tritogeneia. From his awful head 
wise Zeus himself bore her arrayed in warlike arms of flashing gold, and awe seized 
all the gods as they gazed. But Athena sprang quickly from the immortal head and 
stood before Zeus who holds the aegis, shaking a sharp spear: great Olympus began to 
reel horribly at the might of the owl-eyed goddess, and earth round about cried 
fearfully, and the sea was moved and tossed with dark waves, while foam burst forth 
suddenly: the birth son of Hyperion stopped his swift-footed horses a long while, until 
the maiden Pallas Athena had stripped the heavenly armour from her immortal 
shoulders. And wise Zeus was glad. ' 
Hence, Athena, the goddess of mind and thought-nous kai dianoia- has been 
bequeathed to later ages as the celebrated daughter of the mighty Zeus. According to 
the poet, the goddess knows only of a father and belongs wholly to him. No mother 
gave birth to her. The most famous image of the goddess comes from her Acropolis 
statue: armed, with her body covered by a shield and the head by a huge helmet, ready 
to attack or to guard; Athena Poliuchos, the great, impregnable protectress of the polis 
of Athens; her statue, sign of the Athenian valour in the Persian wars. 
Athena kindles the heroes and inspirits them at the right instant. She stands by 
Achilles, Diomedes, and others favourites in battles and shows exceptional care to 
Hercules, the serni-god hero, who paves his way to the gods by his extraordinary 
1 Homeric Hymn to Athena 
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deeds. In Aeshcylus's Eumenides, she unambiguously declares her masculine nature: 
"No mother bore me, in all things my heart turns to the male, save only for the 
wedlock, and I incline wholly to the father. ', 2 And, yet Athena does not stand for the 
brutal masculinity of the god of war, Ares. Nor her bright reasoning for the 
contemplative reason of Apollo. For the encouragement of the battles is always 
accompanied by moderation and prudence and her wisdom by practical spirit and the 
knowledge of skills and handicraftship. She is not predominantly the warrior goddess, 
but the great counsellor, the prudent admonisher and also the patroness of 
craftsmanship, teacher of useful skills, goddess of healing powers and peaceful arts. 
At this stage, Athena seems to need also a mother, and her various admirers remember 
the 'monstrous' aspect of the myth: Athena did not spring from Zeus's head ex nihilo, 
but because Zeus had devoured his wife, Metis, in order to avoid the Fate of his father 
and grandfather. However, Metis was already pregnant with Athena, who grew 
painfully in Zeus's head and violently burst forth out of it. As daughter of Metis - 
which means counsel, measure and order - Athena is also called poly-metis, i. e. many- 
counsellor. She is the goddess of thoughtful and practical consideration of things. 
She shifts knowledge from the exclusive realm of her father's power to humankind. 
She is interested in the emancipation of humans from the gods, in the enhancement of 
the civilising progress and the defence of the polis. She teaches skilful techniques and 
she admonishes humans to bridle their passions and uncontrollable desires. She guides 
humans in the market-place and enables them to take reasonable decisions. She 
invents the jury, in order to render the humans able to make their own judgements - 
until now hidden in the realm of the gods or the relentless Moira - and to wrest human 
consciousness from the whims of the gods. 
2 Cited in W. Otto's, The Homeric Gods, p. 173. 
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Athena is thus the bright and benevolent goddess: the owl-eyed goddess, whose 
flashing eyes - as the owl's - are able to see all around and in the dark. She stands for 
the ability of reflection, assessment of the whole, prudent judgement. But she is not 
mere pensive. Her insightful mind is no detached reasoning, as her combating spirit is 
not unconstrained impulse. She is the goddess of thoughtful action, of reflective, 
recollective awareness of her actions, which leads her to the Victory, as it has been 
represented by Phidias's statue, where Athena holds the goddess of Nike in her right 
hand. As such, she is the 'owl of Minerva', who flies - victoriously - in the dusk. 
Nevertheless, Athena is, above all, Zeus' daughter. For all her civilising undertakings 
occur under the aegis of her father. She fosters humans' emancipation from the gods, 
but only within the limits of Zeus' tolerance. It is with his advice that she helps his 
devoted heroes, whilst she denies aid or even horribly punishes anyone who threatens 
Zeus' monokratoria (exclusive power), anticipating thus, the paradoxical linkage 
between monotheism and logic. It has even been suggested that the vulture which 
every night pecked on Prometheus' liver, due to his disobedience to Zeus, was Athena 
herself. 3 
Athena's victory seems thus to be buttressed by Zeus' power and his incontestable 
order. 
However, there is another, marginal myth which alludes to the possibility of a 
completely different account for the birth of the goddess. The myth was written by 
Apollodorus and Virgil and is as follows: Askalaphos was the son of Acheron - river 
of the Underworld - and Gorgyia - also called Orphne, i. e. Darkness. Askalaphos was 
mentioned as a tailed, semi-human, semi-lizard-like creature, and possibly the root of 
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his name is a-skallo, which means the non-cultivated. When Hades gave Persephone 
the pomegranate, in order to capture her in the Underworld, Askalaphos - as dweller 
of the realm of Hades - was the only witness of Persephone's fatal act, without, 
though, trying to prevent her. Demeter, in her fury, transformed Askalaphos into a 
screech owl, which lived with Persephone in the Underworld. The connection of the 
transformed Askalaphos with the owl of Minerva may sound artificial, but 
paradoxically enough, in the ancient statue of Athena-Nike, Athena holds in her left 
hand a pomegranate, and the Athenians also called her their Kore, that is their 
Persephone. 
The myth stops here, and the book continues with other stories. What happened to the 
owl afterwards, we do not know. It may have stayed for ages in the underworld, 
perhaps waiting until the defeat of the old regime of Cronus and the victory of the 
Olympian Pantheon, whence it might have flown into Metis' body. For Metis does not 
simply means counsel, measure and order. Metis was a Titaness, and thus her measure 
stands for the old order, that pertaining to the age of the Titans and not to the order of 
Zeus. And this is, possibly, the missing link between Athena's masculine nature and 
her feminine countenance, and not her counsel aspect, which does not necessarily 
modify her masculine temperament, nor contradict Zeus' order4. For, if Metis' order 
was that of Zeus', he would not feel threatened by her forthcoming child. The owl 
now seems to be Demeter's wild creation, and moreover, the irresponsible, 
uncultivated child of the river of the underworld and the darkness, nurtured by 
pomegranates and forbidden desires. This child had probably to wait until the polis 
3 Shearer A., Athene, Image and Energy, p. 17, Arkana, 1998 
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needed to consolidate Zeus' order, and the Athenians to establish their Panellenic, 
victorious identity - against the barbarian invaders -, in order to be transformed into 
the prudent goddess. Athena's mysterious past appears as impregnable as the goddess 
herself - in her prominent image - and betrays itself only in the enticing fruit that she 
holds in her left hand. Yet, there are other suspicious stories that also reveal a less 
bright, rather dark aspect of the goddess, as the following, written by Philostratus: 
Athena was chased by Hephaistos, but she resisted him, and his semen fell to the 
Earth (Chthon). However, out of their strife (eris), a child was born, Eri-chthon. 
Athena sought to save the child and to bring it up in secret. She received it from earth 
and she laid the child in a covered basket - probably such as those which are used in 
the Mysteries. From the basket a serpent crawls out, and later was said that Athena - 
no longer the virgin maiden - had borne a serpent. 
' 
If in ancient times, Athena was the mother of a serpent, by the time the Parthenon of 
Athens was dedicated to Mary as mother of God, Athena was officially recognised as 
the Mother of God, Thetokos, while in the Age of Enlightenment she stands again for 
the power of human reason, the owl of Minerva. What Athena would be in Schelling's 
visionary epoch of a new mythology, it is hard to guess. 
It may now have become obvious why we began our concluding remarks with these 
two different myths with regard the birth of Athena. Our investigation, as a whole, 
revolves around these two depictions: Athena as solid goddess of the brightness and 
purity of reason, immutable order and restitutive power, and Athena, as elusive 
goddess of transmutations, unknown flights and unpredictable images. 
4 See W. Otto' and A. Shearer's interpretations, where they attribute Athena's feminity to her counsel 
aspects and her action-oriented nature. 
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in fact, in the course of this research we met some of her transformations. We found 
her rescuing Dionysus' heart, and sitting silently by Logos - as Sophia - but mainly, 
we saw her fighting for order and power. The latter image stands for the mode through 
which the goddess has predominantly been understood by the modern era. She has 
been identified with the realm of human reason in its order-giving authority, 
normative comprehension of the world or its possessive appropriation. Accordingly, 
we saw the confinement of the notion of cognitive experience to the realm that 
precisely falls under the aegis of reason, that is, under its rules, precepts or 
voluntaristic drives. We found, though, that this was a too narrow realm to express a 
restless and ever-transformative goddess. 
Schelling's thought points to the discovery of the unsettling images of the goddess. He 
understood her not only as the sensible virgin, moderate counsellor and protectress of 
the polis, but also as mistress of logos, impulsive actress, destroyer of polies. He 
discovered that the goddess of calm reflection emerges from intractable longing and 
furious passions. He called us to rediscover the goddess in her inexhaustible 
transmutations in the theurgy of the cosmic becoming and the 'magic of insoluble 
life'. 
Hence, we may now turn to the main conclusion of our research, which is 
philosophy's need for a radical reconceptualisation of the notion of experience. 
In the course of our investigation, we first examined the logic of experience, through 
Kant's and Fichte's accounts of experience. 
Kant's major contribution is the thernatisation - in various ways - of the aporia of 
cognitive experience: the aporia of phenomenal knowledge in its juxtaposition to the 
5 Kerenyi C., The Gods of the Greeks, p. 125, Thames and Hudson, 1961 
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nournenal realm, the riddle of judgement-power, the perplexity of reflection in its 
confrontation with the disorderly abundance of nature, the normativity of Reason's 
Architectonic. However, the original question of the possibility of synthetic a priori 
judgements pre-empts the solution to the aporia. For, the very formulation of this 
question essentially amounts to the necessity of the invention of the foundational 
conditions for the attainment of synthetic a priori knowledge. This, as has been shown 
in the first chapter, leads to the reduction of the notion of experience to the formal 
rules of the understanding; a model, which presupposes and satisfies the conditions for 
an identical-through-time formal subjectivity. Cognitive experience appears as an 
internally consistent, organised and transparent whole, which manages to purify itself 
from the enigmas of the world. These are compacted to the realm of noumena, as if, in 
this way, understanding can do its work unperturbed, namely, the ordering and 
systernatisation of the world. However, this task appears impossible when reflective 
judgement confronts the contingent, which escapes the rules of the understanding. It is 
the confrontation with the contingent that stirs the rigidified conceptualisation of 
experience in the CPR and forces the understanding to a free play with imagination. 
Reflection, in its engagement with the inexhaustible richness of the world, appears 
puzzled and powerless; its previous entitlements to legislative authority upon nature 
are rendered 'illegal', and, moreover, no other contract seems to be forthcoming. For, 
the free play between understanding and imagination excites the feeling of life in the 
judging subject, and life can hardly be regulated by contracts. However, reflection, 
instead of welcoming its puzzlement - through a deeper engagement with the 
paradoxes of life -, turns to the secure realm of Reason: Reflection, even in the elusive 
case of the contingent, must be able to accomplish synthetic a prior! judgements. The 
latter, if they cannot be constitutive of experience, should at least be prescriptive. 
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Hence, Reason from Judge becomes an Architect, in order to establish this time its 
harmonious edifice rather than its severe tribunal. In both cases, experience is 
eventually conceived as the outcome of a syn-thetic activity, performed by the judging 
subject: a constitutive synthesis of the understanding, which transforms the 
fragmented spatio-temporal representations into an orderly, unified cognitive 
judgement, and a normative synthesis, of the harmonious mental state between 
understanding and imagination, which transforms the contingent into a final object for 
the Architectonic of Reason. Both syntheses attempt an ultimate resolution of the 
enigma of cognitive judgement, whilst the world remains essentially opaque and alien 
to the subject. Thus, the enigma of the world loses its fascinating and provocative 
dynan*s, since it is either settled in the rules of the understanding and the precepts of 
reason, or expelled to the realm of pure faith: the aporia of cognitive experience 
oscillates between an orderly settlement and a static fixation. 
Fichte's account of experience turns the Kantian duality between knowledge and faith 
into their identity: the faith in logic and the logic of faith. His project, as we saw in the 
third chapter, essentially amounts to a severe logical enterprise to prove his faith in the 
absolute self-positing ego. Fichte's identity-thinking does not rescue the notion of 
experience from the limitations of the representational model. In fact, it enhances 
them, since in Fichte's account, experience is entirely exhausted by the ego's 
determinations, without even acknowledging the subjective and limited character of 
these determinations. If Kant expels the divine from the realm of experience, Fichte 
appropriates it and deforms it by reducing it to the absolute, primordial ego. Identity- 
thinking, rather than providing a richer notion of experience than the representational, 
leads to a doctrinaire account of experience: a dual separation between subject/object, 
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self/world, infinite/finitude, is substituted by their identity, where the absolute ego 
absorbs the world and its enigma. 
This is the case, in a reverse way, with Schelling's early Identity Philosophy, which, 
due to its obsession with the concept of the Absolute, constructs thefaith of 
experience. 
This thesis argues for the need of a radical reconceptualisation of the notion of 
experience, which challenges both the logic and the faith of experience, through the 
logogrif of experience. This is intimated by Schelling's original insights into the 
notion of cosmic theurgy and man's active engagement with it. 
The logogrific approach towards the notion of experience recognises neither the 
Architectonic of Reason nor the Architectonic of the Cosmos: it neither expels the 
divine nor exalts it. Logogrif welcomes the divine in the world, in its enigmatic 
multiplicity, sensuality and spirituality, mortality and regeneration, transcendence and 
immanence. The logogrific notion of experience thus maintains the enigma of world, 
in its most various and unpredictable manifestations, thereby maintaining the 
dynamics of man's active engagement with it. Cognitive experience springs from the 
most diversified shapes of life, which, in their exuberant richness, carry the enigmatic 
unity of the most intense contradictions: the logogrific approach transforms the static 
aporia into a moving and ever-transmutable riddle. 
Therefore, we come to the conclusion that experience cannot be reduced to the 
"rrýinirnal-6 level of the orderly classification of the world, according to the rules of 
6 See Benjamin W., Program of the Coming Philosophy. 
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the cognising consciousness and the latter's need to consolidate its firm identity; 
neither can it be sought in the enlarged normative reconstructions of the architectonic 
of reason. Moreover, experience cannot be degraded to the ego's obsessive 
possessiveness and jealous wilfulness. Instead, through Schelling's insights, we have 
seen a more inclusive and yet incomplete and allusive notion of experience, which 
derives from the untameable realm of the cosmic theurgy and the inexhaustible 
multifariousness of life. In this context the recurrent problem of the subject-object 
dichotomy is readdressed by an innovative approach: this dichotomy is not suspended 
by the ego's will nor does it alternate in thought's recollective inversions. The subject- 
object polarity blurs in the magic of life itself, which stands for the paradoxical realm 
of their indifference, the enigmatic indifference of their highest autonomy and deeper 
bond, both. The logogrific notion of experience is woven by a longing consciousness: 
longing for penetrating into the mysteries of the cosmos, longing to decodify, 
experience and play with them. This notion includes the erratic, ineffable and 
recurrent history of the unknown forces of the unconscious, the inscrutable history of 
the life of the gods, the theurgic history of the cosmic becoming. These histories 
though, as histories not of self-consciousness but of its 'others', are mythologies. 
Accordingly, Logos needs to reflect not only upon its own history but also upon its 
pre-history and the history of its 'other': Mythos'. This brings us to the brink of a 
forthcoming project, namely to the investigation of the relation between logos and 
mythos, through their entangled history, but also in the light of their intriguing future. 
" The very fact that Kant was able to commence his immense work under the constellation of the 
Enlightenment indicates that his work was undertaken on the basis of an experience virtually reduced to 
nadir, to a minimum of significance. " 
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Appendix I 
Heidegger's critical remarks on Kant 
Heidegger expounded his critical interpretation of Kant mainly through his major 
book, Kant and the Problems of Metaphysics ( 1929). Heidegger's critique is well- 
known and highly influential, mainly with regard to the disclosure and upgrading of 
the role of imagination in the task of the deduction of the categories, a role which has 
only implicitly assigned by Kant and later was abandoned in favour of the 
understanding. 
This substantial insight however, belongs to a wider project to which Heidegger 
attempts, namely the retrieval of the ground laying of Metaphysics and thereby the 
introduction of his Fundamental Ontology. In this thesis, we will not be concerned 
with the wider Heideggerian project, since this would require a separate research. We 
will focus our remarks on the issues related to Heidegger's appraisal of German 
Idealism and consequently on his conception of the issue of finitude, which also 
appears to be the standpoint of his critique of Schelling. 
As already mentioned, Heidegger's undertaking of Kant's CPR develops from the 
perspective of reconsidering the laying of the Ground of Metaphysics. According to 
Heidegger, Kant's fundamental task of the Deduction of the categories should not be 
interpreted in cognitive or epistemological terms. Instead, it rather implicitly addresses 
and thereby formulates, in a specific mode, a ground for Metaphysics and indeed for 
Ontology. The transcendental question, by introducing the idea that in order for 
beings to be understood - ontic knowledge in Heidegger's terms -, there should be 
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some a priori conditions that make the knowledge in question possible - ontological 
knowledge -, lays the ground for Metaphysics, in the specific mode of an inquiry into 
the realm of Pure Reason. The Kantian mode of ground laying attests to the ongoing 
recurrence of the fundamental question of Being, even though in the reduced and 
disguised fonn of a critique of Pure Reason. 
Heidegger then discerns that Kant introduced the laying of the ground not only in 
terms of Pure Reason but also, implicitly, in terms of Being, by means of the role of 
the imagination. The latter has been insightfully suggested by Kant in the first edition 
of the Deduction, but was neglected and ultimately expelled from the second edition: 
"Kant himself .... helped to prepare the turn away from an uncomprehended finitude 
toward a conforming infinitude"'. Imagination, with its double nature and intrinsic 
temporality, constitutes a much more fruitful ground than that of Pure Reason, so long 
as it anticipates Heidegger's Dasein, thereby inaugurating the retrieval of 
Metaphysics in terms of Heidegger's new ontology. Being manifested itself in a 
moment of remembrance, but since then, seems to have again sunk into deep oblivion. 
We will discuss later the relevance of imagination to the Kantian project, in order to 
now proceed to Heidegger's main point, namely the retrieval and reformulation of the 
laying of the ground of Metaphysics. 
So far Kant has been appraised for the acknowledgement of the necessity to 
distinguish between ontic and ontological knowledge; this is the way Heidegger 
introduces the question of Being, namely in transcendental terms: 
If we ask about the possibility of comprehending something like Being, we 
1 See Heidegger M., Kant and the Problems of Metaphysics. 
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do not then invent this "Being" and violently force it into becoming a 
problem in order, perhaps, to take up again a question from the philosophical 
tradition. Rather what is asked about is the possibility of comprehending 
what all of us as human beings already and permanently understands. For its 
part, the question of Being as a question concerning the possibility of the 
concept of Being, springs forth from the preconceptual understanding of 
Being. 2 
Heidegger attempts to maintain the difference between ontic and ontological 
knowledge, between experience and the conditions of its possibility, but in such a way 
as to avoid the fixation and thereby the oblivion of Being. Transcendental method 
then transcends itself. the conditions for possibility of experience are already 
conditioned by experience itself. The understanding of beings presupposes the 
understanding of Being, which, however, transpires from beings themselves. 
However, Heidegger will forget his transcendence. He will require the removal of 
beings for the understanding of Being, relocating Being in the very tradition that he 
himself reconstructed, dismissed and yet reproduced. 
The main point of Heidegger's undertaking is the "authentic result" of the Kantian 
ground laying. The latter consists in the confession about the finiteness of human 
cognition, and therefore about finitude in general, as the fundamental essence of the 
human condition. Despite Kant's retreat to the convenience of sheer spontaneity, the 
issue of finitude arises inexorably out of the mere utterance of the three central 
questions: what can I know, what should I do, what may I hope?. 
The innermost interest of human reason unites these three questions in itself. In it, 
an ability, a duty, and a allowing (to hope) of human reason stand in question. 
Where an ability is questionable and wants to be delimited in terms of its 
possibilities, it already places itself within a disability. An all powerful entity need 
not ask: What can I do, i. e., What can I not do? It not only does not have to ask, but 
accordingly to its essence it cannot pose this question at all. This disability, 
however, is no deficiency; it is rather what is untouched in very deficiency and 
lbid. p. 158. 
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"not". Whosoever comes wholly to be moved by his innermost interest in this 
question reveals a finitude in the depths of his essence. 3 
Hence, the recognition of finitude - as the deeper essence of the human being - is what 
should constitute the basis for the retrieval of Metaphysics. The legacy of German 
Idealism should be reconsidered so long as the claims of Pure Reason forget the 
fundamental concept of finitude: 
On the basis of a fundamentally inadequate metaphysical conception of man (as ego) 
and of human personality, Kant and his successors appeal to the notion of absolute 
person or absolute spirit, and then attempt to determine the essence of man on the 
basis of this inadequate concept of spirit. The self-contained character of this 
absolute systematicity only conceals the questionableness of its initial approach and 
its point of departure, since here the problem of man, of human Dasein in general, 
has not been properly recognised as a problem. But Hegel's step from Kant to 
absolute idealism is the sole consequence of Western philosophy. It became possible 
and necessary through Kant because the problem of human Dasein, the problem of 
finitude, did not properly become a problem for Kant himself. That is to say, this did 
not become the central problem of philosophy because Kant himself, as the second 
edition of the Critique of Pure Reason reveals, helped to prepare the turn away from 
an uncomprehended finitude toward a conforming infinitude. 4 
Hence, Heidegger admits that Kant introduced the notion of finitude, either in terms 
of the undeveloped form of the imagination or through the very limits of a being who 
is obliged to ask what could he know, do, and hope, but not ultimately so, so long as 
Kant eventually appeals to the notion of the absolute person. The fundamental 
concept offinitude, and indeed in terms of Dasein, becomes, then, the key issue so 
that the notion of the absolute person should be dismissed and along with it a new 
dawn for the history of philosophy would arise. Does, however, the concept of 
finitude as such constitute the escape route from the impasse of the notion of absolute 
person, or rather, are they perfectly compatible and indeed supplementary concepts? 
Ibid. p. 142. 
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To begin with, Kant not only implicitly introduced but he rather built his whole 
system on the basis of the assumption of finitude. Our conclusion from the 
transcendental deduction, namely the necessity of the continuous through- time, 
formal identity of the self, derives precisely from the assumption of an absolute 
finitude in the human condition: a non creative intuition, which merely receives the 
givenness, a spontaneity that is able to deliver only rules. For only a being who is so 
radically cut off and thus ultimately alien from its world, stands in need of persistent 
self-control, rigid rules and incessant regularity, as the constant formal identity 
prescribes. In turn, only a being abstracted from nature needs the assumption of 
finality in Nature, and again only a being intolerably tormented by its finitude 
endlessly strives for its absolute purification by means of the moral law. In other 
words, our contention is that it is the assumption of finitude itself, in Kant, which 
leads him to the notion of an absolute and yet self-defeating subjectivity. In fact, it is 
the specific conceptualisation of the finitude that leaves the human being thus exposed 
and consequently necessitates either an arrogant identity or a self-humiliating 
discipline. It is a concept of finitude that stands in absolute separation from infinitude 
and thus becomes a relation of awe and obedience of the former to the latter. In turn, 
this separation desecularises the infinite itself; it renders it a compelling, omnipotent, 
indestructible and even faultless concept, which man has always to take seriously. 
Man can no longer compete or play with his gods; he thinks only his ineluctable 
mortality and he could never conceive of the possibility of theirs', i. e. gods', as well. 
This conceptualisation of finitude coffesponds to a conceiving of time as an a priori 
form of intuition deprived of any creative potential and to a conception of temporality 
4 Heidegger M., The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, p. 208. 
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as a process of unifying sequential monadic moments. Heidegger's original 
interpretation of Kant's CPR is precisely built on his enterprise to prove the creative 
element of pure intuition and the receptive element of pure understanding, both 
actually springing from the common, but no longer, "to us, unknown root" of human 
knowledge, the transcendental power of imagination. Heidegger claims, contra to 
most Kantian scholars who "all too quickly deny that something is intuited in pure 
intuition in general"5, and simply consider intuition as a mere form, that pure intuition 
is in fact formative and therefore creative. Pure intuitions are claimed by Kant as 
original because they "let something spring forth ... ..... they are (i. e. pure intuitions) 
formative in the peculiar sense that they pro-pose the look of space and time in 
advance as totalities which are in themselves manifold. In this presenting, however, 
lies the essence of the pure power of imagination. 996 Now, the creative dimension of 
intuition has been insightfully brought out by Schelling in his System of 
Transcendental Idealism (1800). Here, Schelling, breaking from the ego-based 
conception of intuition, elucidates the point that in order for receptivity to be receptive 
at all, it should also be active , since the fact of receptivity itself manifests an ability to 
receive, and therefore a creative element. Schelling, though, did not rush to classify 
his discovery under a new generic concept, but he let it flow in the still unknown and 
inscrutable realm of cosmic or even non-cosmic forces. Heidegger though, specifies 
the creative element of pure intuition as follows: 
The rooting of pure intuition in the pure power of imagination becomes clear 
if we ask about the character of what is intuited in pure intuition .... What is discerned in pure intuition is a whole which is unified in itself, although it is not 
empty, and whose parts are always just limitations of itself. But this unified whole 
must allow itself to be discerned in advance regarding this togetherness of its 
5 Heidegger M., Kant and the Problems of Metaphysics, p. 1 oo. 6 Op. Cit. 'P. 99. 
257 
manifoldness, which is for the most part indistinct. Pure intuition - originally 
unifying, i. e., giving unity - must catch sight of the unity. Kant therefore rightly 
speaks here not of a synthesis, but rather of the Synopsis. The totality of what is 
intuited in pure intuition does not have the unity which characterises the 
universality of a concept. The unity of the totality of intuition, therefore, also 
cannot spring forth from the "synthesis "of the understanding. It is a unity which is 
caught sight in advance in the image-giving imagining. The "syn" of the totality of 
space and time belongs to a faculty of formative intuition. The pure synopsis, if it 
constitutes the essence of pure intuition, is only possible in the transcendental 
power of imagination, and that is all the more as this ( transcendental power of 
imagination ) is in general the origin of all that is synthetic. "Synthesis" must be 
taken here in a way, which is quite wide enough to encompass the synopsis of 
intuition and the " synthesis" of the understanding. (my emphasis) 
From the above extract, we can draw the following results: Heidegger exhausts the 
spontaneous, creative dimension of intuition as a unifying role, which, however, does 
not spring from the spontaneity of understanding, and thus is synoptic rather than 
synthetic. How are we to understand this apparently important distinction between 
synopsis and synthesis? In fact, here, Heidegger makes a claim about his conception 
of Being and Logos, their common origin and their split. Imagination's power is 
conceived as a unifying one because it is intended to pertain to the essence of Being. 
The latter is conceived, mainly in his lecture-text An Introduction to Metaphysics, as 
the power that springs forth, emerges, appears in its simultaneous disclosure and 
concealment and most importantly, as standing in itself, gathered togetherness in itself 
and by itself, and maintained by itself in such togetherness. Logos also, considered as 
"the steady gathering,, 7 , the emerging power that stands for the "intrinsic togetherness 
,8 of the essent, i. e., the being' , still belongs to Being. Nevertheless, the "synthesis" of 
understanding belongs to the epoch of the separation of Logos from Being; synthesis 
has forgotten synopsis, and yet it insists to determine it, insofar as this appears more 
7 Heidegger M., An Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 130. 
8 Op. cit. p. 131. 
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comfortable. We discussed, in the fourth chapter, Heidegger's conception of Being as 
gatherness with respect to his interpretation of Schelling's philosophy. At present, our 
main concern is to find out to what extent the Kantian concept of pure intuition could 
be indeed accommodated in Heidegger's ontological project, as he attempts to. 9 
As already mentioned the angle from which Heidegger discovers the creative element 
of pure intuition is its mode of totality, in its springing forth. Heidegger did not further 
develop the idea of springing forth itself, as a process, but he rather focused in its 
springing forth as a totality, which in this way attests to pure intuition's creative 
power. It is the case indeed, that according to Kant, space and time, as pure intuitions, 
are represented as totalities apart from the synthetic activity of the understanding. This 
however, does not entail the unifying, and moreover, the thus creative element of 
intuition, for in fact this immediate inference misses the crucial point that Kant does 
not conceive totality in terms of any unifying activity, even in the wider sense of the 
notion of synthesis. Instead, Kant conceives the totality of pure intuition in the form of 
their singularity -a basic feature of any intuition at all-, being consistent with his 
general conception of intuition as sheer givenness, as demonstration of the inexorable 
passivity and finitude of human knowledge. When Kant refers to pure intuitions, he 
means space and time as the necessary assumptions for human receptivity under 
which empirical manifold could be manifested at all to human beings. It is highly 
questionable why Kant does separate the conditions of givenness from the givenness 
itself, but this critical question should not lead us to an interpretation of pure intuition 
that would indeed raise the Kantian inconsistency but would miss Kant's point about 
9 Heidegger attempts to appropriate Kant's CPR in a double sense, namely both with regard to the role 
of imagination that allegedly anticipates his wider concept of Being and with regard to Kant's shrinking 
back from it, which thus confirms Heidegger's major claim on the forgetfulness of Being by the 
philosophical tradition. 
259 
space and time. 
Kant associates space and time exclusively to human finitude; a divine understanding 
would never be in need of receiving things in their succession or spatial order, for it 
could immediately grasp everything in its absolute intensity and extensity. This, in 
turn, implicitly suggests a concept of eternal and rather static infinity: a major issue, 
which will not be pursued here. The relevant point is the conceptualisation of space 
and time as exclusively subjective conditions of human sensibility, by virtue of its 
finitude. Sensibility is understood as sheer givenness, not as affection by means of 
senses, hence its pure, a priori status; the purity does not refer to any lack of 
contamination by the senses but to its conception as transcendental notion. Human 
beings then can relate immediately to the world only temporally and spatially, for this 
is the only possible mode according to which the word manifold could be received at 
all. Now the question is, if in this mode of immediacy and receptivity a creative 
element exists. As we saw, according to Heidegger, this element does exist by virtue 
of the unifying power of pure intuition, which lets it appear as totality. However, 
Kant, apart from his derivation of space and time by dint of human finitude, especially 
stresses their singular status. The latter is not conceived as a result of any unification 
process but as simple oneness, since Kant, implicitly, distinguishes the concept of 
time as pure form of intuition from the concept of temporality that is associated to 
various processes of synthesis of sequential moments, which themselves are 
considered as manifold. Whence then does this singularity come? Our suggestion is 
that the singularity could be understood as the tangential intersection of the numerical 
identity of the setf with the world manifold, or in other words, as the inevitable mode 
in which the world could be given to a being characterised by a numerically one, 
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persistent identity. Kant stresses the concept of the original numerical identity of the 
self, already from the first Edition of the Transcendental Deduction, and in fact even 
more explicitly there, than in the second Edition. 10 The threefold synthesis, i. e. the 
synthesis of apprehension in intuition, the synthesis of reproduction in imagination 
and the synthesis of recognition in a concept, is grounded on spontaneity, to which 
both imagination and understanding belong under the tutelage of understanding: 
If each representation were completely foreign to every other, standing apart in 
isolation, no such thing as knowledge would arise. For knowledge is (essentially) a 
whole in which representations stand compared and connected. As sense contains 
a manifold in its intuition, I ascribe to it a synopsis. But to such synopsis a 
synthesis must always correspond; receptivity can make knowledge possible only 
when combined with spontaneity. Now this spontaneity is the ground of a 
threefold synthesis, namely, the apprehension of representations as modifications 
of the mind in intuition, their reproduction in imagination, and their recognition in 
a concept. These point to three subjective sources of knowledge which make 
possible the understanding itself- and consequently all experience as its empirical 
product (my emphasis)" 
From the above extract, we can also see the way Kant uses the term synopsis. 
According to Kant, the awareness of empirical manifold presupposes time, considered 
both as the a priori condition, in order for the manifold to appear at all and as inner 
sense, which allows the mind to distinguish the manifold in its manifoldness, i. e. 
multiplicity. Synopsis then, stands precisely for the awareness of the diversity, which 
was possible to appear as such by virtue of time - considered as isolated moments of 
inner sense -, and not for the awareness of unification. It is this chaotic manifoldness 
which must appear as such, in order to necessitate its synthesis. In Kant then, intuition 
stands for dispersion and not for unity; for time is considered either as a singular form 
or as infinite isolated moments in this oneness. Both accounts of time are consistent 
10 CPR A108 
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with the modem 17'h century scientific conception of time, namely abstract and 
uniform, linked to a corresponding abstract subjectivity. 
12 
However, it was Kant who conceived of imagination as partaking both in sensibility 
and in spontaneity and it does not require that much effort to see that, almost by 
its 
definition, imagination appears as the common root of its very constituents elements. 
However, for Kant the hypothetical common root of the two stems of human 
knowledge, even after his third Critique - where imagination escapes from the tutelage 
of understanding, but at the same time implicitly introduces a new conceptualisation 
of time beyond the notion of pure form of intuition - remains unknown. Heidegger's 
view would be that Kant was embedded in the Western philosophical tradition which 
has forgotten Being, as if the dynamics of a philosophical project could be explained 
exclusively in terms of logical grounds, dismissing social and historical conditions. If 
Kant, during the first Critique was indeed rather strongly immersed in the tradition of 
Cartisian dualism, and still, though with a much more loose and ambiguous way, 
during the third Critique - restricting thus imagination to the realm of understanding in 
the CPR, and eventually to the demands of the sensus communis in the CJ -, 
nevertheless, he seems to be able to draw from the strengths of this tradition, namely 
the aspect of non-identity of these two equally incomprehensible stems of human 
knowledge. For Kant, the common root remained unknown, perhaps, because Kant, by 
means of his aporia, makes an implicit claim about the ultimate non-reducibility of 
11 CPR A97 
12 In Plato for example, time and space have a very different meaning; time has an objective status, as 
the moving image of eternity, and the concept of space does not exist at all. Instead of the abstract 
concept of choros (space), Plato uses the concrete concept chora or hypodochi. This stands for 
something concrete, material indeed, like a wax surface, that registers the deformations that an Idea 
undergoes when it gets received by the chora. Chora is the receptor and indicator of degrading 
changes, which in a way, fits with Plato's account of a deluded self in a world of doxas and degraded 
polis. 
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these elements. Imagination may transmute itself from one form to the other but this 
does not entail the qualitative identity of these different forms. Perhaps, this is the 
point of the tradition that Heidegger forgets and yet follows him in the construction of 
his own system. 
However, concerning the main point of his enterprise, namely the concept of finitude 
of human knowledge, Heidegger seems to follow rather close the Kantian legacy. 
Heidegger does not explicitly link his discovery of the role of imagination with his 
main purpose, i. e. to bring forward the finitude of human essence. He seems, though, 
to be suggesting that imagination, taken as a concept that anticipates his concept of 
Being, lets the two cognitive stems spring forth. Man does not posses his cognitive 
powers; the latter rather spring from Being, to which man belongs and of which he is 
part. Human being should no longer be conceived as cut off from the world; instead it 
is already immersed in it, partakes of its movement and is constituted by it. Man's 
finitude is conceived in terms of man's belonging to the world. In Heidegger's terms, 
man exists at all because there is Being that dwells in him, and endows him with his 
different faculties. In turn, man is finite exactly as a specific mode of Being, as 
Dasein. Dasein, though should be understood as a relation to Being, which Heidegger 
calls the understanding of Being. The understanding of Being consists in the different 
modes of relating to the manifestation of Being in man, as Dasein. The dynamics of 
the different modes with which man relates to how Being manifests itself to him and 
thereby how man relates to himself, by means of how he lets Being manifest itself to 
him, would be indeed a quite interesting and fruitful context for the investigation of 
the concept of finitude. 
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However, Heidegger does not develop his account of finitude in this line of thought, 
which he constructively brought out. He shifts his account to a more specific 
direction: "Dasein should be construed in its finitude, namely, with a view toward the 
intrinsic making-possible of the understanding of Being .... The finitude of Dasein -the 
understanding of Being- lies in forgetfulness. " 13 
Finitude no longer consists in the very fact of understanding of Being, but in the 
specific mode of understanding asforgetting Being. This shift already prefigures a 
rather rigid conceptualisation of the identification or split between finitude and 
infinity, man and Being, man and himselL 
Heidegger specifies even more the concept of finitude, as the condition of original 
finitude, which consists in the suppression of Dasein in man, which is manifested as 
the mode of everydayness in inauthentic Dasein. 
How are we to understand the above statements? Moreover, how are we to understand 
the major claim about the overcoming of this finitude, by means of the fundamental 
ontological act, which consists in "a remembering again"? 14 
We need to examine closer Heidegger's concept of Dasein, in order to grasp in what 
its suppression consists. The texts which illuminate this issue are Heidegger's later 
lectures, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, and An Introduction to 
Metaphysics, 1935. These lie rather as supplementary to the first division of Being 
and Time, that deals with the analytic of Dasein in its everydayness mode, and sustain 
the abrupt transition to the second division of Being and Time. According to 
13 Heidegger M., Kant and thePproblems ofMetaphysics, p. 163. 
14 Heidegger claims: " The basic fundamental ontological act of the Metaphysics of Dasein as the laying 
of the ground for Metaphysics is hence a "remembering again", in KPM, p. 164. 
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Heidegger, in the FCM, Dasein is characterised by a fundamental tripartite structure 
which consists in three interconnected basic moments that occur in it: a) Dasein's pre- 
logical openness for beings as such and holding itself toward the binding character of 
things, b) Dasein's openness for beings as completion and c) Dasein's unveiling of 
the being of beings. 
By the first moment, Heidegger means the unique way in which Dasein comports 
towards beings. Human beings have the potential to relate to beings (other human 
beings, animals, plants, and nature), in such a way as to let them manifest themselves 
to man, as such. This connotes the specific mode of openness of Dasein towards 
beings so that the latter are let by Dasein to be accessible in a meaningful way. This 
specific mode of openness is juxtaposed to animal's behaviour that is characterised by 
a self-absorbing relatedness to beings because of their instinctual drives. Animals, 
then, are not really open towards beings since they do not have access to them, or 
rather their access is encircled by the narrow ring of their instinctual drives; their 
world is poor and closed off from the meaning of beings. Instead, Dasein lets beings 
be open to it and thus it relates to them as such. This term remains rather unelaborate 
in Heidegger's text, but drawing on his further clarifications, we can understand it as a 
mode of relating to beings in terms of a meaningful binding of man with beings. 
Dasein lets beings manifest to it so that man apprehends beings, i. e. lets them appear 
to Dasein as unified, ordered, and gathered in themselves, whereby man agrees with 
them and binds himself with them in a meaningful way; the latter in turn, takes on the 
form of Xoyo; and linguistic utterance: 
there belongs to man a being open for ... of such a kind that this being open for... 
has the character of apprehending something as something This kind of relating to 
beings we call comportment, as distinct from the behaviour of animals.... 
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.. Sounds which emerge out of and 
for thisfundamental relation of letting 
something come into agreement and holding it together are words..... essential 
agreement is discourse possible in its essential function: 0-11gatmV, giving that 
which is understandable to be understood. 15 
The relevant point for our discussion is that this ability, i. e. openness towards beings 
as such, is possible only for a being characterised byfreedom. Freedom is what mostly 
pertains to Dasein and allows the disclosure or the concealment of the meaning of 
beings by means of koyo;: 
Such ability is possible only as this ability if it is grounded in beingfreefor beings 
as such. It is upon this that beingfree in that pointing out that points toward and 
away is grounded, and this beingfree in-can then unfold as beingfreefor 
revealing or concealing (truth or falsity) In short, the koyo; wco(pavnico; as 
assertion is possible only where there is freedom. 16 
Dasein's then first major moment, which occurs inherently in it, is its potential to be 
free. The latter mode of freedom should be understood as the Dasein's ability for its 
attunement with beings and thereby for its being bound by their intrinsic meaning. 
Aoyo; also is grounded in this pre-predicative, pre-logical disposition of man toward 
beings, whose very essence consists in freedom. "Being open for ... is from the very 
outset afree holding oneself toward whatever beings are given there in letting oneself 
be bound" 17 . 
So far, Heidegger suggests an interesting problematic with regard to the concept of 
freedom in terms of binding and therefore of limiting oneself according to the 
immanent relations pertaining to beings. However, Heidegger ascribes a specific 
15. Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, p. 308,309. 16 Op. cit. p. 339. 
17 Op. cit., p. 342. 
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meaning to this type of freedom, which radically removes the potential dynamism of 
the previous approach; the latter consists in the free openness of Dascin toward beings 
&gas a whole". It is this mode of openness "as a whole" or completion, which 
announces the deeper essence of freedom in Dasein, and, consequently, constitutes its 
most fundamental moment that determines the others. Heidegger is exceptionally 
vague in the exposition of this crucial notion, which also highlights the meaning of the 
"fundamental ontological act" and his conception of finitude. By way of exegesis, 
Heidegger gives only a spatial example: that the way we perceive things in space, i. e. 
a badly positioned board in a lecture theatre, presupposes our pre-logical relatedness 
to the whole of space, in this case, the whole of the lecture theatre and indeed in its 
functional sense, according to which the different positions of things assume a 
functional order in this whole. 
The pre-logical being openfor beings, out of which every Xoyo; must 
speak, has in advance always completed beings in the direction of an "as a 
whole". But this completion we are not to understand the subsequent addition 
of something missing, but rather the priorforming of the "as a whole" 
already prevailing. 18 
In fact, Heidegger elevates the notion of the term "as a whole" to his central concept, 
only by means of which we may grasp - though always imperceptibly - the "enigmatic 
distinction between being and beings. "19 
The prior forming of the world "as a whole" has nothing to do with the - impossible at 
any case - grasp of the totality of beings, not even with the previously suggested, by 
his example, preconceptual awareness of functional relatedness of beings in the 
whole; rather the opposite is the case. The manifestation of the world "as a whole" 
presupposes the removal of beings as such, and only thus the Being of the beings 
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could be opened to Dasein. The manifestation of the world "as a whole" then, does 
not indicate any intuitive reference to any holistic relatedness among beings, but it 
rather refers to a fundamental mood, to a fundamental attunement of Dasein with the 
world, that lets Dasein to be exposed to the "mystery of Being"20 It refers to a mood 
that conununes us with the deeper, unspeakable abysses of Being and thereby renders 
possible our coming to terms with our inexorable finitude. The fundamental 
attunement of grasping the world "as a whole" discloses to us the very essence of the 
world as a prevailing one; "a prevailing that man does not have power over, but which 
precisely prevails through and around hW'21 The manifestation of the world "as a 
whole" does not occur to ordinary understanding. The latter rather forgets it, 
immersed in its everydayness and busy occupation, 22 and sticks to the undifferentiated 
multiplicity of beings, which only appear uniformly as objects to it, as isolated 
present-at-hand entities. Instead, the undifferentiatedness of the "as a whole" is of a 
different type, since by its removal of beings, it would unveil their essence by virtue of 
their baptism in the mystery of Being. The latter, namely the unveiling of the Being of 
beings, constitutes the third fundamental moment of Dasein. The three fundamental 
moments of Dasein's structure constitutes what Heidegger calls the process of world- 
formation, whose central act lies in Dasein's letting the world manifest itself "as a 
whole", in its prevailing and abysmal dimension. This is the meaning of Dasein's 
freedom, and Dasein's essence. 
The above analytic exposition of Dasein's, essence is presented in a more literary way 
in his lectures, An Introduction to Metaphysics. In this work, Heidegger deals with 
18 Op. cit., p. 348. 
19 Op. cit., p. 352. 
20 Op. cit., p. 35 1. 
21 Op. cit., p. 26. 
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"the question of the essence of man", "by consulting the poetic project of being- 
human among the Greeks"23, through his interpretation of an extract of the chorus of 
Sophocles' Antigone. 24 Here, man is conceived as the 8Ctvo'r(x'rov of all beings, 
namely as the strangest, the most terrible being, "in the sense of the overpowering 
power which compels panic fear, true fear" and "in the sense of one who uses power, 
who not only disposes of power but is violent in so far as the use of power is the basic 
,, 25 trait not only of his action but also of his being-there. Man is deinon being because 
is a prodigious, powerful being in the midst of beings, but is the deinotaton, the most 
prodigious amongst all beings, for only he dares to confront and measure himself 
against the powerfulness of Being. 
But man is the strangest of all, not only because he passes his life amid the strange 
understood in this sense but because he departs from his customary, familiar 
limits, because his is the violent one, who tending toward the strange in the sense 
of the overpowering, surpasses the limits of the familiar. 26 
However, man, according to Heidegger, in the epoch of forgetfulness, no longer 
attempts to surpass the limits of the familiar. Man now lives in the customary; sunk in 
everydayness, in the realm of ordinariness, lost in inauthentic and meaningless 
existence: Dasein is suppressed in man; this is the condition of his original finitude. 
It seems, though, that it is Heidegger who forgets that that the essence of human being 
was conceived by the Greeks not only as deinon, i. e. inspiring awe , but also as deilon, 
i. e. wretched; coward, slothful, canny, sly and self-interested; moreover, as 
22 op. cit., p. 275,277. 
23 Heidegger M., An Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 143. 
2' We will not deal with the validity of Heidegger's interpretation of the poem, since this is not the 
object of our inquiry. We will only focus on the aspects that may clarify Heidegger's conception of the 
essence of Dasein. 
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deisidaimon27, i. e. as a being which itself feels awe - for the daimons -; the latter were 
always acting as conflictually co-existing tendencies in the diverse modes of human 
expression. 
Hence, finitude is understood as the suppression of Dasein, where the latter is 
considered as the overpowering power, the deinon in man. This dimension is what can 
allow Dasein to let the world be manifested "as a whole", and thus to make Dasein be 
everywhere at home, i. e. the totality of the abyss. 
What is all this talk about philosophy as homesickness? Novalis himself 
elucidates: "an urge to be everywhere at home"... What is demanded by this urge? 
To be at home everywhere-what does it mean? Not merely here or there, nor even 
simply in every place, in all places taken together one after the other. Rather, to be 
at home everywhere means to be at once and at all time within the whole. We 
name this within the whole and its character of wholeness the world. We are 
always called upon by something as a whole. This "as a whole" is the world. 
We are asking: What is that- world? 
This is where we are driven in our homesickness: to being as a whole. Our very 
being is this restlessness. We have always already departed toward the whole, or 
better, we are always already on the way to it. But we are driven on, i. e. we are 
somehow simultaneously tom back by something, resisting in a gravity that draws 
us downward. (my emphasis). We are underway to this "as a whole". We ourselves 
are this underway, this transition, this "neither the one nor the other". 
What is this oscillating to and for between the neither/nor? Not the one and 
likewise not the other, this "indeed, and yet not, and yet indeed". What is the 
unrest of this "not"? We name itfinitude 28 
Finitude then is our way back from the i ourney towards the confrontation with the 
world in its manifestation "as a whole". But how could we find our way back to 
home, the home of the uncannyness and the dwelling of the deinon? How could we 
25Heidegger M., An Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 149. 
26 Op. cit., p. 151. 
27 Both deisidaimon and deinon derive from the same root, i. e. deido, which means to feel awe; deinon 
means what generates awe, while deisi-daimon is what is seized by the awe of daimons or gods. 28 Heidegger M., The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, p. 5,6. 
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remember again? Heidegger's answer is, by awaking in Dasein those fundamental 
attunements, that will disclose the world "as a whole" in its prevailing, overpowering 
dimension. By fundamental attunements, Heidegger means the mood of profound 
boredom, that reveals the telling refusal of all beings and lets us be exposed negatively 
in the totality of the world, in the FCM, or the mood of the anxiety towards death, that 
reveals the inexorable finitude of our existence, in Being and Time. These 
attunements, in turn, may recall the suppressed deinon in Dasein, may awake man 
from his lethargic oblivion. 
The awaking of these attunements though, is an event that cannot occur to any 
ordinary man. Only the destined ones, those who honour the mystery of Being can let 
themselves open to the return of the deinon in them. 
All observation of whatever kind must remain eternally distant from what world is, 
insofar as its essence resides in what we call the prevailing of world, a prevailing 
that is more originary than all those beings that press themselves upon us. The 
awaking of fundamental attunements... serve one purpose: to prepare our 
entering into the occurrence of the prevailing of world. This philosophising entry 
and return of man into the Dasein in him can only ever be prepared, never effected. 
Awaking is a matter for each individual human being, not a matter of his or her 
good will or even skilfulness, but of his or her destiny, whatever falls or does not 
fall to him or her. Everything that contingently falls upon us, however, only falls 
and falls due to us if we have waited for it and are able to wait. Only whoever 
honours a mystery gains the strength to wait. 29 
Heidegger then laments for the original finitude in human being that led it - inevitably 
though, since Destiny governs Being - to its inauthentic condition. Finitude is 
considered as a derogatory state of Fall, a state that deprives man of his original 
deinon essence. Heidegger laments, even more, for the degrading consequences of this 
decline, which culminated in the unprecedented emasculation of the spirit in the age 
29 Op. Cit., p. 35 1. 
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of contemporary western civilisation. 
For the basic fallacy underlying such modes of thought consists in the belief that 
history begins with the primitive and backward, the weak and helpless. The 
opposite is true. The beginning is strongest and mightiest. What comes afterward 
is not development but the flattening that results from mere spreading out; it is 
inability to retain the beginning; the beginning is emasculated and exaggerated into 
a caricature of greatness taken as purely numerical and quantitative size and 
extension. 30 
However, finitude might be overcome. The reverence of moral law now gives its place 
to the honouring of the mystery of Being, with the difference though, that it does not 
constitute an endless duty for every individual but a destined revelation of those who 
can respond to their fateful call. The humble finite being could then, by its 
confrontation with the mystery of Being, break its limits and dare a new hybris. But 
why hybris ? 
It is by addressing this question that we can gain the deeper and implicit significance 
of Heidegger's conception of finitude. For, what is most celebrated by Heidegger is 
not the moment of resolution toward the disclosure of Dasein in man, but rather the 
relentlessfutility of this act. Heidegger expounds this position in his analysis of the 
second strophe of Sophocles' poem, which, it is claimed, encapsulates in the deepest 
way the question on human essence. According to Heidegger's reading of the poem, 
the supreme manifestation of the enigmatic magnificence of the deinotaton human 
being consists in the inevitably self-destructive nature of his adventures. Man, the 
overpowerful, violent, creative fighter, ultimately comes to nothingness. 
For man, as he journeys everywhere, is not without issue in the external sense that 
he comes up against outward barriers and cannot go on. In one way or another he 
can always go further into the etceteras. He is without issue because he is always 
thrown back on the paths that he himself has laid out: he becomes mired in his 
paths, caught in the beaten track, and thus caught he compasses the circle of his 
IM., p. 155. 
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world, entangles himself in appearance, and so excludes himself from being ... The 
violence that originally creates the paths engenders its own mischief of versatility, 
which is intrinsically issueless 31 
Here, we can recover the deeper essence of human finitude, namely, man's issueless 
fight, even when he recalls the deinotaton in him, or rather even more so, exactly by 
virtue of this recalling. For man discovers the moment of infinity in him, only to 
realise even deeper the relentlessness of his radical finitude. The tragic recognition of 
this meaningless finitude though, seems to be the essence of a meaningful existence. 
Man sunk into forgetfulness can arise out from it, through a leap into remembering 
which, however, will turn out to be a fatal leap into the void. The latter appears to be 
the only dignified redemption from his original finitude, an act of artistic despair; an 
act that proves the original impossibility of the confrontation of man with the 
prevailing whole, and yet the hidden charm of this vain battle, which absorbs him in 
its vortex. 
Finitude stands again in abysmal opposition to infinity. The latter appears as the 
unconquerable prevailing whole, which engulfs in its seductive mystery whoever 
honours it. However, infinity appears in such a compelling, overpowerful mode, only 
to a being that posits itself as equal to it, namely posits itself with the intention of 
appropriating it and controlling it. For a being that does not harbour the projection of 
its absolute infinity, that does not long for eternity and immortality, would not feel 
shattered or threatened by this whole. The latter would generate to it not only feelings 
of awe and impotence but also those of wonder, curiosity, love and pleasure. This 
'whole' and the notion of infinity in turn, would not be perceived in its eternal, 
indestructible, omnipotent, and indeed personified absoluteness, but in its attractive, 
" IM., p. 15 g. 
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playful, terrifying and amusing, constraining and liberating , lawful and lawless 
diversity, where everything comes to-be, ceases to-be, and recurs in transmuted forms, 
in a process of incessant motion. Issueless results only as long as the issue is the 
conquest of infinity; as long as man attempts to discover his meaning in the projection 
of his absolute purification and despises the meaning of his contradictory present. 
Finitude, in Heidegger, is conceived in terms of a struggle for its overcoming. If in 
Kant this struggle remained an endless task, in Heidegger it appears in a reverse way, 
as the tragic celebration of the impossibility of its completion. This in turn, becomes a 
moment of heroic infinity, registered, possibly, in the golden pages of the "strangest 
and mightiest beginning", the honoured dawn of the history of humanity. 
Heidegger then seems to maintain the Kantian tradition of the concept of finitude. 
Finitude reminds imperfection, incompletion, deprivation, our non-creative 
dimension, a resentful 'not', what binds us and fetters us, what "draws us downward". 
Finitude, in this sense, namely fixation and termination of movement, stands for the 
conceptual counterpart of the mathematical definition of infinity, i. e. indefinite 
progressive or regressive sequence of abstract moments 
If in Kant's system finitude creates a self-humbling person, which perennially strives 
for the attainment of its theoretical and moral integrity, in Heidegger's, finitude 
signals the revelation of self-heroising creativity, which, however, exhausts its 
potential as a desperate, tragic leap in the abyss of the unconquerable absolute. 
Instead, we suggest that we should adopt a more dynamic approach toward the notion 
of finitude, which, in combination with another conceptualisation of infinity - as that 
mentioned above -, allows for a creative movement that does not derive from their 
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fixed roles, but from their paradoxical intertwinement 
The latter consists in conceiving of finitude as the necessary condition of incessant 
movement, diversity and freedom. This implies that we consider finitude as the 
necessitated termination of one state in order to give its place to another. 
Finitude then implies differentiation, movement, multiplicity. This should be 
understood in the context where finitude is apprehended as the manifestation of the 
exhaustion of the inner potential of expressibility of an entity. Exhaustion in turn, may 
occur either by means of transient fulfilment, completion, or through violent 
encounter and destructive interaction, in both cases, representing a dynamic process 
towards one's struggle of expressing his potential in a network of multiple 
interactions. Finitude may then describe a moment of dynamic completion of one 
phase of a process, which in turn, by virtue of its completion can generate new phases, 
further movement at a differentiated level. In this context, our suggestion is to 
interpret finitude in terms of excess. We can draw this meaning if we appeal to the 
etymological radix of the term limit in Greek, a method - i. e. resort to etymology - that 
Heidergger relishes so much. For the root of peras, i. e. limit in ancient Greek, which 
is Per, means too much, and generates the term peras, that signifies limit and the term 
peran, that signifies beyond, according to the verb pero which means to traverse. 
Finitude then as excess refers both to the excess that is required in the process of 
expressibiltity, in order for fulfilment to be attained but also to the excess which is 
displayed in the attempt to traverse, to pass beyond the limit. 
Finitude in this sense stands for the different shapes that the dynamic play of 
interacting potencies take, and from this point of view for the beautiful or the ugly. 
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Finitude stands for the interests of the potencies, as the latter may have been delimited 
in the battle of their encounters, contra to the all-powerful, disinterested and rather 
boring infinity- 32 
This meaning of finitude, i. e. as excess, encloses in itself the dimension of infinity, not 
in contrast but by virtue of its finitude. For it is the infinity of the excessive longing 
for expression, the excessive desire for reaching one's limits, and the excessive 
exertion of energy to even overcome these limits. This is possible the reason why the 
Greeks, who were so much afraid of trangressions (hybris), connected the perata 
(limits) with desmous (bondS)33 , and Parmenides put Ananke, Destiny, whom 
Heidegger always recalls, to bind the limits of the One. Heidegger seems to inherit 
from the Greeks more their bonds than their limits. 
32 For example, finitude manifested as the curvature of space-time unity, in Einstein's general theory of 
relativity, attests to the predominance of the interests of the gravitational forces. Also, the discontinuous 
and unpredictable emission of energy by means of quanta, i. e. finite quantities, gives us an example of 
finitude as the exhaustion of the inner potential of the entity which emits the energy. This scientific 
observation alludes to the idea that cosmic energy moves through ruptures and that space and time then, 
can no longer conceived in a uniform, abstract way, since they are defined by this very movement. 
33 In Homer, for example, when the companions of Odysseus bound him to the mast, they fastened the 
bonds around his uncontrollable limits, so that he might listen to Sirens in safety. But Oceanus, the 
begetter of everything, in Greek Mythology, is considered as limited, imagined as a circular river, in 
perpetual motion, whose limits are but the repetitive circles of its ongoing generative activity. 
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Appendix 11 
Andrew Bowie, in his Shelling and Modem European Philosophy, reads Schelling's concept 
of Identity in such a way that renders him precursor of Heidegger's ontic/ontological 
distinction, the disclosure of the Being of beings. 
Bowie quotes the following abstract of Schelling's text. 
Taken in an absolute sense, the proposition A=A does not claim that A exists at all, 
nor that A exists as subject or as predicate ...... In this proposition one can, therefore, 
abstract from everything, from the reality of A at all, as well as from its reality as 
subject and as predicate; but what absolutely cannot be abstracted from, and what 
remains as the sole reality in this proposition is the sameness (Gleichheit), or 
absolute identity itself, which is accordingly the true substance of knowledge in this 
proposition ..... The sameness does not exist via the subject and the object, but rather 
the other way round, only in so far as the sameness is, i. e., only in so far as both are 
one and the same, are subject and object as well. ' 
Then he comments as follows: 
There is, Schelling claims, a 'doubling of identity', in which the sameness of what is 
divided is only possible on the basis of a prior absolute identity. This can be 
explained by pondering the fact that the statement that two things are absolutely 
different is meaningless in that if they are absolutely different they are not even two 
things, and the statement refutes itself. 
if I say that the subject is the predicate, what is on each side of the proposition can 
change: the same person can be angry and not be angry at different times. What 
cannot change is the ontological priorfact that both subject and predicate are. The 
fact that they both are is the prior condition o their being identified with each other ýf 
as whatever kind of being they may be. This sameness might appear suspiciously 
like the night in which all cows are black, but the argument does not entail such a 
result. 2 
'Andrew Bowie, Schelling and Modern European Philosophy, p. 62 
2 Op. cit., P. 62 
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in order to clarify his last proposition, Bowie undertakes an explication of the relation 
between Absolute and particular beings. Here, he uses M. Frank's notion of transitive being. 
"Manfred Frank suggests that Schelling conceives of being as the 'transitive relationship of a 
subject to its predicates'. Instead of 'to be' functioning as an intransitive linking verb, in the 
,, 3 Absolute, things are transitively 'been'. 
From our school books on syntax, we know that the term 'transitive' is used for a verb when 
by the latter we assume the transition of energy on behalf of the subject towards the predicate. 
It is precisely this quality, which is here assigned to the Absolute, namely, the infusion of 
Infinite's breath into the lifeless particulars. It is indeed this line of thought that Bowie 
develops in the rest of this chapter. 
Our particular being as you or I, in which my identity is arrived at by my difference 
from you or all other yous, is 'affirmed' by a being which we cannot know as our 
own because that being cannot depend upon difference, which would be the 
condition of possibility of knowing it. 4 
Hence, the Absolute constitutes the higher Identity to which particulars are related. The latter, 
though, appear as mere links in the infinite chain of causal connections. 
Every single being is determined by another single being, which in its turn is 
determined by another single being, and so on into infinity. For as a single being it is 
not determined by itself, because it does not have the ground of its being in itself. 
But it is just as little determined for existence by God; for in God lies only the 
ground of the totality and of beings to the extent to which it is in the totality..... the 
single being..... can only be determined for existence by another single being; but the 
latter must, for the same reason, be determined again by another, and so on to 
infinity. 5 
-' Op. cit., p, 63 
4 Op. cit., p. 64 
1 Op. cit., p. 63 
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Therefore, the appearing world of objects is in fact the 'complete negation of true being'. The 
whole image is hardly original. It conjures Newton's cosmology, namely his deterministic 
conception of nature, along with the God's implanting of energy into it. More interesting 
though, is that this position (i. e. the relation of the Absolute to the appearing world) is 
presented as strictly monistic and, in addition, as a way to avoid relativism. The argument 
provided for the above claim, is based on the idea of the disclosure of Being, which always 
transcends any particular through which it is disclosed, as the eye discloses itself in its 
reflection but in fact transcends entirely the medium of its reflection, i. e. the mirror. 
Similarly, the One is like the eye, insofar as it discloses itself through the medium of the 
particulars and yet it transcends them as the eye transcends the mirror. This position requires 
the assumption of a hypostasised Absolute that would disclose itself as such through the 
particulars. It is this assumption that allows us, according to Bowie, to move beyond reflexive 
knowledge. Since the Absolute does not depend upon difference, we cannot 'know' it, yet we 
could 'feel' it through its disclosure: "to get to this Being we must, therefore, go beyond 
reflexive knowledge v6 , and let the One reveal itself in itself and therefore to us. But even if 
this is accepted, is still not sustainable why the manifestations of the Absolute should be 
conceived in an entirely finite way - by our limited and dependent faculties of reflective 
knowledge - while the Absolute itself could be felt in an infinite way, as if our ability even to 
be possessed by the Absolute is not limited as well. 
Accordingly, man is explained in terms of this dualistic account of the particular, i. e. on the 
one hand, as a being entirely dependent upon other particulars and therefore requiring a priori 
synthetic judgements to unify the differences in the field of rational knowledge, and on the 
other, as a mere isolated medium that allows the disclosure of the Infinite in the sphere of 
non-reflective cognition, namely the 'moral law' of aesthetic truth: the dichotomy of 
Op. Cit., p. 63 
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theoretical and practical reason once more and relativism attacked by the unquestioned 
validity of aesthetic theology. 
Heidegger himself seems to abandon an account of Identity that discloses itself through 
beings, when he conceives it as an 'event of appropriation' in a mutual and mediated 
correlation between man and Being 7. 'Events of appropriation' are taken to belong to the 
Same, where this Sameness itself is interpreted as active interaction, acts of mutual 
appropriation, mutual be-longing, recalling, thus, Schelling's notion of longing in the 
Philosophical Inquiries into the Nature of Human Freedom. 
7 Heidegger M., ldentiýy and Difference, p. 14, 
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